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SUMMARY
The unprecedented growth of computing power and communication bandwidth in the
last few decades has driven an explosion in the size and complexity of application software.
Specifically, it has spurred an almost universal adoption of modular and extensible software
designs, from ordinary PC applications, to operating systems kernels, and even to embedded
systems. In many cases, however, the ability to extend software systems has come hand in
hand with the need to isolate them from untrusted or potentially faulty extensions.
This dissertation will focus on the important problem of code isolation, where exist-
ing techniques vary in many and often interrelated dimensions such as granularity, code
complexity, invocation latency, dynamism, isolation strategy, permissible extension func-
tionality, and degree of integration with the operating system kernel. Specifically, the im-
plementation of a particular technique imposes restrictions on the properties of extensions.
Examples include proof-based techniques that are only applicable to simple extensions of
small granularity, hardware-based isolation techniques that typically incur a measurable
invocation latency due to hardware re-configuration overhead, and programming language
techniques that impose implementation and compiler restrictions.
The goal of this dissertation is to explore the design space of code isolation techniques,
identify characteristics of individual approaches, and then argue for and design a hybrid
approach that combines their advantages while avoiding their drawbacks. The contributions
of this thesis will be threefold: (1) a taxonomy of metrics and properties relevant to software
code isolation techniques, (2) the design and implementation of a novel hybrid architecture
for safe kernel extension with pliable characteristics, and (3) an evaluation of the hybrid





In the last three decades, the world has enjoyed a tremendous and sustained technological
rate of growth in terms of both the available computing and communication speeds and
of their penetration in society. Computing power has followed Moore’s Law of exponential
growth, doubling every 18 months and resulting in an annualized increase of about 60%.
Communication bandwidth has also grown exponentially, albeit at a slower annualized rate
of approximately 50%, and storage capacities, which have been lagging behind in relative
terms, are currently staging a comeback with an annualized growth rate of 100%. All
of these trends combined have revolutionized society and sped up almost every aspect of
modern life.
The resulting waves of innovation are generating new applications and improving existing
ones every day, and the pace is accelerating. To cope with the unrelenting pressure for
change, software systems have been evolving away from their static and inflexible origins
and towards more modular and adaptable designs. Extensibility has emerged as a property
essential for adaptation, and there exists a wide variety of approaches for software extension.
Virtually every type of software system today, from ordinary personal computer (PC)
applications, to operating system (OS) kernels, to exotic embedded systems employ or
benefit from some form of extensibility technology. Irrespective of their size, purpose,
or position in the software hierarchy, applications are making increasing use of plugins,
extensions, loadable drivers, or even plain shared libraries. Examples abound, and we
briefly mention a few representative ones.
User Software
Popular multimedia applications like XMMS [1], Xine [108], and MPlayer [72] (rich multi-
format audio and video players), and others such as the FireFox [71] web browser or the
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GIMP [31] image manipulation program have structures that are explicitly designed to
allow them to be augmented with or to modify their functionality through new extensions.
In the cases of XMMS, Xine, and MPlayer, a large number of plugins are available to
enable those applications to reproduce a wide variety of media formats, to deal with a
rich set of output devices, or even to simply give a custom look to their graphical user
interfaces. In the FireFox and GIMP cases, extensions are even more versatile and provide
a primary mechanism to adapt them to handle new web formats (e.g., Shockwave [3] and
Flash animations), to behavioral changes (e.g., pop-up ad blocking or tabbed browsing
in FireFox and new image processing algorithms in the GIMP), and even completely new
services (e.g., the BugMeNot [23] compulsory web registration bypass service). It is worth
mentioning that Emacs [28], one of the most popular text editors, is also the most extensible
one. Its wealth of packages is so large that Emacs transcends the boundaries of a mere
application and has turned into a complete work environment!
System Software
System software is code that is not under user control and is typically vital for the operation
of the system. For example, almost any executable running on top of a modern operating
system today makes use of shared objects (also known as dynamically linked libraries in
Microsoft Windows) that help to extend or adapt it to the peculiarities of the particular
execution environment. Examples are numerous and span a great range of libraries for
any given purpose from versions of OpenGL or DirectX graphics interfaces to the Linux
Pluggable Authentication Modules. A crucial advantage of shared objects vs. static libraries
is that, by acting as physically separate extensions, they afford great flexibility in altering
how individual applications interact with the system without having to modify or recompile
the actual applications.
OS Kernel
Because of their many benefits, extensions have found a place not only in applications, but
also in the underlying operating system kernels. Practically all major OS kernels in use
today support some form of extension. Initially spurred by the desire to be able to load
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and unload device drivers as needed on the fly, the technology was generalized for arbitrary
functionality resulting in the modern loadable kernel modules [19] that help to reduce a
kernel’s memory footprint and enable piecemeal dynamic runtime upgrades.
Pre-Boot Environment
Finally, as the ultimate testament to the usefulness of extensible design, we briefly mention
its use in software components even below the level of the OS kernel. The Extensible
Firmware Interface (EFI) is a recent Intel initiative to abstract the pre-boot environment
away from the details of the underlying BIOS or firmware and turn it into a uniform,
device-independent, and extensible environment.
1.2 Motivation
Clearly, extensibility has proved to be a tremendously beneficial technique. Indeed, a well-
accepted approach for increasing the adaptability of software systems is to equip them with
extension capabilities and use those to modify or increase their functionality at runtime.
However, this new found flexibility comes at the price of an increase in the system’s fragility
or vulnerability because of potentially buggy or even malicious extensions. Exposure to
such extension-borne risks is particularly important for privileged software systems like OS
kernel, but applies and is still important in unprivileged applications like web browsers or
multimedia players. In order to avoid failures, untrusted extensions need to be isolated
from the software they augment. This inherent asymmetry of trust leads to the following
two requirements to any extension architecture:
1. Safety: It must prevent the compromise of the safety of its host software, and
2. Performance: Its overheads should be small, lest they overwhelm or render useless
the benefits derived through the extensions.
Unfortunately, these requirements are antagonistic. One simple example of their conflict
is as follows. Attaining high performance by executing native code in the kernel’s address
space is possible but would ignore safety issues. Interpreting the untrusted code in a sand-
box would provide the desired safety but at the same time it will decrease performance
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significantly. Despite these difficulties, OS kernel extensions have proved to be a useful
adaptation and specialization model. Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the world’s most
popular OSs, Microsoft Windows, is also said to be one of the most extensible ones [104].
A large body of research has accumulated over the last decade focusing on ways of
safely extending OS kernels to specialize them or to adapt them to individual application
needs [12, 22, 102, 16, 29, 77, 51, 91, 103, 30, 13, 61, 84, 85].
Research approaches have employed theoretical, hardware-, or software-based methods
for code isolation. Each of these three classes of methods can be used to provide varying
levels of safety and performance and has its own general set of properties and characteristics
common to its members. We touch briefly on the relative qualities of these three general
classes:
1. Formal Methods use logic reasoning techniques to prove invariants of extensions and
safety properties about the behavior of their code. While their use in restricted
problem domains, e.g., the Microsoft driver verifier [8], has been successful, more
general approaches, such as Proof-Carrying Code [77] for example, have failed to
scale up and have remained practical only for limited code sizes.
2. Type-Safe Language approaches like SPIN [12], the Open Kernel Environment [13],
or more recently, Cyclone [51] and Microsoft Research’s Singularity [44] are based on
special properties of languages and/or trusted compilers. The restrictions they impose
on development environments, e.g., the Modula-3 language, SPIN’s special compiler
or Singularity’s Sing# language, detract from their practicality and use outside of
research lab prototypes.
3. Software-Based approaches fall into two subcategories: (1) interpreters and (2) soft-
ware fault isolation (SFI). Interpreters like the Berkeley Packet Filter [61] trade speed
for safety, and performance degradation makes them less fitting for critical infras-
tructure. SFI [102] rewrites untrusted machine code, inserting runtime protection
checks for memory references and jump-targets. Despite achieving performance su-
perior to that of interpreters, SFI approaches still incur a measurable performance
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penalty [77, 16] and require intricate and complex binary manipulations.
4. Hardware-Based techniques [53, 22, 107, 16] have formed a popular avenue of attack
to the problem. Generally, they are able to achieve native performance by configuring
the execution environment so that necessary runtime safety checks are carried out
by the CPU protection hardware. High performance is attained in terms of avoiding
per-instruction overheads, but limitations are imposed by various details of the pro-
tection hardware available, e.g., increased latency of invocation compared to a simple
procedure call. Additionally, there might be a need to modify certain OS compo-
nents. However, today’s largely mono-cultural hardware world, among other reasons,
is mitigating the impact of that latter criticism and making this approach increasingly
popular.
This short feature review is by no means comprehensive. Rather, it is only meant to
highlight that there are both distinct advantages and distinct drawbacks to each class of
techniques, as well as each individual technique in particular. The main point is that no
single proposal is capable of satisfying the complete spectrum of features along the multiple
dimensions of granularity, code complexity, invocation latency, dynamism, isolation strategy,
permissible extension functionality, and degree of integration with the host kernel.
This thesis will focus on the need for an extension architecture that is sufficiently mal-
leable to address the extremes of the medley of assorted requirements as well as combinations
of them. We propose a hybrid approach to code isolation as we believe it provides a unique
opportunity for overcoming the drawbacks of individual techniques.
1.3 Terminology
This section briefly defines the meaning of some terms and notions in the context of this
thesis.
OS Extension: An OS extension, henceforth simply termed extension, is the logical
unit of functionality that an application deposits into the OS kernel in order to adapt
some aspect of it. Extensions are deployed to either modify the behavior or to enhance the
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functionality of a kernel service, subsystem, or driver. Examples include, but are not limited
to, custom metrics to a thread scheduler, algorithms for page victim selection, networking
filter code, etc. They typically consists of one or a number of routines.
Routine: Routines are the basic building blocks of extensions. As in regular programs,
they serve to impart structure or to encapsulate commonly repeated functionality. Routines
can return values like functions or simply serve as procedural containers for code.
Namespace: A namespace refers to the set of symbols that are available to an ex-
tension during its runtime. This set consists of the symbols corresponding to its routines,
supplied by the extending application, joined with the set of kernel symbols explicitly ex-
ported to that extension by the kernel service or subsystem that it adapts. The latter type of
symbols need not necessarily refer to internal kernel interfaces directly. Instead, they might
refer to interposed wrapper functions that check, limit, or sanitize the kernel-extension
interaction and information exchange during runtime.
Latency: Latency is a metric defined as the period of apparent inactivity between
the time that a stimulus is presented and the moment that a response occurs. In the
context of this dissertation, the latency overhead is an important parameter intrinsic to the
various isolation technologies employed to ensure the host kernel’s safety from untrusted
extensions. Specifically, latency will refer to the amount of wall-clock time elapsing between
the execution of the first machine instruction of a kernel to extension invocation and the
execution of the first instruction of the extension, or vice versa. Essentially, latency is a
measure of how “reactive” different extension isolation technologies are.
Throughput: Throughput is another metric, defined as the rate at which a processor
can perform some action expressed as units of work per units of time. In the context of this
dissertation, throughput is another important parameter intrinsic to the various isolation
technologies employed. Specifically, throughput will refer to the number of times that a null
extension can be executed by the host kernel in a single unit of time. Thus, throughput
will be used as a measure of the pure cost of some isolation technique.
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1.4 Thesis
Modern servers and desktops are general purpose systems, yet they are increasingly required
to perform an ever widening number of specialized tasks. Their oftentimes conflicting
demands require OS kernels to be adaptable through custom extensions.
This dissertation’s thesis is that:
A hybrid approach to safe runtime OS kernel adaptation is capable
of increased functionality and flexibility thanks to combining the ad-
vantages of a variety of individual isolation techniques while avoiding
their respective drawbacks. The resulting hybrid kernel extensions
are malleable and more general than homogeneous alternatives.
The goal of the dissertation is to explore the design space of isolation and extension tech-
niques, identify characteristics of individual approaches, and design a hybrid architecture
that combines their advantages while avoiding their drawbacks.
The contributions of this dissertation are threefold:
1. A taxonomy of metrics and properties relevant to software extensions and an associ-
ated classification of existing approaches.
2. Design and implementation of a novel hybrid infrastructure for safe kernel adaptation
that enables extensions isolated through a hybrid combination of different techniques.
3. Evaluation and comparison of the proposed hybrid approach to homogeneous alter-
natives.
1.5 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces a set of isolation requirements, a formal completeness argument,
and a classification system based on it.
Chapter 3 presents a novel hybrid code isolation technique based on complementary
elements of software- and hardware-fault isolation.
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Chapter 4 details the experimental evaluation of the proposed hybrid isolation tech-
nique and hybrid extension architecture and compares them against homogeneous alterna-
tives.
Chapter 5 reviews related work on extensible kernels.




Attempts to characterize any set of distinct programmatic techniques in general, and code
isolation techniques in particular, requires that we compare and contrast descriptions of
the alternative techniques’ characteristic features. A systematic approach to such a com-
parison becomes all the more important when one’s goal is not only to characterize, but
also to compare and exploit their differences as in the hybrid approach presented in this
dissertation. To aid in the latter, this chapter is devoted to formulating a complete set of re-
quirements that any code isolation technique must satisfy and then proposing an associated
classification.
The invocation of foreign code involves a transfer, and thus at least a temporary loss,
of execution control. It also involves the risk of disallowed or undesirable data modification
by the foreign code. Informally, it seems natural and self-evident then, that the following
characteristics of untrusted code must be controlled:
1. its access to data,
2. its ability to direct the flow of control,
3. its ability to influence the execution environment, and
4. its running time.
We assert that this set of requirements is complete in the sense that it provides for
the complete isolation or shielding of a trusted application from an untrusted or foreign
code extension. In order to provide a formal foundation for our assertion, we next for-
mulate a completeness argument in the context of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
This formulation also allows us to simplify the problem by abstracting away many complex
implementation details of modern computing architectures.
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Figure 1: An Ordinary Turing Machine.
2.1 Formal Basis
Turing machines are simple abstract computational devices initially proposed as convenient
means of investigating the extent and limitations of what can be computed. They were first
described by Alan Turing in 1936 [98] and despite their simplicity, they have been shown
to be able to simulate the logic of any computer that can be constructed.
Many possible definitions for what constitutes a Turing machine exist, ranging from
the mathematically abstract state automata to the physically feasible, albeit impractical,
mechanical automatons [67]. As they have all been shown to be equivalent, we choose to
use the simplest single-tape mechanical description of such a machine for our completeness
arguments.
A single-tape Ordinary Turing Machine (OTM), such as the one shown in Figure 1, is
essentially defined as an automaton that has only a finite number of internal states and an
infinitely long data tape on which it can read, write, and erase symbols. The tape can move
one space at a time in either direction.
While general, Ordinary Turing Machines are static in the sense that each machine
is limited to implementing the one algorithm for which its internal states are expressly
constructed. In contrast, a Universal Turing Machine can perform any operation of any
other Ordinary Turing Machine. This is achieved by means of complex instructions provided
on its tape along with input data and in effect make it programmable.
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Figure 2: A Universal Turing Machine.
A Universal Turing Machine, like the one depicted in Figure 2, receives a complete
symbolic description of the machine it is expected to emulate on one (finite) part of its
tape. The rest of the unbounded tape is used for storing input/output data, as well as for
scratch space on which the UTM can record the current state of the imitated machine, the
tape position it is scanning, etc.
As described, Universal Turing Machines possess a number of key characteristics that
make them an excellent model in which to study the completeness of our set of requirements
for code isolation. Those characteristics are:
1. Programmable: since UTMs are programmable, they constitute a direct and intuitive
analogue to any modern digital computer.
2. von Neumann: because, loosely speaking, the ‘code’ or program being executed re-
sides on the same tape as the input/output ‘data’ being operated on, UTMs have
an inherently von Neumann architecture closely resembling that of modern digital
computers.
3. Simple: UTMs have an uncomplicated structure, despite being computationally equiv-
alent to modern machines. This is important, as it allows our arguments to sidestep
many nonessential details of actual hardware, such as user/kernel modes, privilege
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Figure 3: A Universal Turing Machine interpreting an extended Ordinary Turing Machine.
rings, interrupts and exceptions, caches, etc.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider an Universal Turing Machine that
is simulating an Ordinary Turing Machine (the application), the state-description of which
has been augmented with additional states (the extension). Our aim will be to draw a direct
analogy with a general purpose computer running an application that has been augmented
with an extension – a plugin, dynamic library, etc. An underlying assumption is that in
contrast to the main program, the extension is untrusted and must be isolated and prevented
from interfering with the latter.
Figure 3 is a visual representation of the backdrop for the discussion in the rest of this
chapter. It features a Universal Turing Machine depicted by a rectangle with an inverted
trapezoid read/write head and a finite number of UTM machine states represented with
Greek letters comprising its fixed simulation logic. Below it is the UTM’s infinite tape split
into three regions: two finite ‘code’ regions and an infinite ‘data’ region. The former are
represented by capital Latin letters with the letters A-G representing the description of the
application simulated by the UTM and XA-XD representing the additional state description
of the untrusted extension. The remainder of the tape extends infinitely to the right and
represents both the application’s and the extension’s input/output data and scratch space.
Albeit simple in structure and with strictly finite state descriptions, Turing machines
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can describe arbitrarily complex algorithms thanks to the unlimited amount of scratch
space that can be stored on their infinite tapes. The deliberate lack of a limit is a critically
important for the expressive power of the machines and must be preserved with respect
to both the application and the extension. Thus, it merits a brief mention that the setup
described in Figure 3 can accommodate this infinite nature, e.g. by assigning positions
in the unbounded right portion of the tape to the application and to the extension in an
alternating fashion.
The remainder of this chapter concerns the vulnerabilities of machines. Toward this
end, we enumerate the individual components of our Universal Turing Machine and sys-
tematically analyze their avenues of exposure – the ways in which their functions can be
taken advantage of or interfered with by malicious or buggy extensions.
2.2 Attack Types
In the computer security literature, it is widely accepted [95, 81] that a secure system must
have all of the following properties:
• Confidentiality: A system should only be read accessible to authorized parties,
• Integrity: System assets should only be modifiable by authorized parties,
• Availability: System assets should be available to authorized parties, and
• Authenticity: A system should be able to verify the identity of its users.
The purpose of any computer security system is to ensure that all of these properties
are always valid. The types of threats to these properties fall into 4 major categories, as
identified by Stallings [95] and Oppliger [81]:
• Interruption is an attack on Availability whereby the normal operation of the system
is interrupted in some way or is completely denied,
• Interception is an attack on Confidentiality whereby an unauthorized party is able
to gain access to an asset,
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Figure 4: Types of attacks: (a) Interruption, (b) Interception, (c) Modification, (d) Fab-
rication.
• Modification is an attack on Integrity whereby an unauthorized party not only gains
access but also tampers with an asset, and
• Fabrication is an attack on Authenticity whereby an unauthorized party is able to
impersonate an authorized party and/or to insert counterfeit objects into the system.
Figure 4 provides a simple visual representation of the 4 categories of attacks in terms
of abstract communicating entities. Bearing this classification in mind, we now focus on the
component objects that make up our UTM model. We analyze the types of attacks appli-
cable to each of them, and finally distill a formally complete set of isolation requirements.
2.3 Attack Targets
The simple structure of the Universal Turing Machine in Figure 3 makes it easy to identify
an exhaustive list of components. The short list includes the following:
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• State Automaton: The UTM state automaton consists of the UTM ‘execution unit’,
which holds the current state and realizes its state transitions, as well as the finite
set of all possible states – α through σ. The former can be viewed as analogous to a
central processing unit and the latter, perhaps, to its microcode.
• Read/Write Head: The UTM’s read/write head is the inverted trapezoid situated
below the state automaton. It provides the UTM with access to both its program and
its data. It is analogous to a modern computer’s I/O hardware such as I/O-buses,
disk controllers, etc.
• Tape: The UTM tape is the endless strip of symbols sitting immediately below the
UTM’s read/write head. It corresponds to a computer’s temporary and persistent
storage systems such as RAM memory, hard disks, CD/DVD drives, etc.
In terms of our attack model, we will regard the UTM “hardware”, as well as the main
application description as benevolent and trustworthy. Hence, we concentrate our attention,
first, on identifying the ways in which untrusted extension software can manipulate them to
interfere with their proper operation, and second, on describing possible countermeasures.
2.3.1 State Automaton
Once a malicious extension obtains the interpretive control of the UTM state automaton,
it is in a good position to perform a ‘Denial of Service’ (DoS) attack against the UTM by
simply monopolizing the thread of control and starving competing applications. Denial of
service attacks assault the Availability property of the UTM and fall under the Interruption
attack category in our classification scheme. This highlights the need for a mechanism
for Timing Isolation, i.e. for the enforcement of some upper limit of execution ‘time’
allocated to untrusted extensions and for forceful preemption of delinquent code.
A different avenue for abuse of interpretive control of the UTM is to direct it in a harmful
way. Realistic computer code is rarely self-sufficient and oftentimes relies on libraries and
external services such as those provided by an operating system. The ability of untrusted
code to transfer control to external services in arbitrary ways, however, raises the possibility
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of misuse. Clever selection of external targets can be used to bypass restrictions, e.g. calling
panic() to crash the machine, spin lock() to monopolize or block system resources, or
even transferring control to the middle of a function to circumvent parameter verification
checks. Such attacks fall into the Fabrication category, as their effects can be equivalent
to violating the system’s Authenticity property. Preventing this type of attack requires the
imposition of Execution Control on untrusted code and limiting its ability to direct the
flow of control only to well-defined and safe entry points.
Finally, as its name suggests, the UTM state automaton is stateful itself. This compels
us to consider the possibility of malicious extensions manipulating its state. Such attacks
can be thought of as a formalization of the general idea of exploiting specific features of the
implementation of an execution machine, e.g. exploiting instructions that disable interrupts,
swap page table bases, etc. This constitutes another kind of Fabrication attack. It suggests
the need for Code Vetting by the UTM state machine to monitor and restrict the use of
state-changing primitives by untrusted extensions to a small set formed on the basis of a
minimalistic ‘need-to-use’ principle.
2.3.2 Read/Write Head
Because the head serves as the main I/O abstraction of our UTM, it represents the gateway
to both its scratch space (analogous to RAM) as well as its input and output (analogous
to disks). However, by virtue of the fact that both application and extension share those
mediums, it is possible for each of them, in particular for the untrusted extension, to
gain access to the resources of the other. This constitutes an Interception attack on the
Confidentiality of the system and motivates the need for the access device to implement a
Memory Isolation policy based on the identity of the executing code.
Moreover, the write function of the head raises the specter of destructive unauthorized
access to data, and the von Neumann architecture of our UTM model raises the even graver
possibility of malicious code alteration. These are Modification type attacks against the




The tape is the final building block of our UTM. Like its real-life analogues – stable storage
devices – it does not play an active role in execution of the thread of control, but rather
it acts as a passive medium holding raw input/output data and code. The lack of control
functions obviates the need for special isolation requirements from the UTM tape.
2.4 Summary
To summarize, in this chapter we have presented a generic formal model of a computing
machine and combined it with a taxonomy of security attacks. We have systematically
analyzed all parts of the model with respect to the attack taxonomy and have identified all
available avenues of security exposure. From the latter, we have derived a complete and
exhaustive set of requirements, necessary in order to achieve comprehensive isolation among
active execution contexts. For convenience, we distill that set below:
• Memory Isolation: prescribes the imposition of limitations on both ‘read’ and
‘write’ accesses to storage (be it real memory, or abstract tape) and forms the basis
for protection among address spaces. In this way it also provides the foundation for
protection against code modifications exploiting the von Neumann architecture.
• Execution Control: stipulates the enforcement of strict constraints over the ability
of untrusted code to direct the flow of execution control. It restricts allowable branch
targets only to well-defined entry points of explicitly authorized services.
• Timing Control: dictates the establishment of upper bounds on the permissible
runtime of untrusted code and forceful preemption for violations of the constraint.
Thus, timing control helps to prevent denial of service attacks and to ensure the
liveness of the system.
• Code Vetting: prevents exploits of the stateful nature of the UTM by requiring that
dangerous state transitions be identified and be made unavailable to untrusted code.
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We continue with a closer look at the implementation details of various practical code




This chapter describes the technical underpinnings of the central contribution of this dis-
sertation, namely the proposal of a ‘hybrid’ approach to code isolation. We advocate the
simultaneous use of a heterogeneous mix of isolation techniques, each of which is aimed at a
particular isolation criterion, and whose union covers the complete set of such requirements.
Although there are many techniques that can simultaneously satisfy multiple isolation
requirements, their use typically results in loss of flexibility and/or arbitrary restrictions,
e.g., implementation language lock-in, hardware limitations, etc. Hence, the key benefits
of a hybrid scheme are both increased flexibility and improved performance delivered by
means of alternative implementation venues.
In the remainder of this chapter, we explore the technical details of an actual hybrid
prototype composed from a combination of popular individual techniques. In the first half
of the chapter, we focus on the implementation and distinctive features of a few concrete
homogeneous techniques. We discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and propose some
improvements. In the second part of the chapter, we describe how distinct techniques can
be blended together into a heterogeneous hybrid prototype with improved properties.
To better illustrate the technical points throughout the discussion, we provide simple
code examples in a high-level language, as well as in low-level IA-32 assembly [47, 48].
Many of the code snippets come from a simple PPM image grayscaling code, while a larger
and more realistic example is provided in Appendix B. The latter consists of the computa-
tional kernel of Edgebreaker – a state-of-the-art compression algorithm for triangle mesh 3D
model descriptions. Because of its size, we focus on a subset of the Edgebreaker reference
implementation in Appendix B. The complete source code is available online [87].
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3.1 Homogeneous Techniques
The homogeneous techniques considered are representative of two well-known, if antago-
nistic, categories, namely ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ fault isolation. In the former category,
restrictions are enforced through some form of software manipulation at compile-, load-,
or run-time. In contrast, the latter employ features of the underlying physical hardware,
which are reconfigured in such a way as to achieve the desired constraints.
3.1.1 Software Fault Isolation
The first homogeneous technique considered is generally known as ‘Software Fault Isolation’
(SFI). It is also known as ‘sandboxing’, since it can be thought of as executing unsafe
extension code inside a limited sandboxed execution environment where it can do no harm.
SFI was first described by Wahbe et.al. [102] as an alternative to hardware fault isolation
and a means for reducing the communication costs experienced by software extensions at
the expense of increased execution time. It operates by modifying extensions’ object code to
place them in a faulting domain that is logically separate from their host application. While
Wahbe et.al.’s technique was initially described and implemented in the context of a MIPS
RISC-processor based machine, CISC-processor versions have been devised in later years,
such as Small and Seltzer’s MiSFIT [94] and McCamant and Morrisett’s PittSFIeld [60],
both targeted at the Intel IA-32.
The basic idea of sandboxing is to take a potentially unsafe extension, transform its
code by inserting checking and fault handling instructions interspersed wherever any kind
of fault may occur, and then link and proceed to execute the extension directly as part of
its host application.
In order for sandboxing to succeed, all possible sources of runtime faults must be inter-
cepted before the fault has affected the execution environment. Many such sources exist,
each violating one of the isolation requirements from Chapter 2.
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Listing 1: An example usage of code sanitizing through dynamic binary rewriting. In this
synthetic example, the unsafe instruction LGDT in line 3 is sanitized by rewriting it into a
series of null operation NOP instructions.
1 movl $0x3 ,%eax movl $0x3 ,%eax
2 addl %eax,%ebx addl %eax,%ebx
3 lgdtl $0x12345678 => nop ; nop ; . . . nop # trans fo rmat ion
4 movl %eax,%ebx movl %eax,%ebx
5 addl %ebx,%ebx addl %ebx,%ebx
3.1.1.1 Code Vetting
Ultimately, after sandboxing has been performed, extension and host code execute directly
on the same hardware. Hence, there is a potential for a malicious extension to execute
code that reconfigures the hardware and thus impacts its host application. Numerous such
examples can be given, ranging from instructions like LGDT, LLDT, and LIDT, which set
the bases of vitally important descriptor tables that control the CPU, to interrupt control
instructions like CLI, STI, and POPF, which can interfere with the mutual exclusion property
of critical sections. Most of these unsafe instructions have no valid use in extensions and
thus should never appear in them. This makes such extensions easy to detect and deal with,
by either rejecting them outright or ‘sanitizing’ the unsafe instructions.
The details of these approaches necessarily depend on the form that extensions take. If
distributed as source code, extensions can be compiled by a trusted code generator on the
fly and thus be code vetted by construction. If distributed in binary form, code vetting can
be achieved by disassembling extensions’ object code and verifying the absence of unsafe
instructions. A more powerful and complex process of code vetting by ‘sanitizing’ unsafe
instructions is through dynamic binary rewriting, a technique capable of modifying and/or
inserting object code into an already compiled binary, essentially turning unsafe code into
null operations. Listing 1 provides a visual example of how dynamic binary rewriting could
be used to sanitize potentially unsafe instructions into safe, empty ones.
3.1.1.2 Memory Isolation
Because host and extension share the execution environment, the need arises for the former
to protect its data from the latter. Hence, in-core data stored in random access memory
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Figure 5: Memory segment restrictions for the sandboxing code from Listing 2.
Listing 2: Memory access verification code that can deal with the most general form
of IA-32 indirect addressing as well as with arbitrary (byte granularity) memory segment
boundaries and sizes. Lines 1–7 sandbox the memory reference on line 8.
1 pushl %eax # save temporary r e g i s t e r
2 l ea l 0x1(%ebx) ,%eax # compute e f f e c t i v e address
3 cmpl %eax ,$LO BOUND # compare to low segment bound
4 jb out o f bounds # handle low bound v i o l a t i o n s
5 cmpl %eax , $HI BOUND # compare to high segment bound
6 jae out o f bounds # handle high bound v i o l a t i o n s
7 popl %eax # re s t o r e temporary r e g i s t e r
8 movzbl 0x1(%ebx) ,%eax # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
is vitally important to any isolation scheme. Lacking any memory protection measures,
in-core data is directly accessible to whichever code controls the CPU at the moment.
The general approach for sandboxing memory isolation is to separate each extension
into its own contiguous logical memory segments and then to inspect and possibly modify
its object code in such a way as to prevent unauthorized external memory references. Each
segment is assigned separate access rights. Code segments, for example, can be either
readable or not, but are always immutable in order to guard against self-modifying code
attacks. In contrast, data segments can be readable, writable, or both, but cannot be the
target of execution control transfers, to prevent execution of synthetic code.
In order to verify each memory reference for conformance to these restrictions, however,
its target must be computed. In the case of direct addressing, this is trivial because the
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Figure 6: Memory segment restrictions for the isolation code from Listing 3.
Listing 3: Faster memory access verification code that can also deal with the most gen-
eral form of IA-32 indirect addressing, but requires memory segments of 2N byte size and
alignment. Lines 1–6 sandbox the memory reference on line 7.
1 pushl %eax # save temporary r e g i s t e r
2 l ea l 0x1(%ebx) ,%eax # compute e f f e c t i v e address
3 andl $BIT MASK,%eax # mask−o f f low−order b i t s
4 cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax # compare high−order b i t s
5 jne out o f bounds # handle v i o l a t i o n
6 popl %eax # re s t o r e temporary r e g i s t e r
7 movzbl 0x1(%ebx) ,%eax # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
fixed target is readily available as part of the binary instruction code. Hence, direct ad-
dressed memory references can be verified at a low one-time cost during the loading stage
of the extension and will not incur any further runtime overhead. The targets of indirect-
addressed memory references, however, cannot be known at load time because they are
variable and depend on the values of the registers used in the address calculation at the
moment of execution. Therefore, sandboxing indirect addressed memory references requires
the insertion of dynamic checks into the binary.
The most general form of indirect addressing allows the computation of the effective-
address to include a base address, an offset, and a scaled index combined according to the
formula:
BASE + Roffset + Rindex ∗ SCALE
Expressed as:
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Figure 7: Memory segment layout with top and bottom guard buffers. Used with the
sandboxing code from Listing 4.
BASE(Roffset, Rindex, SCALE)
in the GNU Assembler syntax, also known as AT&T syntax, that is used throughout
this document.
The IA-32 instruction set requires the presence of at least one argument of the sum,
but allows any permutation in which all or some of the remaining arguments are omitted.
It offers a lot of flexibility by permitting any CPU register, including word and byte sub-
registers like %ax, %ah, %al, etc., to be used in the offset and index, but it limits the scale
factor of the index to the numbers 1, 2, 4, or 8. The base can be any number, but both
the base and the index scale must be fixed and known at compile time because they are
encoded into the binary representation of the instruction.
The implementation of memory reference sandboxing involves a compromise between
two interrelated parameters: the alignment and size restrictions on the choice of memory
regions on the one hand, and the speed and efficiency of the associated sandboxing code on
the other hand. Implementations trade flexible choice of memory segments’ parameters for
optimized verification code as shown in Figure 6 and Listing 3, or vice versa as in Figure 5
and Listing 2.
In the interest of completeness, we should mention another alternative that is aimed
at avoiding the need to compute the effective-address of the target. It relies on allocating
exclusion buffer zones adjacent to each memory segment that are big enough to cover
24
Listing 4: (a) A fixed base is statically verifiable at load time, (b) operates on buffered,
2N byte sized/aligned segments and eliminates effective-address computation but still re-
quires saving/restoring of the base address due to a destructive check, (c) operates on
buffered segments of arbitrary size/alignment and eliminates the need for both effective-
address computation and for saving/restoring the base address, thanks to a non-destructive
check.
1 # (a )
2 movl $0x3 ,(%eax,%ebx , 4 ) # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
3
4 # (b)
5 pushl %eax # save temporary r e g i s t e r
6 andl $BIT MASK,%eax # mask−o f f low−order b i t s
7 cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax # compare high−order b i t s
8 jne out o f bounds # handle v i o l a t i o n
9 popl %eax # re s t o r e temporary r e g i s t e r
10 movl $0x3 ,(%eax,%ebx , 4 ) # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
11
12 # ( c )
13 cmpl %eax ,$LO BOUND # compare to low segment bound
14 jb out o f bounds # handle low bound v i o l a t i o n s
15 cmpl %eax , $HI BOUND # compare to high segment bound
16 jae out o f bounds # handle high bound v i o l a t i o n s
17 movl $0x3 ,(%eax,%ebx , 4 ) # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
the largest offset computable with that instruction set’s indirect addressing modes. Then,
the validity of each indirect memory access can be determined by verifying only that its
base address falls within the original memory segment, as any possible offset will at most
displace it within the safe buffer zones. Examples of this technique are shown in Figure 7
and Listing 4.
Given the IA-32 architecture’s considerable freedom in the formation of indirect mode
effective-addresses and the large size of the registers that can be used as offsets and indices,
the buffered approach would waste a significant amount of memory as guard buffers. Al-
lowing for 32-bit offset and index registers would actually require guard buffers covering the
whole address space. Therefore, this approach is not well suited to the IA-32 architecture
and is only appropriate on platforms with more restricted indirect addressing modes.
Furthermore, there is a simple optimization that can be applied equally well to all
sandboxing techniques. Similar to a compiler optimization, it reduces the cost of sandboxing
by custom tailoring the verification code in the simpler cases of indirect mode addressing
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Listing 5: Generic optimizations for sandboxing memory isolation code applicable for
simple use of indirect addressing mode where the effective-address is pre-computed in a
single register. (a) arbitrary memory regions, (b) 2N byte sized/aligned memory regions.
1 # (a )
2 # ELIMINATED: save temporary r e g i s t e r
3 # ELIMINATED: e f f e c t i v e address computations
4 cmpl %edi ,$LO BOUND # compare to low segment bound
5 jb out o f bounds # handle low bound v i o l a t i o n s
6 cmpl %edi , $HI BOUND # compare to high segment bound
7 jae out o f bounds # handle high bound v i o l a t i o n s
8 # ELIMINATED: r e s t o r e temporary r e g i s t e r




13 pushl %edi # save temporary r e g i s t e r
14 # ELIMINATED: e f f e c t i v e address computations
15 andl $BIT MASK,%edi # mask−o f f low−order b i t s
16 cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%edi # compare high−order b i t s
17 jne out o f bounds # handle v i o l a t i o n
18 popl %edi # re s t o r e temporary r e g i s t e r
19 movb %dl ,(%edi ) # o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n
where the effective-address requires no computation and is already easily accessible in a
platform register. An example of this optimization is detailed in Listing 5. Depending on
the memory segment model, it can eliminate from 1 to 3 instructions from each verification
instance resulting in approximately 40% cost reduction (3 out of 7 instructions) in those
cases.
3.1.1.3 Execution Control
Every time a host application makes use of an extension, it necessarily relinquishes, albeit
temporarily, control of the execution environment to that extension. The latter is then
generally able to direct the flow of control in an arbitrary way. This fact necessitates
the imposition of flow control restrictions on software fault-isolated extensions in order to
contain them within the confines of their sandboxes.
As illustrated in Figure 8, flow control falls into two categories: external, which takes
the form of callbacks into the host application or OS and is typically used to obtain services
needed by the extension, and internal, which implements coding logic and takes the form
of intra-extension jumps, branches, and calls.
26
Figure 8: Execution control restricts external callbacks only to explicitly allowed service
entry points and also guards against internal misaligned instruction decoding attacks such
as the one shown in Listing 7.
Listing 6: An example of a misaligned callback attack. It shows how, if allowed to invoke
an arbitrary callback entry point, an extension can circumvent protection mechanisms, or
even invoke dangerous external symbols, e.g., panic(), etc.
1 int s e r v i c e c a l l b a c k ( int extID , . . . )
2 {
3 normal entry po int −> i f ( ! p r i v i l e g e d ( extID ) )
4 return ERROR NO PRIVILEGE;
5
6 spoofed entry po int −> /∗
7 ∗ Se rv i c e code . . .
8 ∗/
9
10 return 0 ;
11 }
Restrictions on the flow of control are needed for both categories. In the former, the
unchecked choice of callback entry points could allow a malicious extension to circumvent
parameter checks (see Listing 6) and could lead to disastrous results ranging from security
violations to crashes. In the latter, a malicious extension running on a variable instruc-
tion length architecture could exploit misaligned instruction decoding and circumvent code
vetting and execute arbitrary code with disastrous results.
Code vetting guarantees that the machine instructions that make up a sandboxed ex-
tension do not include any that can impact the execution environment in an unsafe way.
On fixed instruction set architectures, the flow of control can only be directed at the fixed
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Listing 7: An example of a misaligned instruction decoding attack. It shows how an oth-
erwise innocuous instruction (line 3) can be decoded as malicious code halting the machine
(lines 7–8) through a misaligned branch to its tail fraction.
1 # Of f s e t Object−Code Insn Operands
2




7 0 : b8 90 90 .byte 0xb8 , 0x90 , 0x90
8 3 : f 4 c l i # DANGER!
9 4 : f a hlt # DANGER!
10 5 :
instruction boundaries, so there is no room for instruction misinterpretation.
On variable instruction length architectures, however, the flow of control can be directed
at a finer byte granularity. This makes it possible to construct machine code in such a way
that it decodes as innocuous instructions when accessed properly aligned, thus allowing it
to slip under the radar of code vetting, but decode as unsafe instructions when accessed
misaligned. An example of such code for the IA-32 architecture is shown in Listing 7.
The concrete implementation details of internal flow control are both similar and differ-
ent among techniques. The similarity is that all techniques rely on rewriting the binary and
the injection of additional target verification code before each indirect branch. The more
important differences, however, lie in the way in which the set of allowable branch targets
is determined.
Execution Control in MiSFIT
MiSFIT [93, 94] is one of the first software fault isolation tools. Developed by Small and
Seltzer at Harvard University, it was designed to operate as a filter stage to the assembly
output of gcc, the C compiler that is part of the GNU Compiler Collection [27]. Because it
operates on source code, albeit low-level assembly source code, MiSFIT is able to glean and
exploit semantic information about the set of valid control flow targets in a program, which
is lost after the final compilation. It builds a table of legitimate targets by enumerating
all the labels and procedure entry points in the intermediate assembly and then injects
sandboxing code before each indirect control transfer instruction that checks the actual
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runtime target for presence in the table.
To limit the table search time in the face of a potentially large number of valid target
addresses, MiSFIT implements the table as a sparse, open addressed hash table, claiming
near-linear search time [94]. The table is stored as an array where the hash of the key
(target address) yields an index into the array to check. Effectively, the hash bucket size is
1, and collisions are handled by overflowing into the next bucket. That is, if an item hashes
to slot n that is already occupied, the insertion algorithm attempts to successively place
it in n + 1, n + 2, etc., until it succeeds. An advantage to this open addressed hashing is
that if the original slot fails to produce a match during a lookup, the next few successive
slots to be checked are likely to already be present in the cache because they are adjacent.
Thus, even if a probe fails, the cost of subsequent probes is reduced. Furthermore, the
arrangement allows one to trade table size vs. lookup speed because increasing the size of
the hash table decreases its density. Assuming a hashing function that spreads the items
around evenly, in theory the number of probes per lookup can be reduced to near-constant.
As noted by Small et.al., an evenly distributed table with a density of 50% will require
an average of 1.5 probes per lookup. This is important as indirect control transfers are
quite common, constituting the implementation of choice for switch statements, function
pointers, object dispatch tables, and procedure returns. Listing 8 provides an illustration
of the code transformations MiSFIT performs in order to instrument the indirect control
transfers in a sandboxed binary.
MiSFIT is programming language agnostic, as it is essentially an additional back-end
stage of the compiler. For the same reason, however, it suffers a drawback in that it is
not applicable to legacy or proprietary extensions for which source code may not be readily
available. Furthermore, MiSFIT’s approach presents a trade-off between the size of the
hash-table and the speed of control transfer target verification.
Execution Control in PittSFIeld
PittSFIeld [59, 60] is a software fault isolation tool for the IA-32 architecture developed
by McCamant and Morrisett at MIT. Like MiSFIT, it takes the form of a filter for gcc
generated assembly, but unlike it, it employs a sharply contrasting approach to sandboxing.
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Listing 8: MiSFIT code transformations for sandboxing of indirect control transfers. (a)
original indirect control transfer, and (b) sandboxed by MiSFIT (code extracted from the
MiSFIT 0.2 distribution).
1 # (a )






8 movl %edi ,%eax




13 m i s f i t i n d c a l l f r o m g r a f t :
14 pushl %es i
15 movl %eax,%es i # save o r i g i n a l t a r g e t addr
16
17 cmpl $0 ,%eax # jumping to NULL?
18 je 3 f
19 1 :
20 movl mi s f i t ha sh t ab l e ,%ecx # get base o f t ab l e
21 andl misf i t hashmask ,%eax # and in mask
22 addl %eax,%ecx # load the t e s t word
23 cmpl (%ecx) ,% es i # i s t h i s the one?
24 jne 2 f # nope , t ry again
25 movl %esi ,%eax # re s t o r e saved e s i
26 popl %es i
27 jmp ∗ %eax # c a l l i t
28 2 :
29 cmpl $0 ,(%ecx ) # have we h i t a zero?
30 je 3 f # yep , f a i l
31 addl $4 ,%eax # nope , t ry next s l o t
32 jmp 1b
33 3 :
34 pushl %es i
35 ca l l m i s f i t b a d i n d c a l l
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Whereas the philosophy of MiSFIT is to accept and cope with the variable instruction length
nature of the architecture, PittSFIeld’s approach is to partially restrict it to a fixed instruc-
tion length architecture. Its basic strategy is to enforce artificial alignment restrictions by
regarding memory as a series of ‘chunks’, which satisfy the following restrictions:
1. The size and alignment of each chunk are fixed at a power of 2 bytes, equal to or
larger that the length of the longest instruction encoding, e.g., 24 = 16 bytes or larger
for IA-32.
2. No instruction can straddle a chunk boundary.
3. Instructions, which could be the target of a control transfer, must always be placed
at the beginning of a chunk.
To satisfy those criteria, PittSFIeld intersperses no-op filler instructions as needed to
maintain proper alignment. This is always possible as the null NOP instruction is con-
veniently 1 byte sized. Nevertheless, an optimizing compiler like gcc can also utilize
instructions with longer encoding, which have no semantic impact on the code, such as
leal 0(%esi),%esi for example.
The padding transformation illustrated in Listing 9 allows PittSFIeld to treat the in-
struction stream both as a sequence of variable length instructions and, for the purposes
of control transfers, as a sequence of fixed 24 byte macro-instructions. The artificial align-
ment of control transfer targets simplifies the verification code that needs to be injected
before each indirect control transfer. Target alignment check or enforcement is reduced
to comparing or coercing of the 4 least-significant address bits to 0, whereas the 2n byte
memory sandbox limits are checked or enforced by comparing or coercing the (32 − n)
most-significant address bits to its common address bit-prefix ‘tag’.
The price for this simplification is paid in terms of the code inflation caused by the
padding transformation. Although semantically neutral, the padding code induces “bub-
bles” in the execution pipeline of IA-32 super-scalar processors and also reduces the effec-
tiveness of the instruction cache by wasting some of its capacity on filler code.
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Listing 9: PittSFIeld padding code transformations for sandboxing of indirect control
transfers. (a) short test function (54 bytes), and (b) sandboxed by PittSFIeld (110 bytes,
processed with the PittSFIeld 0.2 distribution).
1 # (a ) # (b)
2
3 .g lobl main .g lobl main
4 .type main , @function .type main , @function
5 main : .p2align 4
6 l ea l 4(%esp ) , %ecx main :
7 andl $−16, %esp lea l 4(%esp ) , %ecx
8 pushl −4(%ecx ) andl $−16, %esp
9 pushl %ebp pushl −4(%ecx )
10 movl %esp , %ebp pushl %ebp
11 pushl %ecx movl %esp , %ebp
12 subl $4 , %esp pushl %ecx
13 movl (%ecx ) , %eax .p2align 4
14 movl apf ( ,%eax , 4 ) , %eax subl $4 , %esp
15 movl %eax , fp movl (%ecx ) , %eax
16 movl fp , %eax movl apf ( ,%eax , 4 ) , %eax
17 movl $3 , (%esp ) .p2align 4
18 ca l l ∗%eax movl %eax , fp
19 addl $4 , %esp movl fp , %eax
20 popl %ecx .p2align 4
21 popl %ebp movl $3 , (%esp )
22 l ea l −4(%ecx ) , %esp movl %eax , %ebx
23 ret .p2align 4
24 . s i z e main , .−main mov %esi , %es i
25 andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
26 andl $ 0 x 1 0 f f f f f 0 , %ebx
27 ca l l ∗%ebx
28 addl $4 , %esp
29 popl %ecx
30 popl %ebp
31 andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp
32 l ea l −4(%ecx ) , %esp
33 .p2align 4
34 andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
35 andl $ 0 x 1 0 f f f f f 0 , (%esp )
36 ret
37 . s i z e main , .−main
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Like MiSFIT, PittSFIeld is also programming language agnostic and operates as a filter
in the back-end of the compiler. Thus, it also shares the related drawback with respect
to legacy and proprietary code. Unlike MiSFIT, however, it does not present a memory
vs. speed trade-off. Control transfer target checks are always fast, but at the expense of
increasing the extension’s code, as opposed to increasing its data.
An Improved Proposal
A shared drawback to the previous two approaches is that, because of the ‘filter’ nature
of their implementations, they can only be applied to extensions distributed in source and
compiled with a specific compiler. This renders them unusable for the important classes of
legacy and proprietary extensions. We now present a novel variation to the basic MiSFIT
design that aims to overcome this restriction and to adapt the technique for use with already
pre-compiled machine code while maintaining rapid lookup speed.
The crux of the problem lies in the fact that after compilation, the semantic information
about the set of valid control transfer targets, i.e., the set of all labels and function entry
points, is lost. We observe, however, that for purposes of software fault isolation, we do not
need full semantic information. In fact, in order to ensure that misaligned control transfers
do not occur, all that is required is a map that describes the boundaries of all well-aligned
instructions and that supports rapid lookups. We propose a packed bitmap implementation
with a single bit per byte of extension code. The complete bitmap then represents a boolean
function providing exactly the needed description.
The size complexity of such a bitmap is O(n), or linear, in the size of the extension
code. In fact, because each bitmap byte represents 8 bytes of code, the total bitmap size is
fixed at 1/8, or 12.5%, of the size of the extension code. The computational complexity of
creating the bitmap is also linear in the size of the code, because it involves disassembling the
well-aligned instruction stream, itself easily reduced to instruction by instruction constant
time lookups in a table describing the architectural machine code. Finally, a lookup in the
bitmap table itself is also O(1), or constant time, and benefits from the IA-32’s ‘bit test’
instruction. An example of the bitmap lookup code is provided in Listing 10.
Thus, the proposed new design allows us to achieve fast constant time lookup, as well
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Listing 10: Example code for indirect control transfer target verification employing a novel
bitmap lookup table. It encodes a boolean function that describes all well-aligned instruc-
tion boundaries and enables constant time lookups. (a) illustrates a typical indirect control
transfer instruction implementing a dispatch table, (b) illustrates the same instruction along
with bitmap-based isolation code. Note how in line 6 the conversion from absolute target
address to an offset within extension code is folded into effective-address computation once
at isolation time. CODE BASE and BITMAP BASE represent the respective numerical
addresses.
1 # (a )




6 l ea l APP−CODE BASE(,%edx ,4) ,%eax
7 cmpl $MAX OFFT,%eax
8 ja out o f bounds
9 bt %eax ,BITMAP BASE
10 jz misa l i gned
11 popl %eax
12 ca l l ∗ APP(,%edx , 4 )
as a dense but fixed table size that is likely shorter than a sparse MiSFIT hash-table of
equivalent lookup speed.
3.1.1.4 Timing Control
The final requirement for complete software fault isolation is timing control. It refers to the
need to impose an upper limit on the execution time of extensions and is dictated by the
loss of control implied in each extension invocation and the potential for mounting ‘denial
of service’ attacks.
Formal techniques have been proven unable to deal with the issue of timing control, as
in general, it is equivalent to solving the NP-complete Halting Problem. Existing software
fault isolation systems also do not provide a software solution. Instead, they rely on the
traditional OS approach of detection and preemption through the means of hardware timers.
The reasons for this reduce to the inefficiency of software implementations.
For example, binary rewriting techniques could be employed to enforce an upper limit
on runtime by interspersing timing checks throughout the binary. While implementable in
practice, this is costly, because in order to guarantee preemption, a check must be inserted
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in each basic block of the extension’s code. However, basic blocks are fairly short, especially
on CISC architectures such as the IA-32, where a basic block’s typical length is about 2 or
3 instructions and branches occur about every 6 instructions [36]. This makes the overhead
of an SFI timing control solution too high to be practical and motivates the use of timers
and preemption.
3.1.2 Hardware Fault Isolation
Hardware fault isolation is an alternative class of homogeneous code isolation techniques
that take advantage of features built into modern processors and chipsets. Such features typ-
ically include hardware timers, processor support for memory segmentation, and sometimes
privilege levels, though different platforms support different sets of features. In particular,
the Intel IA-32 platform supports all of the above, though segmentation is notably missing
from EM64T, its 64-bit extension. While the latter may obviate some of the specific hy-
brid examples presented later in this chapter, it does not negate the larger premise of this
dissertation about the usefulness of hybrid approaches in general.
Hardware-based techniques are not unique to code isolation. In fact, such techniques
are widely used in software ranging from the kernels of ordinary consumer operating sys-
tems like Linux [57] or Windows [90], to research isolation and extensible kernels such as
Denali [107], Exokernel [22], and Palladium [16], to virtualization solutions like Xen [10],
VMware [101], and Microsoft Virtual PC [18, 62]. Irrespective of their purpose, however, all
of the systems above employ similar hardware features to enforce the boundaries between
software components. We continue by taking a closer look at the technical implementation
details of what that entails.
3.1.2.1 Paging and Segmentation
Paging and segmentation are two popular and commonly available memory management
features of modern processors. While the latter is a mechanism specifically designed for
isolating individual software modules so that many of them could run on the same processor
without interfering with each other, the former is meant as a mechanism for implementing
traditional demand-paged virtual memory. Nevertheless, given the right configuration, a
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paging system can also be used to isolate software modules. In fact, that is what modern
commodity operating systems employ, because paging is practically universally available in
processors today and thus affords the greatest portability.
In terms of our classification system, either paging or segmentation can serve as a vehicle
for enforcing the dual memory isolation and execution control requirements. The reason for
this is that both paging and segmentation are implemented as address transformations that
the CPU applies universally to all addresses touched by it during execution in protected
mode. Thus, either technique can be used equally well to control read/write data accesses,
i.e. memory isolation, as well as instruction fetch accesses, and thus the boundaries of
control flow transfers, i.e. execution control.
IA-32 programs operate in ‘logical’ address spaces, set up for them by the operating
system and described by a set of segment selectors or a page table, respectively. At every
memory access, the CPU converts the logical address to be accessed into a physical one to
be emitted on the external address bus. The conversion takes place in the context of the
currently active address space, with the segmentation system mapping the logical address
to a linear address, and the paging system mapping the latter into the final physical address
as shown in Figure 9.
Segmentation
Under IA-32 segmentation, logical addresses are tuples consisting of a segment selector,
ofter an implicit default, and an offset. As shown in detail in Figure 10, a segment selector’s
value specifies a table of segment descriptors and an index into it. Each table entry defines
a region of memory by means of its base address and length, as well as some associated
properties, such as whether its contents can be executed, read, or written. The number of
segments that can be defined is only limited by the size of the descriptor tables and is very
large. The segments that can be used simultaneously, however, are limited to the much
smaller number of segment selector registers that are used to pick out a descriptor for each
memory access. The IA-32 architecture has 6 of those, and it typically uses one (CS) as the
context of the code it executes, another (SS) for the current stack, and the remaining four
(DS, ES, FS, and GS) to refer to data.
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Figure 9: Segmentation and paging mechanisms. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture
Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
Figure 10: Logical to linear address translation. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture
Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
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Figure 11: Unprotected flat memory model. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture Software
Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
Those default roles, however, can be altered by means of segment override instruction
prefixes, through which, for example, one can attempt control transfers to a data segment,
or reads/writes to a code segment. To prevent misuse of memory and to enforce protection
among address spaces, the CPU always checks each access against the protection bits and
the boundaries of its target segment descriptor. Disallowed and out-of-bounds accesses are
caught and result in an exception and the transfer of control back to the OS, which in turn
is responsible for taking appropriate measures against the misbehaving software module.
The described segmentation facility is flexible, and allows for the implementation of
many alternative system designs. On one end of the spectrum, overlaying read-only code
with read/write data segments, as shown in Figure 11, can result in essentially unprotected
designs that make minimal use of segmentation. On the other end of the spectrum, mutually
exclusive code and data layouts can afford protection along with a varying level of address
space complexity, ranging from simpler flat models as in Figure 12, to elaborate multi-
segment models as in Figure 13.
Despite being broadly available, hardware support for segmentation is not universal.
This has caused it to be utilized mostly in research prototypes of extensible systems. Nu-
merous such examples have been developed, notably the the L4 microkernel [38, 55], the
Palladium system [16], and kernel plugins [29], with the latter two built on top of the classic
monolithic Linux kernel.
38
Figure 12: Protected flat memory model. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture Software
Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
Figure 13: Multi-segment memory model. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture Software
Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
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Figure 14: Host/extension segmentation configuration. (a) describes the runtime environ-
ment when the host software module is operating, and (b) describes it when the extension is
operating. Note how the extension’s memory segments are a proper read/write-able subset
of its host’s, signifying the one-way control relationship between them. Note also the level
of indirection between the control registers and the actual segment descriptions allowing for
rapid address space switching.
Typically, the entity being extended is described by a set of segments in a protected
memory model, i.e., with one or more non-overlapping code and data segments and the
appropriate permissions, usually read/execute for the code and read/write for the data.
The extension itself is described by a similar, but separate set of segment descriptors with
their actual memory backing store as a proper subset of the controlling host modules’ data
as shown in Figure 14.
There is an inherent level of indirection between the segment selector registers that
control the ‘context’, in which memory accesses are evaluated, and the segment descriptors
that actually establish their bounds and permission bits. This indirection is a key feature of
segmentation-based schemes, because it allows them to perform rapid address space switches
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by only reloading the selector registers’ values explicitly, and the relatively small descriptors
implicitly by the hardware. Compared to the costs of address space switches by means of
paging, segmentation offers a much faster alternative.
Paging
The IA-32 architecture’s paging system maps the linear address space, output from the
segmentation system, into external physical memory. The address space is split into fixed
size ‘pages’ of typically 4 KB each, though larger 2 MB or 4 MB pages are also supported.
Each linear address space page is mapped individually. It can be either left unmapped, or
mapped onto a ‘frame’ of physical memory, or mapped onto external disk storage. This
permits system software to emulate the presence of ‘virtual’ memory much larger than the
available physical RAM by ‘demand-paging’ a smaller working set. If the page containing a
linear address is not present in memory, the CPU generates a page fault. The OS exception
handler then allocates a frame, loads its contents from disk, and maps the linear address to
it.
Paging differs from segmentation in a number of aspects. Segments can vary in size,
but are inherently comprised of a range of continuous addresses with no holes and typically
encompass completely the object they contain, i.e., code or data. Pages, on the other hand,
are always of a fixed predetermined size and can have arbitrarily scattered mappings that
can result not only in logically continuous but physically discontinuous objects, but also in
structures that are partially in memory and partially on disk.
Figure 15 shows the linear to physical address conversion process and the multi-level
hierarchical mapping structure that controls it. Page mapping descriptors are packed into
memory pages themselves. The page at the top level of the hierarchy, or the page directory,
contain Page Directory Entries (PDEs), which are special mappings that point to pages in
the lower level of the hierarchy, or the page table. Page table pages contain Page Table
Entries (PTEs), which in turn point to the actual ordinary data pages.
Aside from a target address, both PDE and PTE map entries also contain a ‘present’
flag, as well as ‘read/write’ and ‘user/supervisor’ flags. While these flags are useful for
the implementation of demand paging and protecting the OS kernel from a simultaneously
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Figure 15: Linear to physical address translation. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture
Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
mapped process, the means for implementing multiple address spaces are provided by the
ability of system software to replace the mapping structures entirely. The setup commonly
used today is for the OS to build a separate page table for each process, each describing the
(static) pages of the OS kernel and of its process. The reason for this arrangement, is the
high cost of page table switching. With a 4 byte PTE that typically maps 4 KB of memory,
we obtain a page table overhead ratio of 1/1024. Thus, 1 GB of RAM, a reasonable number
by today’s standards, would require 1 MB of page tables.
To speed up the mapping process, modern CPUs cache mappings in a special built-in
cache memory known as a Translation Lookaside Buffer or TLB. Given increasing memory
sizes (and hence TLB sizes) and the widening gap between CPU and main memory speeds,
the cost of flushing and repopulating the TLB during a page table switch can easily reach
many thousands of wasted clock cycles [99], and thus be prohibitively expensive unless
amortized over a relatively long period of execution in the new address space.
3.1.2.2 Privilege Levels
Privilege levels, also known as ‘modes of execution’, are a hardware approach for enforcing
specific restrictions on the types of instructions that code running on the CPU can execute.
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Figure 16: Privilege Rings. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture Software Developer’s
Manual, Volume 1: Basic Architecture.
Typically, CPU hardware supports two privilege levels or modes, supervisor mode and user
mode, though some chips support more, e.g., the IA-32 provides four levels of increasing
privileges as shown in Figure 16.
At any given point in time, the CPU is running at one particular privilege level, and
transitions between levels that elevate privileges can occur only through entry points defined
in advance by the most privileged system software. In addition, there is a different set of
instructions available at each privilege level, with higher privilege corresponding to larger
sets including more powerful system control instructions. Software executing at the highest
privilege has full control over the hardware and responsibility for the setup of the privilege
system.
The IA-32 segmentation system requires that each segment be assigned a specific de-
scriptor privilege level, or DPL in Figure 17. Code executing within that segment cannot
exceed its privilege, though it could run at a lower one in the case of a conforming code
segments invoked from a less privileged one. As the DPL is specified as a two bit number,
it allows for the assignment of any of the IA-32’s 4 privilege levels to any segment. This,
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Figure 17: Segment Descriptor. Source: IA-32 Intel R© Architecture Software Developer’s
Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Programming Manual.
however, is not the case with paging.
The IA-32 paging system also requires that each page be assigned a specific privilege
level in its page table entry. However, the PTE only allocates a single bit for the privilege
specification, see Figure 18, so paging is restricted in its ability to utilize privilege levels.
In effect, paging compresses the IA-32’s 4 privilege levels into two, with levels 0, 1, and 2
mapping to ‘supervisor’, and level 3 mapping to ‘user’.
Irrespective of the number of available levels, privilege level hardware can be exploited
to implement the code vetting requirement for isolation by simply placing untrusted ex-
tension code at a level low-enough so that it will not have access to potentially dangerous
instructions, such as, e.g., CLI, LGDT, or LDS, which respectively disable interrupts, load a
new global segment descriptor table, or reload a segment selector register on IA-32.
The chief benefit of hardware enforced code vetting lies in the fact that it decouples
runtime overhead from the type and quantity of the instruction mix. Because code vetting
is in essence ‘folded’ into the protection checks already performed by the privilege level
hardware, it is essentially free of per-instruction runtime overhead.
In turn, the drawbacks are twofold. First, the use of privilege level hardware necessitates
a privilege level ‘switch’ at every extension invocation, which, depending on extension size
44
Figure 18: Page-Directory and Page-Table Entry formats for 4 KB pages. Source: IA-32
Intel R© Architecture Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3: Architecture and Program-
ming Manual.
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and hardware details, could be perceptible. Second, the reliance on hardware results in a
strict and inflexible technique, in which the sets of allowed and disallowed instruction is fixed
and immutable. For example, a kernel extension might have a valid need for control over
interrupts and thus require the use of the CLI and STI IA-32 instructions to mask/unmask
interrupts. If it is hardware code vetted through the use of sub-supervisor privilege levels,
however, it would be unable to use those instruction, even though safe use could be arranged
by means of non-maskable interrupt preemption.
3.1.2.3 Hardware Timers
Because software solutions to the timing isolation requirement are costly or impractical,
hardware-based preemption solutions have been employed almost universally by systems
ranging from consumer OS kernels to research extensibility frameworks. The approach used
is to detect and preempt violations, e.g., to preempt a process or extension that has failed
to relinquish the CPU in time, rather than to attempt to eliminate the possibility of them
occurring. The implementation of such preemptive approaches relies on the availability of
hardware timers to provide the periodic detection and preemption points, as well as the
means of accounting for the elapsed runtime. Typically, hardware timers in periodic mode
interrupt the CPU at every expiration of a programmed period, thus giving the system a
chance to decrement runtime quanta and, if needed, to preempt wayward software modules.
The IA-32 architecture provides a number of such hardware timers. More specifically
they are the ubiquitous Intel 8254 Programmable Interval Timer (PIT), the Real-Time
Clock (RTC), the Local Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (LAPIC), and the
relatively recent High-Performance Event Timer (HPET).
The PIT and the RTC are the oldest timing sources, dating from the early 1980s, but
they are also practically universally available. Both have a resolution of about 1ms and
support periodic as well as aperiodic modes, though they are usually used in the former
because of the costly I/O port accesses required to program them. The LAPIC timer was
designed to synchronize multiple processors but suffered from poor resolution and silicon
bugs and so it is rarely used in practice. Finally, the HPET was designed jointly by Intel
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and Microsoft to supersede all others as the new IA-32 standard timer and to provide both
periodic and aperiodic functionality, along with the fast memory-mapped programming and
higher precision needed for modern multimedia applications.
Whichever the particular hardware timing source, it is used in essentially the same way to
enable timing isolation. At entry into the code that is to be isolated, it is given a ‘quantum’,
an initial time limit, and the timing source is programmed to initiate a periodic interruption
that hands control back to the caller with a frequency which is a fraction of the quantum.
At each interruption, the caller accounts for the elapsed time period by subtracting it from
the callee’s quantum. If the results in 0, then the quantum is exhausted and continuing
the callee’s execution would result in a timing violation. Instead, the interruption handler
preempts it by forcing a return to its caller.
Timing isolation implemented in this way requires a hardware time source, but it offers
a number of advantages over software alternatives. Its overhead consists of the initial timer
setup and the brief periodic execution of the timer handler. Its only restriction is that the
software module being isolated must not be allowed to meddle with the timer hardware
or to block the delivery of its interrupt. This is typically achieved by some form of code
vetting.
Because of the undecidability of the Halting problem [98], general formal methods for
timing isolation do not exist. Software methods can be devised, which could instrument
arbitrary programs to include a timing check in each of their basic blocks, or every loop
and code path in the source, and thus ensure that they cannot be circumvented. The
cost of such a scheme, however, is likely to be rather high, because basic blocks are rather
short [36], resulting in a large ‘timing’ over ‘useful’ code ratio and significant runtime
overhead. Exploiting call-graph information to minimize the that overhead by placing fewer
checks in well-chosen locations, such as loops and alternative code paths, is possible, but it
would complicate the instrumentation process significantly or limit the applicability of the
technique to specific higher level languages.
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3.2 Heterogeneous Hybrid
By their nature, extensible systems must balance the conflicting requirement of safety (i.e.,
protection) with the performance goals pursued by their extensions. This dissertation is
based on the premise that the trade-off employed by each single isolation scheme is not
likely to meet the needs of all potential system extensions. To overcome such limitations,
we propose a new approach to code isolation, a hybrid approach that aims to combine
the best while avoiding the worst qualities of multiple extension techniques. As one con-
crete example, in the remainder of this chapter, we will describe the rationale, design, and
implementation details for a software/hardware code isolation hybrid.
3.2.1 Metrics
Chapter 2 already explored one of the facets of the extensibility trade-off, namely, it ana-
lyzed the set of requirements necessary to guarantee the safety of an extensible system. But
safety comes at a cost, and that cost is typically expressed either as some form of perfor-
mance degradation, or as additional restrictions on the implementation or the usage of the
system. These costs need to be measured carefully and balanced wisely against the costs
of alternatives. We turn our attention now, to investigate an important question: “How do
these costs present themselves and what are the relevant metrics that describe them?”
To answer that question, we will take a closer look at the usage model and the life cycle of
an extension. Unlike regular software, once designed and implemented, extensions may still
need an additional pre-processing step before they can be used to augment an application.
The reason for this lies not only in the mechanics of dynamic linking of software components,
but also, and more importantly, in the means of protecting the host application from its
extensions. Such means vary widely depending on the particular isolation technique, from
compiling an extension’s source code with a trusted compiler, to binary rewriting its pre-
compiled object code, to setting up hardware-restricted segments or pages for its code and
data, etc. We term this additional pre-processing step the build cost of the extension to
reflect its one-time preparatory nature.
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Once set up, extensions are invoked as needed by their hosts, incurring two more tradi-
tional forms of runtime overhead, which we term their latency and CPU burden. From the
viewpoint of the host software module, they reflect the pure cost of the control transfer into
and out of the extension, and the pure overhead of the actual safe execution of extension
code, respectively. While they are both also a function of the particular isolation technique,
their impacts are rather different. The nature of the latency overhead is that it is incurred
exactly once per invocation and is independent of the extension’s size or instruction mix.
Thus, latency is disproportionately more important for types of extensions that might re-
quire minimal reaction times, or that are small and/or frequently called upon. CPU burden,
on the other hand, is a measure of the per instruction overhead of isolating the extension
code. It can be sensitive to the extension code’s instruction mix and proportional to its
size, and thus it bears more importance for large and/or long running extensions.
Finally, all of the broad range of code isolation techniques employ different protection
mechanisms and impose distinctive restrictions on important non-performance related pa-
rameters, such as extension size limits, types of code that a technique can be applied to,
types of hardware that a technique can be used on, etc. We term this metric the adequacy
of the code isolation technique. Even though it does not impact performance, adequacy can
be of paramount significance, as it can rule out the possibility of employing a particular
code isolation technique in a specific circumstance.
To summarize, our metrics for comparing code isolation techniques are as follows:
1. Build Cost: reflects load-time overheads,
2. Latency: reflects invocation overheads,
3. CPU Burden: reflects runtime overheads, and
4. Adequacy: reflects usability restrictions.
With respect to those metrics, Table 1 presents a compact contrast of how the state-
of-the-art techniques compare to each other. Since our goal is to detect and to exploit the
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Table 1: Comparison of isolation techniques’ features.
Build Cost Latency CPU Burden Adequacy
Formal Proof Generation None None Only Small
Methods Complexity Simple Codes
Type-Safe External None Low to Language Lock,
Languages Compiler Moderate Recompilation
Software Fault Binary Code None Low to Universal, but
Isolation Rewriting Moderate Platform Specific
Hardware Fault None Non-Trivial, None Universal, but
Isolation HW Dependent Platform Specific
differentials that exist among homogeneous isolation techniques, we continue with a closer
look at it.
The differences in the adequacy of a particular technique to a specific task are hard
to quantify, as they are non-numerical and can depend on many divergent factors. The
latter can range from the ability or inability of isolated code to run inside an interrupt
handler, to whether the extension can be coded in some programming language, to whether
legacy binary-only extensions can be handled. Build cost differences, on the other hand,
are numerical and thus easy to quantify and compare. They are useful for distinguishing
practical from impractical techniques, however, their optimization impact is relatively mod-
est because of their one-time nature. For example, the build cost of proving the safety of a
complex or large body of code like a complete device driver is currently beyond our grasp,
whereas software techniques have been applied to the job. The cost differential between
sandboxing a complex or large binary extension and invoking a type-safe language compiler
for it, however, is not really decisive.
The most interesting trade-off exploitable in a composite hybrid isolation environment
results from the cost differentials between techniques in the invocation latency and CPU
burden cost categories. A key observation from Table 1 is that while software techniques
incur minimal latency and a only a moderate CPU burden, hardware techniques have the
exact opposite distribution of costs. This fact suggests possible potential for an improved
hybrid solution, and merits a closer look.
The latency disparity is a direct result of the differences in the mechanics of control
50
Figure 19: Basic costs of safe control transfers on an 866 MHz Pentium III. ‘Near’ calls
are within the same segment, ‘far’ calls are to another segment, interrupts can be used to
simultaneously cross segments and privilege levels, segment reload is the cost of reloading
a data segment register, and finally the cost of general register saving and restoring.
transfers into and out of extensions for the two types of isolation techniques and their
associated component costs shown in Figure 19. In general, all techniques require the
saving and restoring of the CPU’s general registers’ state before and after the execution of
foreign code. Even though such state is conventionally ‘callee saved’, extensions cannot be
trusted to preserve it. The similarities, however, end there.
After state saving is completed, software fault isolation techniques can immediately
transfer control into the extension, incurring only the additional cost of a ‘near’ function
call. Hardware fault isolation techniques, however, require still more work to be done, in
order to reconfigure the memory management unit of the CPU and fold memory isolation
and/or code vetting checks into its normal operation.
Segmentation based HFI techniques must alter the set of referable memory segments
to only those explicitly available to the extension, so they incur a number of data segment
selector reloads and a ‘far’ branch to a different code segment at the same privilege level.
If in addition they implement hardware code vetting, then the branch takes the form of a
software interrupt, which can branch not only to a different segment, but also to a different
privilege level.
Paging based HFI techniques are even costlier, as well as more difficult to quantify,
because at extension invocation they must exchange the active page table and effect a TLB
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Figure 20: Aggregate costs of a safe control transfer on an 866 MHz Pentium III. The SFI
cost includes saving and restoring general registers and a ‘near’ function call. The HFI cost
includes saving and restoring general registers, reloading data segment selector registers
upon entry and exit, and a branch to another segment and privilege level.
flush. The cost of the latter along with the subsequent costs of faulting-in the new page
mappings, varies depending on the CPU architecture, i.e., page table levels, as well as
the data cache availability of the new mappings. Generally, paging is understood to be
significantly more expensive than segmentation [38], since the overhead of reloading even a
single TLB entry measures on the order of several thousand cycles [99].
To better illustrate the latency disparity, Figure 20 depicts it graphically by plotting
the aggregate latency costs of memory isolation and code vetting implemented by purely
software and purely hardware (segmentation) approaches where each bar reflects the sum
total of their respective basic component costs.
Next, the reason for the CPU burden disparity lies in the way in which isolation tech-
niques implement memory isolation. While immediate addressing memory accesses can be
checked once at load time, the targets of indirect addressing memory accesses can only
be known at run-time. This forces software fault isolation techniques to insert a number
of additional checking instructions per each instruction that performs an indirect memory
reference. The inserted code depends on the specifics of the SFI technique, but a general
one could look similar to the ones shown in Listing 2 or Listing 3. Its performance impact
is aggravated by the fact that indirect memory references typically comprise a substantial
fraction of the total number of instructions in most programs. In fact, as evident from
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Figure 21: Typical extension instruction mix. Relative frequency of classes of instructions
in typical systems extensions. The data was computed from a full set of the Linux 2.6.5
kernel’s modules (977 modules total) by disassembling the compiled object files and counting
the number of instructions falling in each category.
Figure 22: Code inflation of software fault isolation, projected on the basis of the examples
in Listing 3 and Listing 10 and the average of the instruction mixes from Figure 21.
Figure 21, the relative frequency of indirect memory references in typical systems code
varies around 25-30% of all instructions. The reason for that fact is that access to many
fundamental programming language objects such as local variables, structures, unions, and
arrays, has an inherently indirect nature and does not lend itself to static checking.
The dynamic checks, which are inserted into the binary at load time, can lead to a
significant code inflation, and are the source of much of software fault isolation’s CPU
burden. For example, suppose that an extension’s instruction mix contains 25% indirect
memory references and suppose that, as in Listing 3, each one is isolated using up to 6
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Figure 23: Inverse latency/CPU burden cost differentials that motivate our hybrid mem-
ory isolation and code vetting prototype. The left graph shows latency in µs, with the SFI
case serving as a minimal baseline. The right graph shows CPU burden in terms of rela-
tive number of instructions (by instruction type), with the HFI case serving as a minimal
baseline.
additional instructions. Under such plausible assumptions, the size of the pure isolation
overhead could grow up to 1.5 times the extension’s code size itself. To better display the
magnitude of the effect, Figure 22 shows the relative code increase by instruction category
in a reasonable systems instruction mix obtained by averaging all the categories in Figure 21
when the SFI techniques from Listing 3 and Listing 10 used to isolate it.
3.2.2 Cost/Benefit Differentials
The best opportunities for application of hybrid isolation techniques, therefore, arise in
situations that exhibit all of the following characteristics:
1. Existence: There exist alternative techniques for implementing some of the isolation
requirements,
2. Feasibility: There is a clear and consistent inverse cost/benefit differential between
compatible pairs of alternative techniques covering a specific isolation requirement,
3. Completeness: A complete coverage of requirements is possible through some combi-
nation of alternative techniques.
Matching all of the above existence, feasibility, and completeness characteristics indi-
cates potential benefits from a hybrid isolation solution.
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Figure 24: Comparison of latency and CPU burden overhead metrics among the hybrid
prototype and software and hardware homogeneous techniques. The left graph shows la-
tency in µs, with the SFI case serving as a minimal baseline. The right graph shows CPU
burden in terms of relative number of instructions (by instruction type), with the HFI case
serving as a minimal baseline.
For a concrete example, we turn to our proposed SFI/HFI prototype of hybrid memory
isolation and code vetting. There, existence is satisfied by virtue of the fact that software
and hardware fault isolation can each implement both memory isolation and code vetting
properties. Feasibility is satisfied by the presence of an inverse latency/CPU burden cost
differential, illustrated in Figure 23, and the compatibility of both techniques, i.e., the
lack of obstacles to applying both techniques to an extension at the same time. Finally,
completeness is also satisfied, with each technique able to simultaneously satisfy more than
one isolation requirement.
For our prototype, we assign timing and memory isolation to be covered by HFI, whereas
code vetting and execution control are to be covered by SFI. The rationale for this assign-
ment of implementation techniques to requirements is to maximize performance. Thus,
timing isolation through hardware timers is chosen for its superiority over extensive instru-
mentation of every basic block. Memory isolation through segmentation is chosen for its
lower CPU burden. And finally, code vetting and execution control through software binary
rewriting are chosen for the reduced latency they offer. As expected, the resulting hybrid’s
performance characteristics, shown in Figure 24, are a balanced compromise between the
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Figure 25: CPU pipeline depth evolution. (a) the 5 stages of the original Pentium pro-
cessor’s ‘P5’ core, (b) the 10 stages of the Pentium II and III processors’ ‘P6’ core, (c) the
much longer 20 stages of the Pentium 4 Willamette core design, later extended to 31 stages
in the Prescott core design, (d) the latest ‘Core’ pipeline, a pronounced turn away from
hyper-pipelines and extreme clock speeds, forced by power and heat dissipation problems.
3.2.3 Impact of CPU Micro-architecture
This work evolved out of our experience with the implementation of KPlugins, a purely
hardware-based research facility for kernel extension, a complete description of which can
be found in [29]. An important piece of critical feedback that we encountered during our
experience developing KPlugins was the perceived high cost of control transfers into and
out of plugins (for the remainder of this discussion we will use the terms ‘plugin’ and
‘extension’ interchangeably). Furthermore, Moore’s Law and the processor architectural
trends at the time pointed towards ever increasing CPU clock frequencies, accompanied by
the corresponding deepening of super-scalar CPU pipelines. The Intel Pentium 4 family
had been introduced with its new NetBurst
TM
architecture including features such as
hyper-pipelined technology and an execution trace cache, both of which made it radically
different from the previous Pentium III’s ‘P6’ architecture and aggravated the costs of plugin
invocation.
The NetBurst cores increased the depth of the CPU pipeline from the original Pen-
tium III’s modest 10 stages (the ‘P6’ core), to Pentium 4’s 20 (Willamette core) and even
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Figure 26: CPU micro-architectural effects on the overheads of code isolation. The left
graph displays the disproportionate increase in basic HFI control transfer costs, whereas the
right graph provides aggregate metrics. The 866 MHz Pentium III and 2.2 GHz Pentium 4
data used in these graphs were normalized to a reference clock speed of 1 GHz.
31 stages in the final Prescott core, shown in Figure 25. Compared to the previous genera-
tion, this effective tripling of pipeline depth decreased the amount of work that each stage
must perform and allowed those Pentium 4 cores to achieve dramatic increases in operating
clock frequency. Unfortunately, the increased pipeline depth also increased the number of
stages that needed to be traced back and flushed when the CPU’s branch predictor made
a mistake.
Furthermore, NetBurst added the execution trace cache replacing the traditional L1
instruction cache. Instead of simply holding the CPU’s original CISC instruction stream
like its predecessor, the trace cache was designed to store its translation into internal RISC-
like ‘micro-operations’, thus saving the significant effort of fetching and decoding them upon
reuse.
These architectural changes, unfortunately, had a disproportionately adverse impact
on control transfers that are difficult or impossible to predict, such as plugin entry and
exit. The left graph in Figure 26 clearly shows the negative effect of the deeper pipeline
on indirect addressing control transfers, particularly interrupts. In contrast, well-behaved
register state saving and restoring code posts a net improvement, fully benefiting from the
faster core clock speed, itself a result of the increased pipeline depth.
The exacerbated costs of hardware fault isolation on these hyper-pipelined architectures,
shown in Figure 26, directly motivated this work, initially as an exploration of means to
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alleviate the heightened plugin invocation latency. The rationale for our hybrid prototype
was the observation, from Figure 26, of the unduly expensive nature of cross-privilege level
control transfers compared to far function calls within the same privilege level.
The recent trend reversal away from over-clocked and hyper-pipelined CPU micro-
architectures, such as Intel’s ‘Core’, does not negate the benefits of hybrid designs. The
benefits of hybrid designs generalize, and are not limited to the invocation latency vs. CPU
burden trade-off used as a case study in this work.
3.2.4 Hybrid Prototype Technical Description
We continue with a closer look at the implementation details of our prototype of a hy-
brid safe extension facility for the Linux kernel. For the reasons already described above,
our prototype was designed with a 50%/50% mix of hardware and software fault isolation
techniques as follows:
1. Timing Control by preemption through periodic interruptions generated by a hardware
timer,
2. Memory Isolation by memory segmentation at the host’s privilege level using features
of the CPU’s MMU hardware,
3. Code Vetting by load time code sanitizing through a software disassembler, and
4. Execution Control by load time binary rewriting through a software disassembler/rewriter.
This combination allows it to combine the best characteristics afforded by the perfor-
mance of MMU hardware assist for numerous and expensive timing and indirect memory
reference checks, with the flexibility and low latency of software code vetting and indirect
control transfers.
3.2.4.1 Timing Control
Our prototype’s realization of timing control mirrors the usual operating system’s scheme
for preemption of threads and processes with some possible modifications. In fact, because
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Listing 11: Sample plugin quantum decrementing and preemption code hooked into the




4 decl SYMBOLNAME(kp quantum ) # decrement p lug in quantum




our prototype is a Linux kernel extension facility, the timing control code is folded into the
kernel’s process preemption mechanism.
Upon boot-up, the Linux kernel programs some hardware timing source to deliver a
periodic interruption to the kernel to serve as a well-defined point for process runtime
accounting and preemption. On old systems the first programmable timer of the 8254
PIT is used, whereas on newer systems programmable timers in either the LAPIC, or the
HPET are used. Irrespective of the actual source, the interrupt is delivered to the same
software handler and provokes the same sequence of events including the decrementing of
the quantum for the currently running process and its de-scheduling if the latter has expired.
At the point of interruption, the CPU is normally running in either unprivileged user
mode, executing the current process, or in privileged kernel mode, on behalf of the current
process. With the addition of our kernel extension facility, a new alternative is created,
namely that the CPU could be executing a kernel extension on behalf of a kernel service.
Accordingly, our prototype modifies the usual Linux timer interrupt handler, as well
as all other interrupt and exception exit paths to add a check for this eventuality. When
a plugin context interruption is detected, similarly to process runtime accounting, plugin
runtime accounting is performed by decrementing a separate plugin quantum and checking
for its expiration on the interruption exit path as shown in the assembly in Listing 11.
Unlike process preemption, however, plugin quantum expiration results in the termination
of the offending plugin. The reason for this is that in our simple prototype’s design, plugins
are not schedulable entities. Rather, they are expected to run to completion in their allotted
time.
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The newly introduced plugin context processing is an addition to the usual Linux kernel’s
interrupt and exception routines. It is complementary and does not interfere with traditional
thread and process quantum decrementing and preemption.
A possible modification to the described scheme is to re-program the CPU’s LAPIC
to deliver a periodic NMI, or Non-Maskable Interrupt, and then use it to drive plugin
quantum accounting and preemption. The benefits of such a modification are that it would
be operable even while the CPU’s usual interrupts are disabled, thus permitting us to allow
otherwise unsafe interrupt control instructions in untrusted plugins. Our simple prototype
does not implement this modification because of the complexity of re-programming the
LAPIC hardware. Despite its obvious usefulness in a production system, the implementation
of such a capability is not essential in a proof-of-concept prototype like ours.
3.2.4.2 Memory Isolation
To cover the memory isolation requirement, our prototype employs a hardware segmentation
based technique. Plugins are placed in memory described through a number of specially
created segments that are different from the kernel’s, but whose memory is a physically a
subset of its. Thus, the kernel has full access to plugin memory through its all-encompassing
segment descriptors, whereas the plugins themselves live in the smaller, restricted world.
The plugin code and data segments cover disjoint memory regions. The former permits
reading and execution and the latter reading and writing of its memory.
Additionally, we have provisions for the creation, on a need-to-know basis, of an extra
plugin data segment that maps some subset of the kernel proper’s data space read-only. It
can be useful for providing immutable plugin access to kernel structures such as received
network packets or file system buffers.
Every time the kernel invokes a plugin extension, it reloads the CPU’s segment selector
registers (CS, SS, DS, ES, FS, and GS) to point to the plugin segment descriptors. The
code vetting and execution control properties ensure that plugins cannot reload or alter
the segment parameters during runtime and the MMU guarantees that every subsequent
memory reference conforms to the types and ranges of the described memory segments.
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Upon completion, plugins return to a well-defined entry point into the kernel, which
reloads all segment selectors to their usual kernel values before proceeding.
The scheme is similar, but not identical, to fully hardware fault isolated systems such
as Palladium [16, 100], the L4 microkernel ‘small spaces’ [55, 99], or the original Kernel
Plugins [29]. The important distinguishing factor is that those systems employ both the
CPU’s segmentation and privilege level hardware by assigning plugin segments to a separate
privilege level from the host kernel.
The assignment is encoded in each segment’s DPL or Descriptor Privilege Level bits,
shown in Figure 17, combined with the RPL, or Requested Privilege Level in the segment
selector register’s least significant 2 bits, and the processor’s CPL, or Current Privilege
Level, defined as the RPL of the current code selector register. Typically all three are the
same, though more complicated relationships are possible but outside of the scope of this
narrative. For a complete discussion the reader is referred to Chapter 4.5 in [49].
In this way, those techniques attain not only memory isolation, but also a rigid form of
code vetting, as the lower privilege levels limit the allowable instruction set. Our prototype
differs by explicitly assigning plugin segments to the kernel’s privilege level. This enables
us to:
1. Avoid costly CPU burden and maintain native execution speed while isolating in-
direct memory references, which make up roughly 30% of typical systems code (see
Figure 21),
2. Enable arbitrarily flexible code vetting, by shifting coverage of that isolation require-
ment to more fluid software methods, and
3. Achieve shorter invocation latency, as cross-privilege level control transfers are signif-
icantly costlier than same-privilege level ones (see Figure 19).
3.2.4.3 Code Vetting
In order to obtain maximum flexibility with respect to the types and formats of extensions
that our prototype can handle, we employ a binary rewriting approach that operates on raw
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machine code and thus applies directly and easily to arbitrary languages and compilers. At
plugin load time the rewriter performs code vetting by decoding and sanitizing the plugin.
Depending on its requested mode of operation, it can either verify the absence of dan-
gerous systems instructions and reject plugins failing the check, or accept such plugins after
neutralizing the dangerous instructions by converting them to null operations, i.e. to a
sequence of NOP instructions on the IA-32.
The prototype implementation of our binary rewriter, termed ‘librewrite’, is based on the
‘libopcodes’ library, which is a part of the ‘binutils’ package supporting the GNU Compiler
Collection [27]. The library provides the cross-platform disassembler functionality that is
used in ‘gdb’ – the GNU project debugger [26].
The original library’s typical usage mode consists of two phases: initialization and dis-
assembly. Prior to use, the initialization routine must be invoked to set up the target
architecture, the disassembler format requested, and the region of memory holding the
machine code of interest. The disassembling routine can then be invoked repeatedly at
arbitrary addresses within the buffer region, and it will decode and return the assembly for
the instruction aligned at that address along with its byte length, i.e. the buffer memory
consumed. One can then restart the process by advancing the disassembling pointer by
that length, and re-invoking the disassembler.
The library is driven by a structured tabular description of the target architecture’s
assembly language. Our prototype extends the basic descriptive structure with a number
of additional fields as follows:
1. sys insn: A data flag that specifies the category of the described instruction. It could
classify it as either a safe non-systems instruction, e.g., ADD, PUSH, etc., or as an unsafe
systems instruction, e.g., INT, LDS, etc. The latter form the class of code which is
not permissible in plugins by the security policy embodied by the table. Depending
on the mode in which it has been invoked, the presence of systems instructions in
its input causes the sanitizer to either reject the plugin outright, or to neutralize all
unsafe instructions in its output.
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2. need scheck: A data flag that marks the instruction as requiring static checking. Typ-
ically, these are safe instructions that operate on or branch to directly addressed
memory, the address of which can be verified at load time. In these cases no further
runtime verification is required because of our prototype’s immutable code invariant.
Examples include directly addressed forms of instructions such as MOV, PUSH, JMP, etc.
3. need dcheck: A data flag that marks the instruction as one that cannot be checked
statically and thus requires dynamic checking. Typically, these are safe instructions
that operate on or branch to indirectly addressed memory. The effective address
of their targets cannot be computed and verified before their actual execution and
thus they require that additional checking code performing the verification be spliced
into the original instruction stream before them. Examples include indirect memory
addressed forms, e.g., 0x42(%esi,%eax,4), of instructions such as MOV, PUSH, JMP,
etc.
4. pre xform: A function pointer that points to a procedure to be invoked prior to
processing the described instruction. The transformation typically emits checking
code relevant for that class of instructions, injecting it immediately before the trigger’s
actual encounter in the output stream.
5. insn xform: A function pointer that points to a procedure to be invoked to transform
the actual instruction bytes and pass them on into the result buffer with or without
any required modifications.
6. post xform: A function pointer that points to a procedure to be invoked after pro-
cessing the described instruction. The transformation typically emits checking code
relevant for that class of instructions, injecting it immediately after the trigger’s actual
encounter in the output stream.
The resulting structure is no longer a passive representation of the structure of the
architecture’s machine language. Along with the relevant processing functions, it is now an
active object that embodies a particular code vetting policy. Combined with our modified
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disassembling routine, it can be used to apply, both statically and dynamically, the isolation
policy to a piece of machine code produced by any compiler from any high-, or even low-level,
language.
Similarly to the libopcodes disassembler, our binary rewriter is driven by the augmented
table. However, in contrast to the former, it is designed not as an inspection tool, but as a
filter or a mapping function that transforms the input machine code into a new, functionally
equivalent machine code guaranteed to conform to the implicitly encoded security policy.
Librewrite’s design is powerful in its capacity to accommodate, encode, and enforce
arbitrary machine instruction-level security policies through the combination of its classifi-
cation markers and transformation actions. Its implementation is also flexible, allowing it
to compile both as a user-space library and as a kernel module, in order to support a wide
spectrum of projects. Furthermore, the computational complexity of librewrite, like that of
its precursor, is linear thanks to their simple table-driven structure.
In the larger context of our hybrid code isolation prototype, however, librewrite is used
for code vetting and execution control only. While the generality of the rewriter is not
needed for the former where a simple load-time sanitizing would suffice, the latter makes
full use of its powerful transformation hooks.
3.2.4.4 Execution Control
As already described in Section 3.1.1.3, our improvement proposal for SFI execution control
prescribes that: (1) we build a bitmap recording the boundaries of all well-aligned instruc-
tions in the output plugin and that we instrument all indirect control transfer instructions
so that during runtime the effective addresses of their targets are validated through that
bitmap. We implement this needed functionality by taking advantage of the rewriting hooks
of librewrite.
The bitmap is built by first allocating and pre-zeroing sufficient memory space for it
and then gradually setting only the bits corresponding to the beginnings of all well-aligned
instruction during the rewriting process.
Target address validation code is injected from the pre/insn/post transformation hooks.
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First the effective target is computed using the original instruction’s indirect addressing
mode. The absolute address is then converted to a relative offset within the plugin, and
finally the bitmap lookup is performed at that relative index. Direct addressed control
transfers are also verified by bitmap lookups, though only statically at load time, so they
do not result in the injection of verification code.
This approach leads to a couple of interesting problems that merit mentioning, which
are (1) how to deal with direct addressed forward references during the rewriting when the
bitmap is still incomplete, and (2) how to handle the internal shifts in the output binary
resulting from the injection of the extraneous validation instructions.
Our prototype solves the first problem by implementing lazy verification of direct ad-
dressed forward references. When they are encountered, we record their target address in a
sorted linear list along with the referencing instruction address. A number of these records
to the same target are possible when multiple control transfer instructions branch to the
same target, e.g., the ‘breaks’ in a C switch statement. As plugin code is processed, if the
current rewriting pointer passes the target address at the front of the forward reference
list we handle all the newly eligible records by back-checking their referencing instructions
before proceeding further.
Our solution to the second problem is to maintain a second structure recording the
amount and location of code ‘inflation’ caused by the injection of verification code. The
inflators structure is implemented as a vector array of records sorted by inflator address.
The linear nature of the rewriting process ensures that the vector of inflators is maintained
naturally and with low overhead. In addition, to minimize the cost of inflation lookups, each
record reflects the cumulative code inflation starting at its address and until the next record’s
address. Thus, the monotonically increasing nature of the structure provides a useful sanity
checking invariant. Coupled with the forward reference list, the table of inflators provides
a convenient way of re-computing and back-patching forward reference targets of control
transfers at the same time when those targets are lazily validated.
At the completion of the rewriting process the final bitmap reflects all well-aligned
instruction boundaries. All directly addressed control transfers had been checked against it,
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and all indirectly addressed ones have been prefixed with runtime validation code. Finally,
because the initial entry point into the plugin is determined by its caller, it follows by
induction that execution control has been established over the entire plugin.
3.3 Other Hybrids
In conclusion, we make no claims of uniqueness or optimality for the particular hybrid
prototype described above. Instead, it is intended as an example of the general idea of hybrid
code isolation advanced in this thesis, with our implementation prototype as a simple proof-
of-concept. Many other hybrids are indeed possible, e.g., combining different homogeneous
donor techniques, a different balance of individual functional contributions, etc. The specific
hybrid technique incarnation described in this chapter was selected for the availability of





The hybrid isolation approach provides a powerful trade-off mechanism for adjusting or
optimizing parameters of code isolation schemes. This chapter shows how that mechanism
can be applied, in practice, to a number of different applications. It also evaluates the ad-
vantages of such hybrid designs by more carefully quantifying the cost differentials involved
and the benefits that can be extracted.
The evaluation will consist of a two-part study of micro-benchmarks and realistic macro-
applications. Micro-benchmarks are a useful way of focusing attention on specific individual
parameters of the isolation scheme, in a fashion that controls other variables. Macro-
applications, on the other hand, present a complex environment where many individual
effects are intertwined and thus, are not easy to distinguish. Despite that, such complex
environments better reflect the actual real-world scenarios in which hybrid isolation schemes
are ultimately to be used. The ability to demonstrate a certain net benefit in realistic
conditions serves to provide validation to the practical usefulness of hybrids.
The chapter starts with a description of the methodology used in setting up and exe-
cuting experiments, including a discussion of the measurement techniques employed. Then,
we characterize the experimental platform and present the micro-benchmark and macro-
applications’ results. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis and interpretation of the
data.
4.1 Methodology
The experimental methodology used in this evaluation is aimed at achieving a pure body
of performance data to work with by eliminating as many extraneous effects as reasonably
possible. We will strive to employ the most precise timing methods available and to reject
or cancel out non-deterministic and/or non-linear data pollution effects resulting from both
hardware and software sources that can be as varied as out-of-order instruction execution,
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memory caching, hardware interrupts, OS scheduling, etc.
Our approach is two-prong. First, we pursue an implementation that rejects as many of
the underlying sources of data pollution as possible by design. Second, in order to cancel
out the remaining factors, we will employ statistical measures of central tendency such as
medians, means, and variances, in order to filter outliers from the data sets. In the next two
sub-sections we elaborate on the details and implementation issues of those two approaches.
4.1.1 Timing
Because in this evaluation we will be concerned with efficiency measures such as latency and
throughput, we will naturally need to measure very small time periods with high degree of
accuracy, as well as to count the number of events occurring per units of time. Time, then,
emerges as an important parameter that we need to be able to measure with precision.
Timing Mechanisms
The IA-32 platform provides a number of hardware assets for time measurement such as
the PIT, the LAPIC, or the HPET. All of those are capable of periodic as well as one-shot
modes, but are more suitable for asynchronous notification of the expiration of a preset
time period, rather than for use as a stopwatch. Still, when programmed in periodic mode
they can be used as the latter by counting the number of their ticks taken by the measured
activity. However, those assets are typically implemented as separate programmable chips,
and they require non-trivial effort to set up, initiate, and conclude a measurement [20].
Those setup costs can involve slow input/output instructions, e.g. as with the PIT, and
unpredictable data bus transaction latencies, e.g. as with the LAPIC or HPET, and can
distort the period being measured significantly, especially when that period is close to or
smaller than the hardware timer’s period.
For these reasons, we choose to employ a different timing mechanism available in all
Pentium class and later IA-32 chips. The method relies on the use of the new RDTSC
instruction, whose name is an abbreviation of ‘ReaD Time-Stamp Counter’.
All Pentium and later chips from Intel Corp. implement an internal 64-bit time-stamp
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counter register in their CPU cores, which is cleared at every processor reset and is incre-
mented by exactly 1 with every core clock cycle. With current power and heat budgets
capping the top processor clock speed in the 3 to 4 GHz range, the counter is large enough
to accommodate continuous counting without overflow for approximately 146 to 194 years,
depending on actual core clock frequency, which is sufficient to cover any reasonable uptime.
The RDTSC instruction’s effect is to read the momentary value of the hidden internal 64-
bit counter register and to return it in the user-accessible pair of EDX:EAX 32-bit registers [48].
Because the RDTSC instruction is usually freely accessible in every CPU mode, it allows for
the easy, convenient, and extremely low-overhead measurement of time periods with very
high precision. The typical CPU core’s operating frequency today ranges anywhere between
1 and 4 GHz, resulting in theoretical precision of 1/4 ns. Unfortunately, the practical limits
of RDTSC-based timing are less precise because of complications arising from the out-of-order
execution engines that power almost all modern super-scalar processors, including the ones
offered by Intel Corp. and AMD.
Out-of-order execution (OoO) is a processor implementation technique that allows the
recapture and use of processor cycles that would otherwise have been wasted because of
delays in pulling data dependencies from slower peripherals, e.g., main memory, or because
of shortages of internal CPU resources, e.g., renaming registers. OoO execution allows for
the retirement of instructions from the CPU core before independent preceding instructions,
in the sense of the linear program order, have retired. This optimization increases the
Instructions Per Clock (IPC) metric, a key measure of CPU throughput.
In the case of RDTSC, the OoO nature of IA-32 processors poses a problem, in that
it reduces the practically attainable timing precision from its theoretical limit. Since the
RDTSC instruction has no dependencies, it is often able to overtake and commit prior to
others that appear before it in the linear program order but which have stalled waiting for
data dependencies, for the availability of ALU units, etc.
In essence, this allows the setting of the start and/or the end of a timing period to occur
non-deterministically earlier than the linear program order would suggest, e.g., a scenario
shown in Listing 12, or that subsequent instructions be executed before the time-stamp
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Listing 12: A simple example of likely out-of-order timing instruction execution. The fact
that the memory cells holding the multiplication operands are missing from the data cache
would stall the MUL instruction until they can be fetched from memory. Because there are
no dependencies between the MUL and the RDTSC, the latter can overtake the former and
commit out-of-order, presuming that enough internal resources are available to rename the
temporary result register from the multiplication that gets overwritten by RDTSC.
1 movb UNCACHED MEM A,%al # load f i r s t mul operand
2 mulb UNCACHED MEM B # mult ip ly by second operand
3 movw %ax ,RESULT # save r e s u l t
4 rdtsc # take a time−stamp
counter reading has committed. While out-of-order execution would have little impact on
the timing of relatively long-running events, such as thread time slices or long running
subroutines, it can introduce significant errors into the measurement of short events, such
as individual instructions or even small high-level language procedures.
The solution to this problem is the serialization of the instruction stream just prior
to the acquisition of each time-stamp. Serialization refers to the explicit imposition of a
strict serial ordering between the in-flight instructions already issued before the serializing
instruction and the ones following it. Serialization also imposes an ordering on memory
transactions issued by preceding instructions, so it can be quite expensive. In essence,
serialization might induce a ‘bubble’ in the execution pipeline of super-scalar CPUs, by
forcing some wasted wait cycles until all in-flight instruction and their memory side effects
have safely committed before continuing. Despite that fact, serialization is vital for the
achievement of precise timing results when measuring extremely short periods.
The proper way to enforce serialization on the IA-32 platform is by issuing a serializing
instruction just before the RDTSC timing one. CPUID is a popular unprivileged serialization
instruction typically used for that purpose because it is short, simple, and has no depen-
dencies. It can go through the CPU pipeline with minimal conflicts, retire quickly, and
cause the smallest perturbation on the timing task at hand. Example time-stamping code
utilizing CPUID serialization is shown in Listing 13.
These additions to the simple act of time-stamping necessarily lead to a dilution of the
attainable timing precision. The practical precision limit, however, can be determined by
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Listing 13: Properly serialized collection of a time-stamp. CPUID serializes the instruction
stream, guaranteeing that all instructions that have already issued and their effects will
commit before the following instructions. RDTSC acquires a time-stamp into the EDX:EAX
register pair, and the final two instructions save it into memory.
1 cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
2 rdtsc # take a time−stamp
3 movl %edx , HIGH BITS # save the high 32−b i t s o f time−stamp
4 movl %eax ,LOW BITS # save the low 32−b i t s o f time−stamp
observing the spacing between two successive back-to-back serialized time-stamps readings.
For our experimental platform, described in detail in Section 4.2, that practical limit is 168
cycles, computed by the code in Listing 14.
Timing Disturbances
Another complication when attempting precise event timing measurements can arise
from the interference that simultaneous, but unrelated events, can have on the one under
measurement. The typical source of such interferences are the interrupts generated by
hardware devices.
Interrupts are an asynchronous notification mechanism used widely from system timers
to network interface cards, fixed disks, etc. They are beneficial as they eliminate the need
for the CPU to perform constant polling of the status of the devices. Their drawback is
that their inherently asynchronous nature causes them to occur at generally unpredictable
times and to cause interruptions in the normal flow of other program code.
When carrying out timing experiments, those interruptions can alter the performance
of the subject code not only by inducing secondary effects such as data and code cache
pollution [66], but also by directly adding their handlers’ execution time to the timed event.
Most OSes today run at least a part of the interrupt processing load in the context of
the application which happens to be executing at the point of interruption. The interrupt
time is unfairly billed to the application and should the interruption occur within the span
of a event that is being timed, they inflate and corrupt that measurement.
For example, in Microsoft’s Windows OS ‘Deferred Procedure Calls’, or DPCs, handle
the bulk of the interrupt processing load and consume the processing time of the currently
running thread [63]. The DPC’s equivalent in the Linux kernel are the so-called ‘soft IRQs’,
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Listing 14: This C code is used to compute the cost of serialized RDTSC time-stamp
collection. Back-to-back serialized time-stamps are taken, their difference is computed and
aggregated. After a preset number of repetitions the average is obtained by dividing the
sum by the number of repetitions. Note 1: the first difference sample is disregarded to
avoid cold data caches. Note 2: the code snippet uses the gcc compiler’s inline assembly
extensions.
#include <s t d i o . h>
#define REPT SHIFT (10)
#define REPT (1 << REPT SHIFT)
unsigned long long t s1 ;
unsigned long long t s2 ;
unsigned long long sum = 0ULL;
int main ( )
{
register int i ;
for ( i =0; i<=REPT; i++) {
asm v o l a t i l e (
/∗ Save r e g i s t e r s ∗/
"pusha\n\t"










/∗ Restore r e g i s t e r s ∗/
"popa\n\t"
: : : "memory" ) ;
/∗ Compute time−stamp d i f f e r e n c e ∗/
t s2 −= ts1 ;
/∗ Discard f i r s t sample ( co ld data cache ) ∗/
i f ( i ) { sum += ts2 ; }
}
/∗ Compute & pr in t average ∗/
sum >>= REPT SHIFT ;











and in recent versions of the kernel, soft IRQs have been migrating into special separate
kernel threads per CPU. While this improves on the former problem, it may not alleviate
the latter one, as that is dependent on the priorities of the system scheduler, and in all
cases, some ‘hard’ interrupt processing occurs within interrupt handlers and is incorrectly
billed to tasks.
There are two possible approaches for correcting such timing disturbances. The first is
to take measures to prevent their occurrence, and the second is to adjust the measurements
taken in order to compensate for or to cancel out the disturbances post-factum.
The former approach is attractive because of its simplicity and ease of implementation.
In essence, all that is required is to disable hardware interrupts before initiating a measure-
ment, perform the measurement, and re-enable hardware interrupts after it. The code to do
that is simple, consisting of just a few instructions as shown in Listing 15. The simplicity
is misleading, though, as there are significant disadvantages to this approach. Disabling
hardware interrupts for long periods of time can not only impact the performance of multi-
media applications, as well as OS time-keeping and scheduling, but also impair the correct
operation of hardware devices. These drawbacks can be mitigated somewhat by either only
measuring short events, or by performing the measurements on a multi-processor system
where hardware interrupts are routed by a smart interrupt controller that is able to forward
them for processing to a CPU that is able to take them.
The latter approach is more complex as it requires additional instrumentation to track
the occurrence of hardware interrupts during event measurements and to record their CPU
usage. It also requires a post-processing step to subtract the interrupt processing from the
event timing samples. Furthermore, as with any other benchmarking instrumentation, one
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always needs to be careful with implementation so as not to impact the event being studied.
The additional variables this approach must track can increase that risk.
For the purposes of this dissertation we have chosen to implement the former approach
as its advantages outweigh its drawbacks in this case. The events being measured are
short enough not to interfere with the correct operation of hardware and the simultaneous
performance of multimedia applications and OS time-keeping and scheduling are not critical
for the relatively brief benchmarking periods.
4.1.2 Statistics
Irregularities
Even when all efforts are taken to avoid timing disturbances, measurement samples are
subject to unavoidable regularities arising from the complex nature of modern computing
platforms. The ever growing performance gap between processors and memory systems and
the increasing data appetite of larger super-scalar CPUs have necessitated the introduction
of fast cache memories at various points at the CPU/memory interface to buffer recently
used data and instructions and exploit the locality of reference exhibited by most programs.
While caches have been remarkably successful in compensating for the computation/s-
torage performance mismatch, they have also introduced significant irregularity in the com-
puting architecture by making memory accesses unpredictably non-uniform. The formula
expressing the average time for memory accesses in the presence of caching is:
Tavg = P × Tcache + (1− P )× TDRAM
where Tcache is the cache access time, TDRAM is the much larger main memory access
time, and P is the probability of a cache hit. To complicate matters further, cache misses
can be predictable, e.g., compulsory misses incurred on the first reference to a datum,
or unpredictable, e.g., the capacity misses due to the finite and insufficient size of the
cache itself, or the conflict misses caused by imperfect cache mapping functions and/or
replacement policies.
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It is clear then, that the typical memory access time of a modern computing architec-
ture is a probabilistic variable, dependent on a number of varied parameters, such as the
cache hardware’s size and associativity, the program’s data access pattern, the program’s
particular input data vector, and even events external to the program itself like interrupts
and other threads executing in parallel.
Thus, the probabilistic nature of the caches’ performance and their increasing use for
not only data (D-caches), but also instruction fetching and decoding (I-caches), page-table
mappings (TLBs), virtualization control structures (VMCS-caches[11]), etc., can induce
complex consistency and/or replication irregularities into benchmarking experiments.
While such irregularities are unavoidable, their effects can be mitigated by careful ex-
periment design and the use of statistics. In this dissertation, we employ the following
techniques to alleviate irregularities and improve benchmark consistency:
1. Disable hardware interrupts to reduce interrupt handler I&D-cache pollution during
benchmarking.
2. Repeat benchmark runs and discard the initial values to eliminate compulsory, or
cold-cache, misses.
3. Employ measures of statistical central tendency and variability, such as medians,
means, and variances, in order to more accurately estimate actual performance be-
havior.
4.2 Experimental Platform
Irrespective of measurement precision, performance results are relative and a function of the
actual platform, in both the hardware and software sense, where they were obtained. Hence,
in this section we will describe, as completely as possible, the details of our experimental
platform.
Hardware
Most of the results in this dissertation are obtained on a personal computer with the
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Table 2: Experimental platform’s hardware specifications.
Feature Part & Model
CPU 2 x Intel R© Pentium R© III @ 866 MHz
(16 KB 4-way I1&D1 caches, 256 KB 8-way unified L2 cache)
Motherboard ASUS CUV4X-D (Dual Socket370)
North Bridge VIA R© 82C694XDP
System Chipset (133/100 MHz FSB and 4X/2X AGP)
South Bridge VIA R© 82C686B
System Chipset (UltraDMA/100/66)
IDE Ports 2 x UltraDMA/100 Bus Master IDE Ports
Expansion Slots 1 x AGP PRO/4X and 5 x PCI
I/O Ports 1 x PS/2 keyboard, 1 x PS/2 mouse
4 x USB v1.1
2 x serial, 1 x parallel
1 x game, 1 x audio
Memory 768 MB of PC100 SDRAM
Video NVIDIA GeForce FX 5200 with 256 MB of Video RAM
Video Capture Creative Labs Video Blaster WebCam 3 USB
Device (Model No. CT6840, CMOS Sensor OmniVision OV7620)
Network Intel EtherExpress PRO100 PCI adapter
Disks 1 x 20 GB Western Digital WD205AA (UDMA4 mode)
1 x 30 GB Western Digital WD300BB-00AUA1 (UDMA5 mode)
specifications listed in Table 2. Because of an unfortunate hardware failure (a CPU mal-
function), however, some measurements had to be performed on a slightly altered system,
where only one of the CPUs was present.
While the presence of a second CPU has a beneficial effect on the overall performance of
the system, it does not impact the fundamental trade-off on which hybrid code isolation is
based, i.e., the cost differentials between software and hardware code isolation, or between
control transfers to the same or to a different privilege level. Nevertheless, those results
which have been obtained on a uniprocessor configuration are clearly marked.
The choice of an experimental platform based on the Pentium III, a processor two
generations removed from the current state-of-the-art, might seem like an odd one, yet, it
was motivated by solid technical reasons.
The next processor generation, the Pentium 4, is based on the vastly different NetBurst
TM
micro-architecture. NetBurst was characterized by a radical departure in micro-architecture
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design, most significantly because of its hyper-pipelined nature. Its various incarnations in-
creased the CPU pipeline depth from Pentium II and III’s 10 stages, to 20 in the Willamette
core, and even 31 stages in the final Prescott core. The dramatic increase in pipeline depth
reduced the workload of each stage and permitted a similarly dramatic decrease in the core’s
basic clock cycle, thus paving the way for achieving much higher operating frequencies. Net-
Burst cores were aimed towards scaling operating frequencies up, eventually reaching up to
10 GHz.
Unfortunately, once NetBurst based processors started production, they were unable to
deliver the promised performance, beset by a combination of architectural and engineering
problems. Their hyper-pipeline proved difficult to utilize efficiently. Its higher operational
frequency and larger depth exaggerated the processor/memory performance gap and aggra-
vated the already high costs of pipeline dependency stalls and flushes due to mispredictions.
At the same time, the high operating frequency resulted in non-linear increases in power
and heat dissipation.
Realizing the magnitude and complexity of the problems, Intel decided to abandon
NetBurst and return to older designs and refocus on IPC (Instructions Per Clock), power




micro-architectures bear a lot of similarity to the Pentium M, itself an evolution of the
Pentium III, and reflect micro-architectural trends for the foreseeable future.
For these reasons, lacking a current Core 2 based platform to experiment on, we opted
for the next best thing and chose a Pentium III based platform. Although it is only an
approximation of the current state-of-the-art, it is relevant with respect to future micro-
architectural trends.
Software
The software configuration of our experimental platform is listed in Table 3.
The choice of operating system kernel was restricted by the fact that our hardware fault
isolation implementation was based on the 2.4.24 version of the Linux kernel. Porting our
prototype to the current 2.6 series of kernels would have required a non-trivial reimplemen-
tation effort with little research value.
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Table 3: Experimental platform’s software specifications.
Feature Release
OS Distribution Fedora Core 1 (Yarrow) with all updates applied
Kernel Linux 2.4.24 with research patches
Web Server Apache 2.0.47
Video Capture USB OV511+
Driver (drivers/media/video/ov511.o)
The particular choice of kernel led us to the selection of Fedora Core 1, FC1 for short,
for the distribution, as it is the most recent Linux distribution that is compatible with the
aging 2.4 series of kernels.
The rest of the software modules operating on the experimental platform, such as the
video capture device driver and the web server, were a direct result of the kernel and
distribution choices.
4.3 Micro-benchmarks
In this section of our experimental evaluation, we focus on a series of micro-benchmarks
to map out the basic parameters of the software and hardware homogeneous code isolation
schemes used as components in our hybrid.
Micro-benchmarks are simple measures and do not reflect the performance level that any
particular application would be able to obtain. Nevertheless, they are useful because they
permit us to evaluate individual performance parameters in a complex and interdependent
computing environment separately and to control for other variables.
The specific parameters measured and analyzed are the invocation latency and the
execution overheads of plugins isolated through software and hardware techniques.
4.3.1 Latency
The invocation latency of an extension represents the delay imposed on the control transfers
into and out of the extension by the features of the isolation technique employed. Invocation
latencies are measured in time units and are typically more important for short running,
frequently executed, or real-time extensions. In those cases these additional costs can be a
significant contributor to the total extension runtime, can add up across many invocations,
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or can cause the violation of deadlines, respectively.
To quantify latency overheads, we measure the runtime of a null extension, i.e., one that
contains no payload code and consists simply of a return statement. The simplest such null
extension assembly code is shown in Listing 16.
In order to gain a more detailed understanding of the source of invocation latency,
however, we also:
1. Vary the number of parameters, because dependent on the details of the isolation
scheme, their number and types may impact invocation times, and
2. Inject midway instrumentation to take a time-stamp inside the extension where pos-
sible.
In this fashion we can differentiate and attribute costs better by accounting for parameter
passing overheads, usually a responsibility of the caller, and by distinguishing between the
inbound and outbound control transfer overheads. The resulting assembly code is shown in
Listing 17.
As already noted, timing instrumentation adds a small yet non-zero overhead itself.
Thus, in cases where the variable we are attempting to measure is comparable to or smaller
than that cost, it may be impractical to perform midway instrumentation. In those cases,
we opt for the usage of statistics and only measure aggregates of the variable to discount
measurement costs.
Pure SFI
By design, a software fault isolated extension is ‘physically’ a part of the application it
extends, i.e., its object code is linked in its host and the two are indistinguishable from the
standpoint of the operating system kernel. Their separation into disjoint faulting domains
is only ‘logical’ and enforced by additional instrumentation injected into the extension at
load time.
Because of the lack of a physical boundary, control transfers between host and extension
are close to simple procedure calls within a single application. As such, they incur the
absolute minimum overhead related only to the mechanics of stack switching and control
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Listing 16: Minimalistic null extension lacking local stack variables and consisting solely
of a single return instruction.
. t e x t
#





cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
rdtsc # take a time−stamp
movl %edx,4+START TSC # save high b i t s o f time−stamp
movl %eax ,START TSC # save low b i t s o f time−stamp
push . . . #
. # push extens i on parameters
. #
. #
push . . . #
ca l l extens i on # invoke extens i on
addl $PARM SIZE,%esp # clean−up parameters ’ s tack
cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
rdtsc # take a time−stamp
movl %edx,4+END TSC # save high b i t s o f time−stamp




ex t ens i on : # extens i on entry po int







Listing 17: Null extension and timing instrumentation including a midway time-stamp.
. t e x t
#





cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
rdtsc # take a time−stamp
movl %edx,4+START TSC # save high b i t s o f time−stamp
movl %eax ,START TSC # save low b i t s o f time−stamp
push . . . #
. # push extens i on parameters
. #
. #
push . . . #
ca l l extens i on # invoke extens i on
addl $PARM SIZE,%esp # clean−up parameters ’ s tack
cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
rdtsc # take a time−stamp
movl %edx,4+END TSC # save high b i t s o f time−stamp





# void extens i on ( . . . )
#
extens i on : # extens i on entry po int
cpuid # s e r i a l i z e i n s t r u c t i o n stream
rdtsc # take a time−stamp
movl %edx,4+MID TSC # save high b i t s o f time−stamp
movl %eax ,MID TSC # save low b i t s o f time−stamp









Figure 27: Null function call as a function of the number of its parameters.
transfer. Thus, they can act as a simple baseline for latency comparison across the spectrum
of isolation technologies.
Listing 19 in Appendix A presents the code used to measure the null function invocation
latency, and Figure 27 displays its results for our experimental Pentium III platform.
It is worth noting that the measured event is of extremely short duration, much shorter,
in fact, than the duration of the timing code itself. For this reason, the code in Listing 19 is
designed to sample an aggregate value for a large number of repetitions in order to amortize
the expense of the measurement itself. The outer loop ensures that the actual measurement
run occurs with warm data and instruction caches.
Of course, real isolation techniques are costlier and would incur a larger invocation
latency penalty. We continue our evaluation by measuring our reference software fault
isolation implementation, as well as other implementations for which code is available.
As previously described, our reference implementation employs a load-time code sani-
tizer that rewrites the untrusted input extensions’ binary code so as to intercept all faults
before they occur and to re-route them to separate handlers. Because the technique involves
no hardware reconfiguration and no special processor setting, extensions essentially oper-
ate in the same machine environment as their host applications. This permits the actual
transfer of control to occur in the same way as the simple function call from the example
in Listing 19, with only the additional overhead of a stack swap and register state saving
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Figure 28: Invocation latency for a null software-isolated extension as a function of the
number of its parameters. Includes stack swapping and state saving/restoring.
and restoring.
SFI isolated extensions live in code, data, and stack spaces that are logically separate
from their hosts. Each data access, stack operation, or control transfer is checked by
verification code injected in the sanitizing stage at extension load time. The IA-32 processor
architecture, however, maintains pointers to the code and stack spaces, in the form of the
EIP instruction pointer and ESP stack pointer registers, but no exclusive data space reference
pointer exists. Thus, at each invocation the code and stack pointers need to be explicitly
switched to their extension space values and then restored upon return. Additionally, as
extensions are not trusted but have full access to general registers, the state of those registers
must be saved and restored upon extension entry and exit, respectively.
The latter two extra steps result in a small latency increase. Listing 20 and Listing 21
in Appendix A display the codes used to measure the latency components of full software
isolation, and Figure 28 shows the corresponding latency data as a function of the number
of extension parameters.
Pure HFI
Our reference implementation of pure hardware fault isolation employs the memory seg-
mentation and privilege level features of IA-32 processors. Extension memory is described
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Listing 18: Modified C calling convention for extension invocation. The explicit declara-
tions to start and list the extension’s arguments permit us to place them directly in their
correct places on the callee’s (extension’s) stack and thus avoid needless memory copying.
kp c a l l ( idx , a , b , c ) => kp s t a r t a r g s ( ) ;
kp push int ( c ) ;
kp push int (b ) ;
kp push int ( a ) ;
k p c a l l ( idx ) ;
by separate and mutually disjoint code and data memory regions, where the former is read-
able and executable and the latter is readable and writable. The extension stack, along
with the global data and heap, is placed into the data segment. In addition, the descrip-
tors for both segments place them in the processor’s privilege ring 1, and thus outside of
the most-privileged ring 0 where the operating system lives. Segment boundaries ensure
the memory isolation property, and the lower privilege level disqualifies dangerous systems
instructions, thus ensuring the code vetting property.
While affording native execution speed to extensions, this arrangement, unfortunately,
complicates control transfers into and out of them by the introduction of two additional
steps.
The first additional step is the copying of extension invocation parameters from the
caller’s stack to the separate extension stack. This is made necessary because of the dif-
ference between the privilege levels of the caller and the callee. This source of overhead
can be minimized by modifying the extension calling convention and requiring the caller
to explicitly place the parameters directly into a ring 0 memory mapped overlay of the
extension’s ring 1 stack, e.g., through custom declaration as shown in Listing 18. However,
as parameter copying is not the major source of overhead, this optimization provides few
gains, while requiring source modifications.
The second, and more expensive, additional step involves the reconfiguration of the
CPU, namely, the reloading of all architectural segment registers, in order to switch from
the caller’s to the callee’s (extension’s) address space.
Both steps contribute latency to the invocation process. Figure 29 shows the distribution
of latency costs for a null extension in our hardware isolation prototype collected using
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Figure 29: Invocation latency for a null hardware-isolated extension as a function of the
number of its parameters. Because of the difference in caller and callee privilege level, the
cost of stack swapping cannot be accounted for explicitly, as it is performed by the hardware
as part of the control transfer.
the kernel module from Listing 22 in Appendix A. Remarkably, the absolute invocation
latency in the purely hardware prototype is over an order of magnitude larger than its
purely software counterpart. As already discussed in Chapter 3, this significant difference
is a result not only of the needed CPU reconfiguration, but also of its interplay with the
internal micro-architectural design of modern processors, evidenced by the disparities in the
basic costs from Figure 26.
Hybrid
Improving on the purely hardware isolation, our hybrid prototype employs segmentation,
but not privilege levels. Thus, both the OS kernel being extended and the extensions
themselves reside in the system privilege ring 0 with no code vetting restrictions imposed
by the hardware.
On the one hand, this arrangement permits us to use the faster long jumps instead
of the slower interrupts and/or exceptions for inter-segment control transfer necessary for
entry and exit into and out of extensions. On the other hand, however, this requires that
the necessary code vetting property be provided in some alternative way.
As described previously in Chapter 3, our hybrid prototype applies a load-time sanitizer
to extensions. The sanitizer operates by decoding the extension binary code, ascertaining
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Figure 30: Invocation latency for a null hybrid-isolated extension as a function of the
number of its parameters.
the absence of dangerous systems instructions, and injecting target verification code before
all indirect control transfers, in order to guarantee proper machine code alignment. The
resulting sanitized code satisfies the code vetting and intra-extension execution control
properties, in that it is guaranteed to only branch to well-aligned instruction boundaries and
to not execute any dangerous instructions. To complete the set of requirements, memory
and timing isolation, as well as external execution control are respectively provided by
segmentation and timer hardware.
Listing 23 in Appendix A provides the source code for the kernel modules used to quan-
tify the invocation latency that can be achieved with our hybrid scheme. Its results are
displayed in Figure 30 and show latency improvement between 48% and 58%, depending
on the number of extension parameters.
Note that there is a difference in extension parameter handling between the purely hard-
ware and hybrid prototypes. While the former copies extension parameters from the caller’s
stack to the callee’s, the latter employs a modified calling convention in order to place the
arguments directly in their correct location on the callee’s stack. The implementation dif-
ference, however, does not result in significant disparities, as the cost of passing arguments,




The throughput metric reflects the execution overhead imposed on extensions isolated with
a particular isolation technique. Execution overheads can be measured in two ways, either
by accounting for the increase in isolated extensions’ code size, or by accounting for the
increase in their actual execution time. Unfortunately, neither approach is best and both
have pros and cons.
The code size approach, for example, has a simple and straightforward implementation
and is consistent and independent of code path and input data, in the sense that it always
yields the same result when applied to the same extension. Nevertheless, the increase in
an extension’s instruction count is a blind measure, in that it fails to account for code
structure, such as loops and conditional statements, and for the type differences in added
isolation instructions. Register bound operations, for example, complete faster than memory
operations. The speed of conditional control transfers varies depending on the correctness
of their branch prediction and memory load/stores vary depending on whether their target
hits of misses in the data cache.
The execution time approach is also simple to implement and it does account for the
extension code structure and the types of isolation overhead instructions, because it mea-
sures the code’s actual execution time. However, it is strongly dependent on the input data
supplied to the extension and only measures the throughput reduction for the actual code
path exercised by that run. Complete code path coverage for non-trivial extensions would
require multiple invocations, in the general case, with specially designed input vectors to
evoke them.
As a result, there is no single best way to account for the throughput reduction incurred
by different isolation techniques. In the interest of completeness, then, we employ both in
our real-life evaluation in Section 4.4. In this section, we use simple micro-benchmark codes
with linear code path structure, so the two metrics should correlate well. Furthermore, to
focus on the overheads specifically impacted by our hybrid proposal, we explore throughput
reduction by studying two extensions artificially constructed to specifically exercise indirect
memory references and indirect control transfers, respectively.
87
Because of their length, the extensions and the measurement instrumentation around
them are shown in Appendix A. The indirect memory reference codes are shown in Listing 26
and Listing 27, and the indirect control transfer codes are shown in Listing 24 and Listing 25.
There are two relevant aspects to those code features – their typical frequency of occur-
rence in our target domain, and their isolation cost. In order to capture both into a single
convenient metric, we define the term Impact Coefficient to be the product of the relative
frequency of occurrence and the ratio of the cost of isolated over non-isolated code minus
one.
Impact Coefficient = Insn Relative Frequency ∗ (Isolated/P lain− 1) (1)
Thus, the ‘Impact Coefficient’ provides us with a quantitative measure of an isolation
technique’s throughput overhead. Intuitively, it provides a glimpse into the “drag” an
isolation technique imposes on extensions in terms relative to their instruction mix and
code size. Table 4 provides an overview of the actual measurements and their computed
impact coefficients.
The data support a number of interesting observations. First, the impact coefficients
computed on the basis of code size and execution times correlate well, as expected from
linear micro-benchmarks that do not exhibit looping or branching structure. Second, the
impact coefficient of software isolation on the throughput of indirect control transfers, at
approximately 8%, is relatively small. Third, the impact coefficient of software isolation
on the throughput of indirect memory references, at approximately 80%, is relatively large.
Finally, because hardware fault isolation executes extensions unmodified, its throughput
impact coefficient would always be 0%.
Unsurprisingly, based solely on their throughput impact, it appears that if purely soft-
ware isolated, typical systems code would experience a significant slowdown, whereas if
purely hardware isolated, it would experience none. The key insight, however, lies in locat-
ing and demonstrating the source of the majority of SFI throughput overhead – the high
frequency and high cost of isolation of indirect memory references.
That observation, in turn, supports the main premise of this dissertation, by suggesting
88
Table 4: Comparison of the throughput impact of different isolation techniques. Since
hardware isolation techniques execute unmodified extension code, they serve as the ba-
sis for comparison. The categories for comparison are the increases in code size (bytes)
and in execution time (CPU cycles) of code features subject to isolation, namely indirect
memory references and indirect control transfers. The relative frequencies of appearance
of such instructions are extracted from the statistical analysis of systems code appearing
in Figure 21. The ‘Impact Coefficient’ metric is computed according to Equation 1 and is
directly proportional to both usage frequency and isolation cost.
Bytes Cycles
Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect
Mem Ref Ctrl Xfer Mem Ref Ctrl Xfer
Plain / HFI
Isolated Code 84 102 11 43
SW Isolated
Code 294 479 41 223
Insn Relative
Frequency 0.31 0.02 0.31 0.02
HFI Impact
Coefficient 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SFI Impact
Coefficient 0.78 0.07 0.85 0.08
the benefits of a hybrid solution that can handle the common case of indirect memory
references in hardware and employ costly software fault isolation only for the less common
case of indirect control transfers.
4.3.3 Qualitative Measures
The micro-benchmarks described above capture some of the quantitative differences between
isolation techniques, but there also exist qualitative ones which can be equally or even more
important. Whereas the former discriminate between performance parameters of competing
techniques, the latter tend to focus on more profound distinctions that can either qualify
or disqualify the usage of a particular technique.
Examples of qualitative differences can range from the ability or inability of a technique
to operate on legacy extensions that are coded in a particular programming language or that
are available in binary form only, through the requirement of a specific proving or trusted
compiler, to the requirement for special hardware features, e.g., segmentation, privilege
rings, etc. Such qualitative differences and the associated limitations fall in the ‘Adequacy’
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comparison metric of our classification scheme from Chapter 3.
Because of their nature, qualitative differences are difficult to assess. Nevertheless, a
hybrid technique that has been engineered in a way allowing it to revert to any of its homo-
geneous component techniques on the fly would always be qualitatively superior because of
its inherent flexibility.
4.4 Macro-Benchmarks
Our evaluation so far has focused exclusively on micro-benchmarks focused tightly on in-
dividual performance metrics such as latency and throughput. The benefits of such simple
measures are first, their ability to provide clean and uncluttered quantitative views of the
performance of a complex system, and second, their ability to control unrelated variables
and thus to provide experiment determinism and repeatability.
Despite their usefulness, micro-benchmarks are not sufficient for the complete evaluation
of any complex system. By focusing too closely on a single facet, they fail to account for
the interdependencies that exist in any such system, and as a result are not a representative
of its expected performance with respect to any particular application load.
4.4.1 Motivation
In order to fill this gap in our evaluation, this section uses larger and more complex macro-
benchmarks consisting of computational kernels from real-life applications. Because of their
dependence on multiple, interdependent, and unpredictable variables, such as memory and
cache latencies, hardware interrupts, etc., we expect that these macro-benchmarks will
exhibit increased variability and decreased precision.
In particular, the application kernels that we employ are the EdgeBreaker 3D triangular-
mesh compression routine and a combined image processing routine consisting of an integer-
only gray-scaling and edge detection algorithms demonstrated in Figure 31 and representing
a transcoding engine from the CameraCast remote video sensor system [52].
These examples are chosen to satisfy a number of criteria:
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Figure 31: Demonstration of the gray-scaling and edge detection image processing load.
The images operated upon are in the raw PPM and PGM formats with size 640x480 pixels.
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1. They represent two classes of actual application loads, as opposed to artificially con-
structed, and hence unrepresentative, loads,
2. They provide a convenient vehicle for gaining insight into the real-life performance
characteristics that are to be expected from traditional as well as from novel hybrid
isolation techniques, and finally,
3. They contribute concrete and application-specific metrics for the evaluation of the
benchmark’s cost, e.g., the added isolation-related runtime per unit work, or perfor-
mance, e.g., the number of work units that can be processed by the isolated code per
unit of time.
Because of their size, the listings for these benchmarks and their isolated versions are
provided separately in Appendix B whereas for the remainder of this chapter we will con-
centrate on a discussion of their results.
4.4.2 Methodology
In order to limit the jitter induced into the benchmark measurements by external events, the
codes are designed to modify the scheduling policy under which they operate to the real-
time SCHED FIFO class. Processes scheduled under it run to completion, or until they
voluntarily yield the CPU or block on I/O. Additionally, SCHED FIFO processes always
take precedence over all non-real-time processes.
We execute the macro-benchmarks one at a time as the only real-time scheduled pro-
cesses in the system, thus eliminating OS scheduling induced jitter. Nevertheless, the un-
avoidable memory caching and hardware interrupts still introduce some measurable variance
into our results.
4.4.3 Aggregate Runtime
The total runtime of an actual application’s kernel extension presents a practical aggregate
metric of the order of performance that can be achieved on the given platform using the
given isolation strategy. Figure 32 presents such aggregate runtime data for EdgeBreaker
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Figure 32: Breakdown of experimentally measured performance for the sample isolated
real-life extensions. Note how the hybrid case of the EdgeBreaker code is somewhat costlier
than predicted by the Impact Coefficient, whereas the hybrid case of the GrayEdge code is
somewhat cheaper. Such fluctuations are caused by differences in the relative instruction
composition between the respective application codes.
compression and GrayEdge image processing, our two macro-benchmarks of choice. More-
over, to aid in attributing performance costs and to emphasize their ratio, the data has
been broken down into two parts, namely, the pure application load of the extension and
the extra isolation overhead. The latter component includes both the latency and CPU
burden dimensions of isolation cost.
While the data clearly bears out the performance part of the throughput/latency com-
promise for the hybrid strategy, it is interesting to note the disparity that exists in the
hybrid isolation effects between the two examples. The cause for that contrast is the dif-
ference in their relative instruction composition, both with respect to each other and with
respect to the “average” system code instruction composition numbers extracted from the
Linux kernel and used as a basis for the impact coefficient.
The GrayEdge image code is memory-intensive and fairly monolithic, consisting of only
2 separate functions applied to the data in series. Thus, it exhibits more indirect mem-
ory references and less indirect control transfers than the average, so it is able to extract
maximum benefits from the hybrid isolation strategy relative to the SFI technique.
EdgeBreaker, on the other hand, is similarly memory-intensive but rather more frag-
mented, consisting of 13 sub-routines, many of which are invoked a large number of times
as part of its algorithm. The resulting larger share of indirect control transfers leads to a
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Figure 33: Experimentally measured isolation cost, presented in application-specific terms.
The added cost is expressed as additional CPU µs per triangle or pixel processed, respec-
tively.
reduction in the efficiency of the hybrid isolation strategy.
4.4.4 Application-Relative Cost & Performance
A more meaningful way of analyzing isolation induced limits is to consider them from the
end application’s view point. In our benchmarks, two useful application-specific cost and
performance metrics are the additional runtime required to process a single triangle or pixel,
respectively, and the reduction in the attainable processing rate measured in triangles or
pixels per second.
Whereas the former is an application-specific relative expression of the raw aggregate
measure from Figure 32, the latter is a relative metric dependent on both the absolute
isolation runtime overhead and the normal non-isolated application processing performed
by the extension.
It is worth noting that the cost computation for the latter in Figure 33 includes a
latency cost component that is fixed and independent from the number of triangles or pixels
processed. However, because it contributes a relatively small absolute term to the overall
cost, it is washed out and disappears in the ‘per triangle’ plot for all practical purposes.
Therefore, the data presented in Figure 33 can be used as a good predictor for the runtime
of an application load given an input of known size.
In turn, the isolation cost can be combined with runtime data for the particular extension
payload and converted into a ‘performance loss’ expressed in native application metrics.
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Figure 34: Experimentally measured performance loss relative to non-isolated perfor-
mance. The left figure reports results for the EdgeBreaker example and the right one for
GrayEdge.
Table 5: Experimentally measured performance loss relative to non-isolated performance.
Macro- Isolation Technique
Benchmark SFI Hybrid HFI
EdgeBreaker 62.53% 33.26% 0%
GrayEdge 64.00% 0.24% 0%
For our two examples this is measured in triangles or pixels per second and demonstrates
the reduction in their throughput effected by isolation. Figure 34 and Table 5 provide a
relative expression of the applications’ performance loss impact in graphical and tabular
form, respectively.
In conclusion, we have presented an evaluation of the main classes of state-of-the-art
isolation techniques. Using concrete micro- and macro-benchmarks, we have assessed their
costs and demonstrated in practice that the choice of isolation technique can have signifi-
cant consequence for the performance of isolated application extensions. Depending on the
extensions’ code composition, an unsuitable isolation technique choice can result in con-
siderable loss of efficiency, flexibility, or both. The experimental evaluation supports the
central thesis of this dissertation unequivocally, confirming initial projections of the ben-
efits of the hybrid software/hardware approach and establishes its limits as well as some




The object of this dissertation is to improve on the state-of-the-art approaches to code
isolation and in this way promote extensible designs for both OS kernels and applications
in general. The approach we are taking is to explore and exploit synergies among a wide
variety of divergent existing techniques and combine them, or parts thereof, in order to
leverage their strengths and alleviate their weaknesses. Thus, necessarily this work bears
similarities with many past and present research efforts in academia as well as industry.
In this chapter, we survey those related works and classify them into several categories
according to their approach to ensuring the safety of isolated extension code and their
relationship to the work presented in this dissertation.
5.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods represent a class of techniques that attempt to use formal safety specifi-
cations, logic reasoning, and automatic proof generation to prove invariants of extensions
and safety properties about the behavior of their code.
In their essence, formal techniques aim to prove a piece of extension code ‘safe’ once and
then exploit this fact every time that it is run by directly executing it within the software
system that it extends, avoiding the need for any further isolation measures. There is a
multitude of benefits to this approach: (1) there is no run-time overhead as the extension
code is executed directly and freely within the extended application, (2) the cost of the initial
proof, large though it may be, is amortized over the lifetime of the extension, and (3) formal
proofs can deal not only with code isolation, but also with aspects of the code’s behavior
and so can additionally ensure that application invariants are preserved, for example.
Despite those desirable qualities, formal methods have not found much practical use
chiefly because of the difficulty of automatic proof generation for large and/or complex
codes, and to a lesser extent, the difficulty of ensuring completeness of the necessary safety
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specification on which the proofs are based. Nonetheless, formal methods have been applied
for simpler problems of manageable size, or to restricted problem domains. We continue
this section with a description of two such formal methods: Proof-Carrying Code [77], and
the Microsoft Driver Verifier [8].
5.1.1 Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [77, 74] is a mechanism through which an application can
determine with certainty the safety of a binary supplied by an untrusted source. The
binary is required to have been compiled with a special compiler which attaches a proof
of the safety of the binary along with its object code. Safety, in this case, is defined as
an attestation to the adherence of the binary code to a ‘safety policy’ that is provided by
the application being extended. The proof takes a form that allows it to be verified easily
and quickly, guarantees the behavior of its object code, and does not involve the use of
encryption. At load time, the proof is validated and, barring a validation failure, it can be
linked into the host application and invoked without the need for any further checks.
One of the chief advantages of the PCC approach is its total lack of run-time over-
head both in terms of invocation latency and of additional checking code. Since the proof
and validation process have already guaranteed the safety of a PCC extension during its
compilation and loading stage, it can be executed directly and immediately when needed,
without the need for latency-incurring reconfiguration of the CPU’s protection hardware
and without any overhead from extraneous embedded checking code.
Another major advantage is the fact that the safety policy defining the boundaries
of the extension’s isolated environment is a powerful approach that can also be used to
define application invariants and attest the extension’s adherence to them. This provides a
practical means for extension behavior attestation that goes beyond the realm of safety and
blends into correctness, e.g., the ability to guarantee that for every spin lock() there is a
corresponding spin unlock(), etc.
Finally, the overheads that do remain, i.e., the creation and verification of the safety
proof, are amortized over the lifetime and all invocations of the extension, respectively.
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Once a proof is created, it can be used for as long as the extension code does not change
and once verified and loaded, an extension can be invoked at will until unloaded.
The PCC approach, however, also has its disadvantages, the chief one of which is the
complexity and cost of the necessary automatic proof generation. Despite advances in
the technology of modern theorem provers, the computational cost of producing a PCC
proof for complex and/or large extensions is still beyond practical means. Examples in
the literature range from trivial functions to simple packet-filters, but fall well short of the
size and complexity of useful real-life scenarios like a file-system kernel module, or a PDF
browser plugin for example.
Other PCC disadvantages include its inability to provide for timing isolation by proving
an upper bound for the termination of the extension. Since this is essentially the Halting
Problem which has been proved NP-complete, it is unlikely that a practical formal method
solution will be found. Moreover, PCC’s guarantees for other isolation properties, such as
Memory Isolation or Execution Control, are determined by the completeness of the safety
policy.
5.1.2 SLAM and Microsoft Driver Verifier
The Microsoft Static Driver Verifier (SDV) came out of Microsoft Research’s SLAM [8, 9, 7]
project which aimed to apply formal reasoning techniques to detect bugs in Microsoft’s
popular Windows OS. The project was specifically focused on discovering bugs in device
drivers as crash statistics have shown them to be the major source, accounting for roughly
85% of all newly discovered bugs [96].
The Microsoft SDV is a rule-based, compile-time, static analysis tool for device drivers
that aims to test for conformance to the Windows Driver Model (WDM) API usage rules.
It uses a well-defined set of 65 rules which cover 7 categories of kernel/driver interaction,
ranging from the use of synchronization, to power management functions, etc.
The SDV performs symbolic execution to examine and evaluate the driver code without
actually executing it in the context of an OS. At compile-time, it creates an abstract model
of the driver that is amenable to model checking algorithms. The subject driver is first
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reduced to a boolean program, where it is easier to track simple properties of variables,
e.g., NULL or non-NULL. The SDV then performs an exhaustive search for program states
that violate its set of rules and symbolically simulates the execution path leading to those
states to determine whether they are truly feasible. The SDV systematically explores all
execution paths in the driver. This is difficult to do through traditional means because of
the asynchronous nature of the driver environment.
While very successful at its narrowly stated goal of discovering bugs in third party
drivers, the SDV approach is not general enough to address the requirements for complete
code isolation. Problems like guaranteeing the safety of dynamic memory accesses or timing
isolation are hard or impossible to handle with an approximating rule-based approach.
5.2 Type-Safe Languages
Another class of approaches to code isolating untrusted software components is based on
the properties of type-safe programming languages. In general, these approaches restrict
the implementation language and compiler to be used for both the main application and for
extensions. The language is required to be type-safe, such as Modula-3, Typed Assembly
Language (TAL), Java, a type-safe C dialect, etc. The compiler is required to be well-
behaved and is trusted to perform the necessary data type checks, especially with respect
to pointers. While some of those checks can be computed at compile time, others may only
be computable later, during the actual runtime, so the compiler is also trusted to build
additional checking instructions into the binary. Finally, the compiler typically is required
to sign the binary so that its trustworthiness can be verified prior to its use.
As with other approaches, type-safe languages have their strong and weak points. On
the one hand, they are able to provide code isolation efficiently by performing as much of
the necessary checks as possible once during compile time. The extensions they produce
merge seamlessly into applications and their use incurs no invocation latency overheads
because no special treatments or hardware reconfiguration are necessary.
On the other hand, they restrict the application and extension implementation language
and compiler. Not every programming language is suitable for every purpose and what is
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more, in many situations such language-lock creates difficult problems with respect to legacy
code or backward compatibility. Moreover, the heavy reliance on a trusted compiler means
that the isolation guarantees are only as strong as the compiler is correct. Since modern
compilers are quite complex, typically consisting of hundreds of thousands of lines of code,
the potential for possible exploits cannot be ruled out. Finally, the additional dynamic
checking code incurs some runtime overhead which is difficult to quantify, but can result in
significant slowdown.
We briefly describe some recent examples of the type-safe languages used to isolate
untrusted code.
5.2.1 Modula-3
Modula-3 is the type-safe language used in the SPIN [12, 92, 43, 82] extensible operating
system. It supports interfaces, type safety, automatic storage management, objects, generic
interfaces, threads, and exceptions, though only the first three are required for SPIN’s
purposes. Interfaces are used to hide implementation detail and only present a strict API
to modules. The approach exploits type-safety to prevent arbitrary memory accesses by
requiring that pointers only point to objects of a matching type.
These two features implement most of the execution control and memory access restric-
tion requirements for isolation. Since they are implemented mostly at compile time, they
are also mostly run-time burden-free. Some operations like dynamic array indexing, dy-
namic pointer casts, etc., however, cannot always be statically checked at compile time. In
these cases, the compiler inserts additional checking instructions. Code vetting in SPIN is
realized by mandating the use of a trusted Modula-3 compiler that only generates proper
code. Finally, timing isolation, unlike the rest of the isolation criteria, is unfortunately not
guaranteed simply by virtue of using Modula-3. To fill this gap, SPIN implements extension
preemption through a periodic timer interrupt.
5.2.2 Typed Assembly Language
Typed Assembly Language (TAL) [70, 21, 69, 40] is an extension of traditional untyped
assembly languages that introduces typing annotations, memory management primitives,
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and a coherent set of typing rules. These typing rules guarantee memory isolation, control
isolation, and type safety of TAL programs. Timing isolation is not handled intrinsically,
however, and either has to be enforced via external means or by additional code inserted
by a higher-level compiler. Code vetting is directly verifiable from the machine language.
The TAL typing constructs are expressive enough to encode most source language pro-
gramming features including records and structures, arrays, polymorphic functions, excep-
tions, abstract data types, sub-typing, and modules. TAL is also flexible enough to allow
many low-level compiler optimizations.
As such, TAL itself is not so much a unique approach, but may instead be characterized
as a target platform for type-safe language compilers that want to produce code that can
be verified to be safe for use in extensible applications or operating system kernels. One
can also look at TAL as a simple form of proof-carrying code, with the type annotations in
the binary constituting the proof and the type-checker applied at load time playing the role
of a proof verifier. The use of TAL frees the choice of extension implementation language
to any high-level language with a TAL-target compiler and removes the requirement for
trusting the compiler. In this way, TAL provides a way to relax some of the constraints of
using high-level type-safe languages.
5.2.3 Type-Safe C
Recent years have seen the emergence of CCured [17, 76, 75, 37] and Cyclone [51, 34, 33, 42,
41], two new programming languages that directly address the legacy code and language lock
drawbacks of type-safe languages like Modula-3, ML, Java, etc. They do this by attempting
to address the safety problems of C, the most popular systems implementation language,
instead of advocating its substitution with an alternative.
Both CCured and Cyclone extend C’s type system and apply a mix of static and dynamic
checks to the source code, and they are implemented as meta-compilers producing regular
C language. The main focus of both is memory access control and more specifically, reining
in the dangers of pointer casts and pointer arithmetic. The general approach is to add type
information to pointers and then build type verification into the compiled program.
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There are, however, distinct differences between the two methods. CCured is most
concerned with porting legacy code with little or no change, so it infers pointer properties
from the code itself and stores them in modified pointer data representations. In contrast,
Cyclone is most concerned with preserving C’s performance and programmer control over
the low-level details of data representation and memory management, so it does not shy
away from extending the language with several versions of typed pointers. Cyclone also
goes beyond memory access control and integrates multi-threading, synchronization, and
region-based memory management into the language.
To gain the full benefits of Cyclone, extensions still need to be ported to it from standard
C, though that task is made much easier by the closeness between both languages. Its
combination of low-level control, cheap porting cost, and a multitude of safety benefits
has quickly popularized Cyclone and made it the language of choice for many extensible
systems, such as the Open Kernel Environment (OKE) [13, 15, 14], the RBClick [83] resource
management extension of the Click [68] modular router, the FLAME [6, 50, 5] programmable
packet-level network monitoring architecture, etc.
Finally, like other programming language techniques, CCured and Cyclone are able to
guarantee memory isolation, control-flow isolation, and code vetting, but cannot guarantee
timing control for extensions.
5.2.4 Singularity
Probably the most novel and far-reaching language approach is a new experimental OS from
Microsoft Research named Singularity [44]. Almost all of Singularity is written in a new
type-safe language named Sing# which is based on C# with some important improvements.
Sing# introduces the notion of message passing with semantics defined by formal contracts
as an organic part of the programming language itself as opposed to an external primitive
provided by a library or the OS. This helps by extending the traditional strong typing of data
to the means for its transmission. All communication in Singularity is performed through
Sing#’s bidirectional ‘channels’ which not only impose the strong typing of message content,
but also requires the specification of messaging protocol through an explicit ‘contract’. The
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combination of these language features effectively extends the type-checking capabilities of
the Sing# compiler outside of the domain of datastructures and across the wider realm of
communicating processes.
Another distinguishing feature of Singularity is its novel definition of the familiar concept
of a process. In traditional OSs, separate processes have always been associated with
separate address spaces with the latter providing the basic foundation for inter-process
isolation. The address space abstraction has invariably been implemented through some
form of direct hardware support, typically an MMU, with its associated costs [4] and a
large body of research on reducing them [55, 99, 16]. Singularity proposes the novel notion
of ‘sealed’ software isolated processes, or SIPs, where the sealed part refers to a closed
process architecture that prohibits dynamic linking and shared memory in favor of static
immutable code and message passing, and the software isolation part refers to discarding
the protection role of hardware (the MMU is used only for page mapping) and relying on
type-isolation to enforce the walls among SIPs. The result is a safe single virtual address
space system that effectively eliminates two significant sources of OS overhead – context
switches and kernel traps.
Singularity’s approach has the welcome characteristics of reducing common overheads
and establishing formal specifications that provide a basis for rigorous reasoning about its
correctness. Those characteristics, however, come at the cost of a static and immutable code
model where the smallest unit of functionality is a complete SIP and where communication
among SIPs is restricted only to message passing. Singularity’s radical departure from
traditional OS design is certainly novel and promising. It would be interesting to see how
it develops and how much traction it manages to establish in the mainstream outside of the
world of pure research.
5.3 Software Fault Isolation
Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [102] is a purely software technique that relies on rewriting
the object code of binary extensions before they are executed. It performs static checking
of memory references and control transfers that employ immediate addressing where the
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targets are fixed and known a priori. To handle indirect addressing instructions, it inserts
additional checking code into the binary that validates their actual targets at run-time. This
is straightforward to do for ordinary memory references as the target address need only be
checked against the boundaries of the sandbox. Control flow instructions, however, require
an additional check in order to verify that their target points to the beginning of a valid
instruction. This is easy on fixed instruction length architectures, as is typically the case for
RISC architectures, where it translates to an additional but inexpensive alignment check.
Variable instruction length architectures, usually CISC, such as the Intel IA-32 [47, 48],
however, are byte-addressable and raise the possibility of a malicious or malformed branch
into the middle of an instruction and thus decoding it as something different and potentially
unsafe.
Two solutions for that problem have been proposed in the literature. The first one
builds a table of all approved jump targets (instruction boundaries) during the initial code
instrumentation step and restricts indirect control transfers only to targets listed in it. The
second homogenizes the variable length CISC instruction set by padding each instruction
to a longer uniform length. The length is typically chosen to be the smallest power-of-2
bytes in order to simplify the checking code.
The combination of static and dynamic checks implemented through binary rewriting
allows the SFI technique to guarantee memory isolation, control flow isolation, as well as to
vet untrusted code. Overhead varies depending on the particular implementation technique
employed. Existing SFI implementations provide no means for timing isolation, though it
is possible to augment them at some additional cost by inserting a timing check in each
basic block of the untrusted code.
In terms of performance metrics, SFI has the advantages of not having any negative
impact on the invocation latency of isolated code and of being universally applicable to
any binary compiled with any compiler from any language and for any architecture. Its
disadvantages are the requirements for an initial instrumentation pass and, much more im-
portantly, the additional CPU burden of between 5% and 200% [91], dependent on program
code, architecture, and implementation.
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5.3.1 MiSFIT
MiSFIT [93, 94] is an SFI implementation for a fixed instruction length RISC MIPS [64, 65]
architecture. In particular, its isolation stage is designed to operate on compiler assembly
output before the final assembler converts it to object code. MiSFIT employs a look-up
table to verify the validity of dynamic branch targets. The table is populated with all
function entry points and labels from the source assembly. These restrictions help keep its
size and look-up cost reasonable.
In principle, it is possible to apply the MiSFIT approach directly to the final object
code, substituting the table look-up with a target alignment check for fixed instruction
length architectures, or populating the branch-table with all valid instruction boundaries
on variable instruction length architectures. The latter case, however, will likely result
in large tables, costly branch target validation checks, and thus a significant increase in
isolation overhead.
5.3.2 PittSFIeld
PittSFIeld [59, 60] stands for “Prototype IA-32 Transformation Tool for Software-based
Fault Isolation Enabling Load-time Determination (of safety)” and is an SFI implementation
aimed at Intel IA-32 [47, 48], a CISC variable instruction length architecture. Like MiSFIT,
it operates on assembly compiler output before it is fed into the final assembler. Its approach
is to modify the code by inserting no-op instructions as padding in such a way as to form
‘chunks’ satisfying the following properties:
1. The size and alignment of each chunk are fixed at a power of 2 bytes, equal to or
larger that the length of the longest instruction encoding, e.g. 24 = 16 bytes or larger
for IA-32.
2. No instruction can straddle a chunk boundary.
3. Instructions, which could be the target of a control transfer, must always be placed
at the beginning of a chunk.
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The benefit of this transformation is that the isolation code for target validation of
indirect branches is reduced to fast bit operations. Ensuring that control transfers only
target chunk beginnings maps to checking or coercing the least-significant 4 target address
bits to 0. Additionally, ensuring that control is transferred within the boundaries of a 2n-
byte sized sandbox maps to checking or coercing the 32− n most-significant target address
bits to the sandbox region’s ‘tag’.
While this keeps the overhead of the introduced checking code minimal, it also inflates
the original extension’s object code through the no-op instruction padding process. The
latter can be thought of as inserting bubbles or stall-cycles in the super-scalar pipeline of
the CPU while also effectively reducing the useful size of its instruction cache.
PittSFIeld’s approach can also be applied directly to pre-compiled object code. In that
case, however, as semantic information about the possible branch targets will be unknown,
all instructions will have to be padded individually, transforming the real variable-length
instructions into virtual new, longer but fixed-length ones and aggravating the costs of
padding significantly.
5.4 Hardware Fault Isolation
Hardware-based isolation techniques exploit features of the underlying physical platform.
Despite the unavoidable differences in implementation detail across different hardware plat-
forms, they all employ similar concepts.
Hardware support for code vetting and execution control is ubiquitous in modern com-
puter architectures and is usually based on the concept of modes of execution. There are
typically two such modes, privileged and unprivileged. Potentially dangerous instructions
are allowed only in the former, and mode switches between them are restricted only to a
set of well-defined entry points set up by system software.
Some architectures, such as PA-RISC [39] and Intel IA-32 [46, 49] for example, provide
additional intermediary modes and generalize the concept as ‘privilege levels’ or ‘privilege
rings’. The Intel IA-32 architecture is arguably the most popular such example. It provides
4 privilege levels, one of which is privileged and is typically reserved for running the OS
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kernel, while the rest are unprivileged and generally run user processes. The presence of
additional intermediary privilege levels can be leveraged by system software to create a hi-
erarchy of software dependency, with every level allowed to depend only on more-privileged,
and by assumption more-trustworthy, ones. Portable OS kernels like the Linux [19, 57] or
Windows [80, 90] kernels, however, only use the extreme rings as that is the lowest common
denominator across all modern architectures. Thus, the intermediary privilege rings have
mostly been used in extensible research kernels and as a means of implementing virtualiza-
tion [101, 10].
Support for timing control typically takes the form of programmable timers, such as the
HPET [45], that supply periodic interruptions and form the basis for a hardware-guaranteed
preemption mechanism. This mechanism is employed for timing isolation of user processes
in preemptible OSs, as well as for extension code in extensible research OS kernels.
With respect to memory isolation, however, two alternative supporting hardware fea-
tures exist: paging and segmentation. They offer very different approaches for achieving
the same goal – checking the ultimate target of each and every memory reference issued by
software.
5.4.1 Paging-Based
Paging-based memory isolation approaches rely on hardware originally built for demand-
paged virtual memory. Physical memory is split into fixed sized frames, access to which
can be protected as a block by means of mapping them into or unmapping them from
the currently active address space. Each address space has a page table associated with
it, and physical memory is mapped and unmapped through linking new frames into or
unlinking existing frames from its page table. Page tables also typically provide a ‘write
enable/disable’ bit per page, and sometimes also an ‘execute enable/disable’ bit per page.
In addition, effective read permissions can be granted and revoked through mapping and
unmapping pages. Though originally designed to support demand-paged virtual memory,
those features allow the hardware to be used to implement a flexible the memory isolation
scheme. Because paging hardware is practically ubiquitous, it is used to provide memory
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isolation among an OS kernel and its processes in virtually all operating systems today,
including Microsoft Windows, all Unix flavors, and many experimental OSs.
5.4.1.1 OS Kernels
Examples of paging-based memory isolation abound. Practically all commercial and non-
research operating systems today, such as Windows [90], Linux [57], Solaris [58], etc., and
most experimental ones employ this technique to protect their kernels from applications as
well as to enforce the walls among the latter.
They use paging hardware to implement the concept of address space, where all of the
memory accessible to a process is mapped in its page table and the rest of the virtual
address space is left unmapped. Each process has a separate page table, the backing store
pages of which are generally disjoint from those of other processes, except for explicitly set
up shared memory, and each process relies on the kernel for address space manipulations,
tear-down, and switching.
As page tables tend to be large and complicated structures, CPUs employ special page
table caches called Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs). Some architectures allow sharing
of the TLB cache by ‘tagging’ TLB entries with an address spaces identifier, though others
are untagged.
The most serious drawback to memory isolation implemented through page-based ad-
dress spaces is the significant cost incurred by address space switching. In untagged TLB
architectures like the Intel IA-32, the TLB needs to be flushed as part of an address space
switch in order to prevent the carryover of cached page mappings into the new address
space. The flush operation is costly in itself, but it also implies significant indirect costs
due to the need to re-populate the TLB after each flush. Tagged TLB architectures such
as MIPS, PowerPC, etc., do not require such a flush, but that is compensated by increased
runtime costs of address translation due to the effective TLB-size reduction because of TLB
resource sharing and the resulting contention among multiple address spaces.
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5.4.2 Segmentation-Based
Some modern CPUs, most notably the Intel IA-32 [46, 49] line but also others like the IBM
PowerPC [105, 106], provide an alternative means of implementing memory isolation based
around the concept of a memory ‘segment’. Segments are described in terms of a tuple
comprised of a base address, limit, type, access rights, and other properties. Multiple code
and data segments can be described simultaneously, and the regions of memory to which
they refer to are typically allowed to overlap.
At any given time, a set of segments are enabled by the OS kernel, and every memory
reference is issued in the context of one of them. Thus, the CPU confines all software gen-
erated memory references to the currently enabled set of segments, and only privileged OS
code can manipulate and enable or disable segments. Examples of the use of segmentation
in addition to page-based memory isolation include the L4 [53, 56, 38] microkernel’s opti-
mized ‘small spaces’ [55], and Linux kernel extension schemes like Palladium [16] and Kernel
Plugins [29]. Despite their well documented performance advantages [99, 29], segmentation
schemes are missing from mainstream OSs largely because of the non-universal availability
of segmentation hardware which complicates or precludes portability.
5.4.2.1 L4
L4 is a second generation microkernel developed at the German National Research Center for
Information Technology (GMD) since 1995. It was conceived as an effort to do microkernels
‘right’ after the disappointing performance of the first generation of microkernels, such as
L3 [54], Mach [2, 32], Chorus [35], Amoeba [97, 73], etc.
L4 is based on the premise that microkernels should offer only a minimal set of OS
abstractions and that they can be made fast at the expense of being processor dependent
and inherently non-portable. Its approach advocates an involved porting process that em-
ploys different algorithms and tailors internal datastructures to the details of the target
hardware, as opposed to simply rebuilding a unified source. The L4 project’s experimental
evidence [53, 38, 99] not only demonstrates the viability of microkernels, but also, in a way,
supports this dissertation’s premise of the benefits of hybrid design. L4 can be viewed as a
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hardware/hardware hybrid because of its use of both paging hardware to implement regular
address spaces and segmentation hardware to implement small address spaces optimized for
low-overhead context-switching.
5.4.2.2 Palladium
Palladium [16, 100] is an extensibility software architecture for user-level processes and
traditional monolithic OS kernels with a prototype implemented on the popular Intel IA-
32 architecture and the Linux kernel. It supports the injection of custom code into an
application or into the OS kernel and thus provides a means for specializing their behavior
or the services they provide.
Much like the L4 microkernel, Palladium employs both paging and segmentation in
order to deal with the isolation aspects of untrusted code extensions. However, it also
differs from it in that it isolates kernel extensions through a segmentation-based scheme,
whereas it isolates user-level extensions though a paging-based scheme. At first blush, this
functional split of Palladium’s implementation resembles a hybrid approach, but it is better
characterized as a union of two separate but disjoint technical solutions.
5.4.2.3 VX32
VX32 [24, 25] is a user-mode library designed to allow applications to load and execute
arbitrary untrusted extensions or plugins safely by means of code isolating them through
use of the Intel IA-32 segmentation hardware. The latter is used in a way similar to L4 and
Palladium, except that the implementation is aimed at user-space applications and requires
that extensions be processed by a compiler specially modified for the VX32 target.
5.5 Resource Control
5.5.1 RBClick
A somewhat related effort, RBClick [83, 86] proposes a hybrid approach to resource control
for dynamic network router extensions. Interestingly, RBClick already employs a type-safe
language (Cyclone) to guarantee the isolation and safety of the router core from untrusted
extensions. However, it advocates a mixed static/dynamic accounting and verification of
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router resources consumed by them. The balance for which RBClick is striving is a mid-
dle ground between static checking, which has the advantage of avoiding the problems of
asynchronous termination and runtime overhead but is overly conservative, and dynamic
checking, which bases its decisions on precise real-time information about the resource con-
sumption of active code but incurs runtime overhead and could lead to an asynchronous
termination of an extension.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented many related techniques, each with a unique approach
and a different set of strengths and weaknesses. To crystallize this point and to re-iterate
the motivation for this dissertation’s thesis, we point to a summary of the pros and cons of
the major classes of techniques in an easy at-a-glance overview in Table 1 on page 50.
Some of their distinguishing features like Latency or CPU Burden are quantitative in
nature and can be readily and precisely measured in unequivocal metrics. Others like Build
Cost or Adequacy are more qualitative and can depend on many and diverse factors, ranging
from the ability or inability of isolated code to run outside of a process context, to whether
the extension can be coded in a particular programming language, to whether legacy binary-
only extensions can be handled. This makes the latter harder to compare objectively, yet,
nonetheless equally important.
The variability that is observed across the board and the lack of a single universally




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis we have presented a novel the design and implementation of a novel hybrid
approach to code isolation. Our proposal is founded on the development of a classification
system for safety requirements and isolation overheads and the subsequent observation and
exploitation of the inverse nature of the relationship between the latency and CPU burden
costs of existing software and hardware fault isolation techniques.
Our classification system provides a formal model for the exploration of the boundaries
and constraints of code isolation techniques. It adopts the Universal Turing Machine as a
simplified prototype of modern computing machines built with von Neumann architectures,
it analyzes the model, and derives a complete set of isolation requirements in its context.
The four classic properties of secure systems: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
authenticity are considered along with the corresponding attack types, resulting in the
formulation of the following comprehensive set of isolation criteria:
• Memory Isolation: prescribes the imposition of limitations of reading and writing
accesses to storage.
• Execution Control: stipulates the enforcement of strict constraints over the flow of
control.
• Timing Control: dictates the establishment end enforcement of upper bounds on the
runtime of untrusted code.
• Code Vetting: prevents the exploitation of the UTM’s stateful nature by denying
dangerous state transitions for isolated code.
At a technical level, this thesis surveys the state-of-the-art code isolation techniques
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and compares their performance on the basis of four quantitative and qualitative metrics,
namely:
• Latency: reflects invocation overheads.
• CPU Burden: reflects runtime overheads.
• Build Cost: reflects load-time overheads.
• Adequacy: reflects usability restrictions.
Implementation techniques are discussed and profiled and an inherent latency/burden
trade-off is identified. Furthermore, a novel hybrid isolation technique is proposed that re-
sults in a better balance between quantitative performance metrics, as well as less restrictive
and more flexible qualitative metrics.
The hybrid isolation technique employs a combination of software and hardware ap-
proaches to cover the full set of safety requirements for system extensions. It is motivated
by the cost differential between the high-burden/low-latency of the former vs. the low-
burden/high-latency of the latter and also by the relative distribution of instructions in
executable machine code.
Finally, we have presented a comparative experimental evaluation of our hybrid isolation
proposal that employs a number of micro-benchmarks focusing narrowly on the individual
aspects of the performance trade-off, as well as two realistic macro-applications demonstrat-
ing the aggregate nature of the hybrid technique’s performance.
Thus, the principal contributions of this thesis to the existing body of research are briefly
summarized as:
• The development of a formal model for studying code isolation techniques, a compre-
hensive set of isolation requirements, and a taxonomy of metrics.
• The design and implementation of a novel hybrid isolation technique that exploits the
performance trade-offs of existing approaches.
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• A comparative experimental evaluation of the hybrid proposal vs. homogeneous alter-
natives using a range of micro-benchmarks as well as two realistic macro-applications.
6.2 Future Work
This thesis opens up several directions for future work, some related to the further explo-
ration of the hybrid theme and others related to the practical usability of the current hybrid
isolation code base.
An interesting direction in the former, more research-oriented, category could be the
examination of possible heuristics or techniques for enabling and automating the dynamic
runtime selection of isolation techniques on a case-to-case basis, perhaps guided by desired
quality of service metrics.
Another direction could be to take a closer look at the changing parameters and prop-
erties of the underlying hardware platforms with an eye towards uncovering more oppor-
tunities for hybrid designs both in the quantitative performance and qualitative flexibility
spaces. A concrete example of this is the disappearance of support for segmentation from
the current and future generations of the Intel x86 architecture and the introduction of
multi-core CPUs across the whole mobile to desktop to server space. Specifically, the built-
in asymmetries of the memory hierarchy of the latter, such as cache level sharing within
a CPU package for example, effectively transform them into NUMA architectures, even
when computing cores are all symmetric. Moreover, the asymmetries present yet another
dimension of differential performance and hence an opportunity for hybrids.
Alternatively, the latter and more practical direction for future work also presents a
number of opportunities for improvement of the current prototype. The existing code is
little more than a proof-of-concept and could certainly benefit a lot from a better integration
between the software and the hardware fault isolation components of the hybrid. A better
implementation of the binary rewriter to incorporate both flexibility in the specification of





This appendix provides the listings for the latency and throughput micro-benchmark mea-
surement codes used in the experimental evaluation in Chapter 4. They have been included
here and not in the main text because of their significant length.
A.1 Latency Codes
Listing 19: Code to measure the cost of a null function call as a function of the number
of its parameters.
#include <s t d i o . h>
#define REPT SHIFT (10)
#define REPT (1 << REPT SHIFT)
unsigned long long t s1 ;
unsigned long long t s2 ;
/∗ Test f unc t i on s to be invoked ∗/
int f 0 (void )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 1 ( int p01 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 2 ( int p01 , int p02 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 4 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 8 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 16 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 ,
int p09 , int p10 , int p11 , int p12 ,
int p13 , int p14 , int p15 , int p16 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 32 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 ,
int p09 , int p10 , int p11 , int p12 ,
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int p13 , int p14 , int p15 , int p16 ,
int p17 , int p18 , int p19 , int p20 ,
int p21 , int p22 , int p23 , int p24 ,
int p25 , int p26 , int p27 , int p28 ,
int p29 , int p30 , int p31 , int p32 )
{ return 0 ; }



















/∗ Macro to bu i ld the t e s t d r i v e r func t i on ∗/
#define BUILD BENCH(x ) \
unsigned long bench##x ( ) \
{ \
int i , j ; \
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) { \
/∗ I n i t i a l time−stamp ∗/ \
asm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid\n\t" \
"rdtsc\n\t" \
: "=A" ( t s1 ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ; \
\
/∗ Timing payload ∗/ \
for ( i =0; i<=REPT; i++) { \








/∗ Fina l time−stamp ∗/ \
asm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid\n\t" \
"rdtsc\n\t" \
: "=A" ( t s2 ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ; \
/∗ Compute average ∗/ \
t s2 −= ts1 ; \
t s2 >>= REPT SHIFT ; \
} \
return (unsigned long ) t s2 ; \
}








int main ( )
{
p r i n t f ("Null fn call as a function of number of parameters\n" ) ;
/∗ Invoke t e s t d r i v e r f unc t i on s ∗/
p r i n t f ("bench0() = %lu\n" , bench0 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench1() = %lu\n" , bench1 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench2() = %lu\n" , bench2 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench4() = %lu\n" , bench4 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench8() = %lu\n" , bench8 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench16() = %lu\n" , bench16 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench32() = %lu\n" , bench32 ( ) ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Listing 20: Code to measure the invocation latency for a null software-isolated extension
as a function of the number of its parameters.
#include <s t d i o . h>
#define REPT SHIFT (10)
#define REPT (1 << REPT SHIFT)
/∗ Extension s tack ∗/
unsigned char s tack [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
/∗ Extension d e s c r i p t o r ∗/
typedef struct {
unsigned long saved esp ;
unsigned long ex t e sp ;
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} runt ime t ;
runt ime t r t = { 0UL, (unsigned long)&stack [ 1 0 2 0 ] } ;
unsigned long long t s1 ;
unsigned long long t s2 ;
/∗ Test f unc t i on s to be invoked ∗/
int f 0 (void )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 1 ( int p01 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 2 ( int p01 , int p02 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 4 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 8 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 16 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 ,
int p09 , int p10 , int p11 , int p12 ,
int p13 , int p14 , int p15 , int p16 )
{ return 0 ; }
int f 32 ( int p01 , int p02 , int p03 , int p04 ,
int p05 , int p06 , int p07 , int p08 ,
int p09 , int p10 , int p11 , int p12 ,
int p13 , int p14 , int p15 , int p16 ,
int p17 , int p18 , int p19 , int p20 ,
int p21 , int p22 , int p23 , int p24 ,
int p25 , int p26 , int p27 , int p28 ,
int p29 , int p30 , int p31 , int p32 )
{ return 0 ; }




















/∗ Macro to bu i ld the t e s t d r i v e r func t i on ∗/
#define BUILD BENCH(x ) \
unsigned long bench##x ( ) \
{ \
int i , j ; \
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) { \
/∗ I n i t i a l time−stamp ∗/ \
asm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid\n\t" \
"rdtsc\n\t" \
: "=A" ( t s1 ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ; \
\
/∗ Timing payload ∗/ \
for ( i =0; i<REPT; i++) { \






















: "=m" ( r t . saved esp ) \
: "m" ( r t . ex t e sp ) ) ; \
} \
\
/∗ Fina l time−stamp ∗/ \
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asm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid\n\t" \
"rdtsc\n\t" \
: "=A" ( t s2 ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ; \
/∗ Compute average ∗/ \
t s2 −= ts1 ; \
t s2 >>= REPT SHIFT ; \
} \
return (unsigned long ) t s2 ; \
}








int main ( )
{
p r i n t f ("Null extension call as a function of number of parameters\n" ) ;
/∗ Invoke t e s t d r i v e r f unc t i on s ∗/
p r i n t f ("bench0() = %lu\n" , bench0 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench1() = %lu\n" , bench1 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench2() = %lu\n" , bench2 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench4() = %lu\n" , bench4 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench8() = %lu\n" , bench8 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench16() = %lu\n" , bench16 ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ("bench32() = %lu\n" , bench32 ( ) ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Listing 21: Code to measure only the cost of stack swapping and state saving and restoring.
#include <s t d i o . h>
#define REPT SHIFT (10)
#define REPT (1 << REPT SHIFT)
/∗ Extension s tack ∗/
unsigned char s tack [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
/∗ Extension d e s c r i p t o r ∗/
typedef struct {
unsigned long saved esp ;
unsigned long ex t e sp ;
} runt ime t ;
runt ime t r t = { 0UL, (unsigned long)&stack [ 1 0 2 0 ] } ;
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unsigned long long t s1 ;
unsigned long long t s2 ;
unsigned long bench ( )
{
int i , j ;
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
/∗ I n i t i a l time−stamp ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e (
"cpuid\n\t"
"rdtsc\n\t"
: "=A" ( t s1 )
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ;
/∗ Timing payload ∗/
for ( i =0; i<REPT; i++) {
















: "=m" ( r t . saved esp )
: "m" ( r t . ex t e sp ) ) ;
}
/∗ Fina l time−stamp ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e (
"cpuid\n\t"
"rdtsc\n\t"
: "=A" ( t s2 )
: : "ebx" , "ecx" ) ;
/∗ Compute average ∗/
t s2 −= ts1 ;
t s2 >>= REPT SHIFT ;
}
return (unsigned long ) t s2 ;
}
int main ( )
{
p r i n t f ("Stack swap and state saving/restoring cost.\n" ) ;
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/∗ Invoke t e s t d r i v e r f unc t i on s ∗/
p r i n t f ("bench() = %lu\n" , bench ( ) ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Listing 22: Kernel module code to measure the invocation latency for a null hardware-
isolated extension as a function of the number of its parameters.
#include <l i nux / con f i g . h>
#include <l i nux / ve r s i on . h>
#include <l i nux /module . h>
#include <l i nux / ke rne l . h>
#include <l i nux / i n i t . h>
#include <l i nux / sched . h>
#include <asm/ cur rent . h>
#include <l i nux / kp lug ins . h>
#define dbg ( fmt , args . . . )
#define e r r ( fmt , args . . . ) p r in tk (KERN ERR fmt , ## args )
#define i n f o ( fmt , args . . . ) p r in tk (KERN INFO fmt , ## args )
unsigned long long t1 ;
unsigned long long t2 ;
#define REP SHIFT (10)
#define REPEATS (1 << REP SHIFT)
#ifde f rd t s c
#undef rd t s c
#endif
#define rd t s c ( x ) a sm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid;rdtsc" \
: "=A" ( x ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" )
/∗
∗ ” runt ime t ” s t r u c tu r e d e s c r i b i n g p lug in space .
∗/
stat ic runt ime t ∗ r t ;
/∗
∗ numerica l index o f the r e g i s t e r r e d p lug in .
∗/
int fn ;




void benchFn end (void ) {}
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#define BENCHFN LEN (( unsigned long ) benchFn end − (unsigned long ) benchFn )





unsigned long f l a g s ;
i n f o ("test_benchmark()\n" ) ;
/∗ Suspend i n t e r r up t s to avoid t iming i n t e r f e r e n c e ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e ("pushfl; popl %0; cli\n\t" : "=g" ( f l a g s ) ) ;
benchFn ( r t ) ;
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
benchFn ( r t ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("functn avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 0 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 1 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , r t ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 0 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 1 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 2 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
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e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt , 0 ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 1 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 2 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 3 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt , 0 , 0 ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 2 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 4 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 5 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
}
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rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 4 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 8 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 9 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 8 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 16 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 1 7 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;




i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Plugin 32 args ∗/
idx = reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" , 3 3 ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
e r r ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp c a l l ( idx , rt ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
i n f o ("plugin, 32 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
i f ( unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ) {
e r r ("Error unregisterring function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Suspend i n t e r r up t s to avoid t iming i n t e r f e r e n c e ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e ("push %0; popfl\n\t" : : "g" ( f l a g s ) ) ;
return ;
}
int i n i t kp demo in i t (void )
{
/∗ Make a runtime s t ru c tu r e ∗/
r t = make runtime ("latency" , 64 , NULL, 4096 ) ;
i f ( ! r t ) {
e r r ("Cannot allocate runtime!\n" ) ;
return −1;
}
test benchmark ( ) ;
return 0 ;
}
void e x i t kp demo cleanup (void )
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{
k i l l r u n t im e ( rt , 1 ) ;
return ;
}
modu le in i t ( kp demo in i t ) ;
module ex i t ( kp demo cleanup ) ;
Listing 23: Kernel module code to measure the invocation latency for a null hybrid-isolated
extension as a function of the number of its parameters.
#include <l i nux / con f i g . h>
#include <l i nux / ve r s i on . h>
#include <l i nux /module . h>
#include <l i nux / ke rne l . h>
#include <l i nux / i n i t . h>
#include <l i nux / sched . h>
#include <asm/ cur rent . h>
#include <asm/desc . h>
#include <l i nux / kp lug ins . h>
/∗
∗ ” runt ime t ” s t r u c tu r e d e s c r i b i n g p lug in space .
∗/
stat ic runt ime t ∗ r t ;
unsigned long f l a g s ;
unsigned long long t1 ;
unsigned long long t2 ;
#define REP SHIFT (10)
#define REPEATS (1 << REP SHIFT)
#ifde f rd t s c
#undef rd t s c
#endif
#define rd t s c ( x ) a sm v o l a t i l e ( \
"cpuid;rdtsc" \
: "=A" ( x ) \
: : "ebx" , "ecx" )




void benchFn end (void ) {}
#define BENCHFN LEN (( unsigned long ) benchFn end − (unsigned long ) benchFn )






kp in f o ("test_benchmark()\n" ) ;
idx = kp reg sym bin ( rt , ( p t f t ) benchFn , BENCHFN LEN, "benchFn" ) ;
i f ( idx < 0) {
kp in f o ("Error registerring a new dynamic (binary) function!\n" ) ;
return ;
}
/∗ Suspend i n t e r r up t s to avoid t iming i n t e r f e r e n c e ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e ("pushfl; popl %0; cli\n\t" : "=g" ( f l a g s ) ) ;
benchFn ( r t ) ;
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
benchFn ( r t ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("functn avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 0 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 0 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 1 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
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}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 1 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 2 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 2 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 4 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 4 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 8 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
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kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 8 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 16 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 16 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Plugin 32 args ∗/
for ( j =0; j <2; j++) {
rd t s c ( t1 ) ;
for ( i =0; i<REPEATS; i++) {
kp s t a r t a r g s ( r t ) ;
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kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push int ( rt , 0 ) ;
kp push typed ( rt , r t ) ;
k p c a l l ( rt , idx ) ;
}
rd t s c ( t2 ) ;
i f ( j ) {
t2 −= t1 ;
t2 >>= REP SHIFT ;
kp in f o ("plugin, 32 args, avg clocks: %lu\n" , (unsigned long ) t2 ) ;
}
}
/∗ Resume i n t e r r up t s ∗/
asm v o l a t i l e ("pushl %0; popfl\n\t" : : "g" ( f l a g s ) ) ;
kp unreg sym ( rt , "benchFn" ) ;
}
/∗ Module i n i t f unc t i on ∗/
int i n i t kp demo in i t (void )
{
/∗ Make a runtime s t ru c tu r e ∗/
r t = kp make runtime ("kp-demo" , 64 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ;
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i f ( ! r t ) {
kp in f o ("Cannot allocate runtime!\n" ) ;
return −1;
}
test benchmark ( ) ;
return 0 ;
}
/∗ Module c leanup func t i on ∗/
void e x i t kp demo cleanup (void )
{
/∗ Destroy the runtime s t ru c tu r e ∗/
kp k i l l r un t ime ( r t ) ;
return ;
}
modu le in i t ( kp demo in i t ) ;
module ex i t ( kp demo cleanup ) ;
MODULEAUTHOR("Ivan Ganev <ganev@cc.gatech.edu>" ) ;
MODULE DESCRIPTION("Kernel Plugin Latency Benchmark" ) ;
#ifde f MODULE LICENSE
MODULE LICENSE("GPL" ) ;
#endif
A.2 Throughput Codes
Listing 24: Code measuring the throughput of plain indirect control transfers.
REPT = 1024
.data





.a l ign 32
count :
. l o n g 0x0
.a l ign 32
i n d i r e c t :
. l o n g 0x0
msg1 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop bytes = %lu\n"
msg2 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop cycles = %lu\n"
132
. t e x t
.g lobl main
main :
# repeat twice to warm I&D caches
movl $2 , count
outLoop :
# take s t a r t time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 1
movl %edx,4+ ts1
# setup inner loop r e p e t i t i o n count
movl $REPT,%ecx
IN BEG = .
# compute inner loop
inLoop :
movl $1f , i n d i r e c t
l ea l i n d i r e c t ,%ebx
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
1 :
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)
addl $9 , i n d i r e c t
jmp ∗ (%ebx)





IN LEN = . − IN BEG
# take end time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 2
movl %edx,4+ ts2
# loop outer loop
decl count
jnz outLoop





# div ide by inner loop count
movl $REPT, count
d i v l count





ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp
ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp




Listing 25: Code measuring the throughput of software isolated indirect control transfers.
REPT = 2048
.data





.a l ign 32
count :
. l o n g 0x0
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.a l ign 32
i n d i r e c t :
. l o n g 0x0
msg1 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop bytes = %lu\n"
msg2 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop cycles = %lu\n"
# plac eho ld e r map a l l ow ing a l l jumps
bitmap :
. r e p t 1024
.byte 0 x f f
. endr
. t e x t
.g lobl main
main :
# repeat twice to warm I&D caches
movl $2 , count
outLoop :
# take s t a r t time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 1
movl %edx,4+ ts1
# setup inner loop r e p e t i t i o n count
movl $REPT,%ecx
IN BEG = .
# compute inner loop
inLoop :
movl $1f , i n d i r e c t





ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap










ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap










ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap









ja misa l i gned
bt %ebx , bitmap










movl %eax , t s 2
movl %edx,4+ ts2
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# loop outer loop
decl count
jnz outLoop





# div ide by inner loop count
movl $REPT, count
d i v l count





ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp
ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp








MAX OFFT = . − main
Listing 26: Code measuring the throughput of plain indirect memory references.
REPT = 1024
.data





.a l ign 32
count :
. l o n g 0x0
.a l ign 32
i n d i r e c t :
. r e p t
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. l o n g 0x0
. endr
msg1 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop bytes = %lu\n"
msg2 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop cycles = %lu\n"
. t e x t
.g lobl main
main :
# repeat twice to warm I&D caches
movl $2 , count
outLoop :
# take s t a r t time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 1
movl %edx,4+ ts1
# setup inner loop r e p e t i t i o n count
movl $REPT,%ecx
IN BEG = .
# compute inner loop
inLoop :
xorl %ebx,%ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
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incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
decl %ecx
jnz inLoop
IN LEN = . − IN BEG
# take end time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 2
movl %edx,4+ ts2
# loop outer loop
decl count
jnz outLoop





# div ide by inner loop count
movl $REPT, count
d i v l count





ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp
ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp




Listing 27: Code measuring the throughput of software isolated indirect memory refer-
ences.
REPT = 1024
# placeho lde r s , used f o r t iming purposes only
BIT MASK = 0x0
SEGMENT ID = 0x0
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.data





.a l ign 32
count :
. l o n g 0x0
.a l ign 32
i n d i r e c t :
. r e p t
. l o n g 0x0
. endr
msg1 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop bytes = %lu\n"
msg2 :
. s t r i n g "Inner loop cycles = %lu\n"
. t e x t
.g lobl main
main :
# repeat twice to warm I&D caches
movl $2 , count
outLoop :
# take s t a r t time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 1
movl %edx,4+ ts1
# setup inner loop r e p e t i t i o n count
movl $REPT,%ecx
IN BEG = .




lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax




lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax




lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
incl %ebx
pushl %eax
lea l i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,%eax
andl $BIT MASK,%eax
cmpl $SEGMENT ID,%eax
jne out o f bounds
popl %eax
movl i n d i r e c t ( ,%ebx ,4) ,% es i
decl %ecx
jnz inLoop
IN LEN = . − IN BEG
# take end time−stamp
cpuid
rdtsc
movl %eax , t s 2
movl %edx,4+ ts2
# loop outer loop
decl count
jnz outLoop





# div ide by inner loop count
movl $REPT, count
d i v l count






ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp
ca l l p r i n t f
addl $0x8 ,%esp











This appendix aims to provide the reader with a more complete example of how code
isolation techniques are applied to an application of real-life significance. In particular, we
will demonstrate the techniques on a computational kernel extracted from the Edgebreaker
compression algorithm for 3D triangle mesh graphics models and an image processing engine
combining gray-scaling and edge detection.
B.1 EdgeBreaker
Edgebreaker is a state-of-the-art technique, which makes it a good candidate for use and
embedding in smart graphics devices and their drivers. It is more effective than generic
compression techniques in reducing the amount of triangle mesh description needed in order
to render a 3D object because it exploits knowledge of the internal structure of the mesh
descriptions. Detailed information about the Edgebreaker algorithm can be found in [88, 89].
For purposes of this example we have extracted the compression kernel from Alla Sa-
fonova’s C++ reference implementation [87] and will demonstrate isolation techniques on
select functions from it. The full implementation is rather large and would inflate the size
of this document needlessly and detract from the clarity of the comparison. The complete
code including I/O routines and example input data is available online [87]. Next, we pro-
ceed with Listing 28 providing the C++ source code for the compression kernel from the
reference implementation of the Edgebreaker algorithm.
Listing 28: C++ reference implementation of the compression kernel from the Edgebreaker
triangular 3D mesh compression algorithm.
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ Types ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
struct Coord3D {
f loat x ;
f loat y ;
f loat z ;
} ;
typedef Coord3D Vertex ;
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typedef Coord3D Vector ;
#define MAX SIZE 256
enum MeshType {MANIFOLD, TPATCH} ;
enum FileFormat {BINARY, ASKII } ;
// Var iab l e s f o r s t o r i n g Input OVTable and geometry
extern int∗ O; // Input Opposite t ab l e
extern int∗ V; // Input Vertex i n d i c e s t ab l e
extern Vertex∗ G; // Input Geometry tab l e
extern Vertex∗ G est ; // Input Geometry tab l e
//Compression v a r i a b l e s
extern int T; // t r i a n g l e s count
extern int N; // v e r t i c e s count
extern int ∗M; //Vetex marking array
extern int ∗U; // Tr i ang l e s marking array
extern FileFormat eFileFormat ;
void PrintErrorAndQuit (char∗ sEr ro rS t r i ng ) ;
#define f p r i n t f ( x . . . )
void in i tCompress ion ( int c , MeshType eMeshType ) ;
void Compress ( int c ) ;
void CheckHandle ( int c ) ;
void EncodeDelta ( int c ) ;
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ EB Helper Functions ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
int NextEdge ( int edge ) {
return (3∗ ( edge / 3) + ( edge + 1) % 3 ) ;
}
int PrevEdge ( int edge ) {
return NextEdge (NextEdge ( edge ) ) ;
}
int RightTri ( int c , int∗ O table ) {
// c . r = c . n . r
return O table [ NextEdge ( c ) ] ;
}
int Le f tTr i ( int c , int∗ O table ) {
// c . l = c . n . n . r
return O table [ NextEdge (NextEdge ( c ) ) ] ;
}
int E2T( int edge ) {
return ( edge / 3 ) ;
}




∗ c − s t a r t compress ion from corner c
∗ MeshType : 2 Mesh types are cu r r en t l y supported :
∗ MANIFOLD − i s a mani fo ld mesh , c o n s i s t e n t l y
∗ o r i en t ed with no ho l e s .
∗ TPATCH − i s a mani fo ld mesh with boundary ,
∗ c o n s i s t e n t l y o r i en t ed .
∗ FileFormat : BINARY or ASKII ( See F i l e Formats f o r d e t a i s )
∗
∗/
void in i tCompress ion ( int c , MeshType eMeshType ) {
// i n i t t ab l e s f o r marking v i s i t e d v e r t i c e s and t r i a n g l e s
//was done in Proce s s InputF i l e func t i on
// id o f the l a s t t r i a n g l e compressed so f a r
T = 0 ;
c = PrevEdge ( c ) ;
// es t imate 1 s t ver tex
EncodeDelta (NextEdge ( c ) ) ;
// i f we do not have a ho le mark 1 s t ver tex as v i s i t e d
// in which case e s t imate func t i on can use i t f o r e s t imat i on
// i f we do have a hole , we do not mark 1 s t ver tex as v i s i t e d
//and i t i s not used f o r e s t imat i on s i n c e i t i s a dummy vertex
i f ( eMeshType==MANIFOLD) M[V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] = 1 ;
// es t imate th i rd ver tex and mark i t as v i s i t e d
EncodeDelta ( c ) ;
M[V[ c ] ] = 1 ;
// es t imate second ver tex and mark i t as v i s i t e d
EncodeDelta ( PrevEdge ( c ) ) ;
M[V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] = 1 ;
// pa int the t r i a n g l e
U[E2T( c ) ] = 1 ; // mark the t r i a n g l e as v i s i t e d
// t r av e r s e t r i a n g l e s i n c i d en t on the f i r s t ver tex
//we do not want to s t o r e c l e r s symbols f o r them
int a = O[ c ] ;
//we keep a count o f number o f t r i a n g l e s i n c i d en t on the f i r s t
// corner
int count = 1 ;
// f i r s t t r a v e r s e ’C ’ t r i a n g l e s
while ( a != PrevEdge (O[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ) ) {
// increment count f o r number o f t r i a n g l e s i n c i d en t on
// the f i r s t corner
count++;
// pa int the t r i ang l e , increment # of t r i a n g l e s
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U[E2T( a ) ] = 1 ;
T++;
// es t imate next ver tex and mark i t as v i s i t e d
EncodeDelta ( a ) ;
M[V[ a ] ] = 1 ;
// cont inue with the r i g h t ne ighbor
a = O[ NextEdge ( a ) ] ;
}
// t r av e r s e ’R ’ t r i a n g l e i n c i d en t on f i r s t ver tex
U[E2T( a ) ] = 1 ;
T++;
count++;
// wr i t e mesh type to c l e r s f i l e
i f ( eMeshType == MANIFOLD) {
i f ( eFi leFormat == ASKII )
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%s\n" , "MANIFOLD" ) ;
} else i f ( eMeshType == TPATCH) {
i f ( eFi leFormat == ASKII )
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%d\n" , "TPATCH" ) ;
} else PrintErrorAndQuit ("Not supported mesh type\n" ) ;
// wr i t e number o f t r i a n g l e s i n c i d en t on f i r s t ver tex to c l e r s f i l e
i f ( eFi leFormat == ASKII ) f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%d\n" , ( int ) count ) ;
// s t a r t c onne c t i v i t y compress ion
Compress (O[ PrevEdge ( a ) ] ) ;
}
void Compress ( int c ) {
// s t a r t t r a v e r s a l f o r t r i a n g l e t r e e
do {
//mark the t r i a n g l e as v i s i t e d
U[E2T( c ) ] = 1 ;
T++;
// check f o r handles
CheckHandle ( c ) ;
// t e s t whether t i p ver tex was v i s i t e d
i f (M[V[ c ] ] == 0) {
//append encoding o f C to c l e r s
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%c\n" , ’C’ ) ;
// es t imate next ver tex and mark i t as v i s i t e d
EncodeDelta ( c ) ;
M[V[ c ] ] = 1 ;
// cont inue with the r i g h t ne ighbor
c = RightTri ( c , O) ;
} else
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// t e s t whether r i g h t t r i a n g l e was v i s i t e d
i f (U[E2T( RightTri ( c , O) ) ] > 0) {
// t e s t whether l e f t t r i a n g l e was v i s i t e d
i f (U[E2T( Le f tTr i ( c , O) ) ] > 0) {
//append code f o r E and pop
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%c\n" , ’E’ ) ;
return ;
} else {
//append code f o r R, move to l e f t t r i a n g l e
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%c\n" , ’R’ ) ;
c = Le f tTr i ( c , O) ;
}
} else
// t e s t whether l e f t t r i a n g l e was v i s i t e d
i f (U[E2T( Le f tTr i ( c , O) ) ] > 0) {
//append code f o r L , move to r i g h t t r i a n g l e
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%c\n" , ’L’ ) ;
c = RightTri ( c , O) ;
} else {
// s t o r e corner number in decompression , to support handles
U[E2T( c ) ] = T∗3+2;
//append code f o r S
f p r i n t f ( f c l e r s , "%c\n" , ’S’ ) ;
// r e c u r s i v e c a l l to v i s i t r i g h t branch f i r s t
Compress ( RightTri ( c , O) ) ;
//move to l e f t t r i a n g l e
c = Le f tTr i ( c , O) ;
// i f the t r i a n g l e to the l e f t was v i s i t e d , then return
i f (U[E2T( c )] >0) return ;
}
} while ( true ) ;
}
void CheckHandle ( int c ) {
// check f o r handles from the r i g h t
i f (U[E2T(O[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ) ] >1) {
// wr i t e oppos i t e co rne r s f o r handle t r i a n g l e s i n to f i l e
f p r i n t f ( fhandles , "%d %d\n" , U[E2T(O[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ) ] , T∗3+1);
}
// check f o r handles from the l e f t
i f (U[E2T(O[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ) ] >1) {
// wr i t e oppos i t e co rne r s f o r handle t r i a n g l e s i n to f i l e
f p r i n t f ( fhandles , "%d %d\n" , U[E2T(O[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ) ] , T∗3+2);
}
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ Vector Operat ions f o r Estimate f unc t i on s ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
//Returns v1 − v2
Vector VMinus( Vertex v1 , Vertex v2 ) {
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Vector tempVector ;
tempVector . x = v1 . x − v2 . x ;
tempVector . y = v1 . y − v2 . y ;
tempVector . z = v1 . z − v2 . z ;
return tempVector ;
}
//Returns v1 + v2
Vector VPlus ( Vertex v1 , Vector v2 ) {
Vector tempVector ;
tempVector . x = v2 . x + v1 . x ;
tempVector . y = v2 . y + v1 . y ;




Vector VMult ( Vertex v1 , f loat k ) {
Vector tempVector ;
tempVector . x = v1 . x∗k ;
tempVector . y = v1 . y∗k ;
tempVector . z = v1 . z∗k ;
return tempVector ;
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ Estimate f unc t i on s ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
/∗
∗ This func t i on does not do any pred i c t i on , i t j u s t wr i t e s
∗ v e r t i c e s i n to array
∗/
void EncodeNoPrediction ( int c ) {
// Store ver tex coo rd ina t e s in to f i l e
f p r i n t f ( f v e r t i c e s , "%f %f %f\n" , G[V[ c ] ] . x , G[V[ c ] ] . y , G[V[ c ] ] . z ) ;
}
void EncodeWithPrediction ( int c ) {
Vector vPred , d e l t a ;
Vertex zeroV = {0 . 0 , 0 . 0 , 0 . 0 } ;
i f (M[V[O[ c ] ] ] > 0 && M[V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] > 0) {
vPred = VPlus ( G est [V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] , G est [V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] ) ;
vPred = VMinus( vPred , G est [V[O[ c ] ] ] ) ;
d e l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
// re turn vPred ;
} else i f (M[V[O[ c ] ] ] > 0) {
vPred = VMult ( G est [V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] , 2 ) ;
vPred = VMinus( vPred , G est [V[O[ c ] ] ] ) ;
d e l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
// re turn vPred ;
} else i f (M[V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] > 0 && M[V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] > 0) {
vPred = VPlus ( G est [V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] , G est [V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] ) ;
vPred = VMult ( vPred , 0 . 5 f ) ;
d e l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
// re turn vPred ;
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} else i f (M[V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] > 0) {
vPred = G est [V[ NextEdge ( c ) ] ] ;
d e l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
// re turn vPred ;
} else i f (M[V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] > 0) {
vPred = G est [V[ PrevEdge ( c ) ] ] ;
d e l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
// re turn vPred ;
} else {
vPred = zeroV ;
de l t a = VMinus(G[V[ c ] ] , vPred ) ;
}
G est [V[ c ] ] = VPlus ( de l ta , vPred ) ;
f p r i n t f ( f v e r t i c e s , "%f %f %f\n" , d e l t a . x , d e l t a . y , d e l t a . z ) ;
}
void EncodeDelta ( int c ) {
EncodeNoPrediction ( c ) ;
//EncodeWithPrediction ( c ) ;
}
Even though the C++ source code seems short, the compression kernel results in ap-
proximately 1300 lines of assembly code, so it is impractical to include in this document.
In order to further narrow it down to a size small enough for inclusion we profiled it to
identify a suitable high-impact subset of functions subject to the following requirements:
1. The subset should be computationally representative of the workload in terms of the
number of total instructions executed,
2. The subset should capture interesting behavior, such as cache misses,
3. The subset should translate into assembly code short enough to include in this docu-
ment.
We ran the Edgebreaker compression kernel through the Cachegrind [78, 79] cache pro-
filer while compressing a sample 5804 triangle 3D mesh model downloaded along with the
reference code and shown in Figure 35. The resulting statistics are displayed in Table 6,
where:
• Ir – instructions executed,
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Figure 35: An example 3D triangular mesh model consisting of a 5804 triangles.
• Dr – data reads,
• D1mr – L1 data cache read misses,
• D2mr – L2 data cache read misses,
• Dw – data writes,
• D1mw – L1 data cache write misses,
• D2mw – L2 data cache write misses.
The profile data was collected on an 866 MHz Intel Pentium III with 16 KB 4-way set-
associative L1 I&D caches and a 256 KB 8-way set-associative unified L2 cache. Cacheline
size is 32 bytes.
Despite the fact that the NextEdge() routine contains the largest portion of instructions
executed, the function itself is simple – consisting of a single line of code – and does not
result in interesting cache behavior. Similarly, most of the other functions are either unre-
markable or concerned with I/O, with the exception of Compress() and CheckHandle().
We choose the latter as examples to focus on for the rest of this chapter because they
combine all of the required features – significant contributions to the total compute load
(Ir), interesting cache behavior (D1mr, D2mr, D1mw, D2mw), and relatively small yet
non-trivial implementations.
We continue with a contrasting view between the non-sandboxed and the PittSFIeld-
sandboxed assembly codes for the two chosen routines displayed in Listing 29, and finally, a
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Table 6: Cache profile generated with Cachegrind for the Edgebreaker compression kernel
operating on the triangular 3D mesh from Figure 35.
Ir Dr D1mr D2mr Dw D1mw D2mw Function
1,036,980 207,396 0 0 138,264 0 0 NextEdge()
330,964 55,160 1 0 113,227 1,089 1,087 ProcessInputFile()
256,993 70,089 0 0 23,363 0 0 E2T()
217,916 68,119 5,087 257 114,521 22 1 Compress()
179,800 69,600 6,834 316 69,600 1 0 CheckHandle()
66,600 27,750 12 0 27,750 0 0 LeftTri()
60,984 29,040 2,092 44 20,328 0 0 EncodeNoPrediction()
60,510 30,255 21 0 18,153 0 0 RightTri()
52,254 11,612 0 0 23,224 0 0 PrevEdge()
11,616 2,904 0 0 2,904 0 0 EncodeDelta()
136 50 6 2 62 7 0 initCompression()
78 45 4 4 26 4 2 ProcessArguments()
45 10 0 0 17 0 0 ClearMemoryAndFiles()
27 8 3 3 13 2 1 main()
23 2 0 0 13 2 2 OpenOutputFiles()
similar contrasting view between the non-sandboxed and hybrid-sandboxed assembly codes
in Listing 30.
It is worthwhile to note that while the code inflation cost evident in the PittSFIeld com-
parison is relatively modest, it is reliant on the use, behavior, and correctness, of a particular
compiler, gcc in this case, as well as on the presence of the original source code. Relax-
ing these constraints would increase the applicability of the technique, possibly extending
its use to binary legacy code, but it would also aggravate its code inflation effect. When
semantic information of the legal control transfer points is lost, any instruction boundary
could be one and thus every instruction must be padded into its own chunk, resulting in
much more significant inefficiencies.
Listing 29: Contrast between the non-sandboxed and the PittSFIeld-sandboxed assem-
blies for the CheckHandle() and Compress() routines from the Edgebreaker compression
reference implementation. Note that actual code inflation is not necessarily proportional
to assembly length, as the inserted alignment directives can translate to long or multiple
instructions, e.g., up to CHUNK SIZE-1 bytes.
; ; unsandboxed ; ; P i t tSFIe ld sandboxed
; ; CheckHandle ( ) ; ; CheckHandle ( )
.a l ign 2 .a l ign 2
.p2align 4 , ,15 .p2align 4 , ,15
.g lobl Z11CheckHandlei .g lobl Z11CheckHandlei
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Z11CheckHandlei : .p2align 4
.LFB114 : Z11CheckHandlei :
.LVL13 : .LFB114 :
pushl %ebp .LVL13 :
.LCFI40 : pushl %ebp
.LBB93 : .LCFI40 :
.LBB94 : .LBB93 :
movl $1431655766 , %eax .LBB94 :
.LBE94 : movl $1431655766 , %eax
.LBE93 : .LBE94 :
movl %esp , %ebp .LBE93 :
.LCFI41 : movl %esp , %ebp
pushl %edi .LCFI41 :
.LCFI42 : pushl %edi
pushl %es i .LCFI42 :
.LCFI43 : pushl %es i
subl $32 , %esp .LCFI43 :
.LCFI44 : subl $32 , %esp
movl 8(%ebp ) , %es i .LCFI44 :
.LBB95 : .p2align 4
.LBB96 : movl 8(%ebp ) , %es i
imull %es i .LBB95 :
movl %esi , %ecx .LBB96 :
sarl $31 , %ecx imull %es i
addl $1 , %es i movl %esi , %ecx
movl $1431655766 , %eax sarl $31 , %ecx
movl %esi , −20(%ebp) .p2align 4
subl %ecx , %edx andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
movl −20(%ebp ) , %ecx addl $1 , %es i
l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edi movl $1431655766 , %eax
imull %es i .p2align 4
.LBE96 : movl %esi , −20(%ebp)
.LBE95 : subl %ecx , %edx
movl O, %eax movl −20(%ebp ) , %ecx
.LBB97 : l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edi
.LBB98 : imull %es i
sarl $31 , %ecx .LBE96 :
movl %edx , %es i .LBE95 :
subl %ecx , %es i .p2align 4
l ea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %ecx movl O, %eax
subl %ecx , −20(%ebp) .LBB97 :
movl −20(%ebp ) , %ecx .LBB98 :
.LBE98 : sarl $31 , %ecx
.LBE97 : movl %edx , %es i
movl %eax , −16(%ebp) subl %ecx , %es i
.LBB99 : l ea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %ecx
.LBB100 : .p2align 4
l ea l (%edi ,%ecx ) , %es i subl %ecx , −20(%ebp)
.LBE100 : movl −20(%ebp ) , %ecx
.LBE99 : .LBE98 :
movl (%eax,%esi , 4 ) , %edi .LBE97 :
movl $1431655766 , %eax movl %eax , −16(%ebp)
imull %edi .LBB99 :
movl U, %eax .LBB100 :
154
sarl $31 , %edi lea l (%edi ,%ecx ) , %es i
movl %edx , %ecx .LBE100 :
subl %edi , %ecx .LBE99 :
movl (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %edx .p2align 4
movl %eax , −12(%ebp) movl (%eax,%esi , 4 ) , %edi
cmpl $1 , %edx movl $1431655766 , %eax
j l e .L43 imull %edi
.LVL14 : .p2align 4
movl T, %eax movl U, %eax
movl %edx , 8(%esp ) sarl $31 , %edi
movl $.LC6 , 4(%esp ) movl %edx , %ecx
lea l 1(%eax,%eax , 2 ) , %eax subl %edi , %ecx
movl %eax , 12(%esp ) movl (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %edx
movl fhandles , %eax .p2align 4
movl %eax , (%esp ) movl %eax , −12(%ebp)
ca l l f p r i n t f cmpl $1 , %edx
movl O, %edx j l e .L43
movl U, %ecx .LVL14 :
movl %edx , −16(%ebp) .p2align 4
movl %ecx , −12(%ebp) movl T, %eax
.L43 : movl %edx , 8(%esp )
movl $1431655766 , %eax .p2align 4
imull %es i movl $.LC6 , 4(%esp )
movl %esi , %eax lea l 1(%eax,%eax , 2 ) , %eax
sarl $31 , %eax movl %eax , 12(%esp )
l ea l 1(%es i ) , %ecx .p2align 4
movl %edx , %edi movl fhandles , %eax
subl %eax , %edi movl %eax , (%esp )
movl $1431655766 , %eax .p2align 4
imull %ecx .byte 0x8d , 0xb4 , 0x26 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
movl %ecx , %eax .byte 0x8d , 0x74 , 0x26 , 0
sarl $31 , %eax ca l l f p r i n t f
movl %edx , %es i movl O, %edx
subl %eax , %es i movl U, %ecx
lea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %eax movl %edx , −16(%ebp)
subl %eax , %ecx .p2align 4
l ea l (%edi ,%edi , 2 ) , %eax movl %ecx , −12(%ebp)
addl %ecx , %eax .p2align 4
movl −16(%ebp ) , %ecx .L43 :
movl (%ecx ,%eax , 4 ) , %es i movl $1431655766 , %eax
movl $1431655766 , %eax imull %es i
imull %es i movl %esi , %eax
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax sarl $31 , %eax
sarl $31 , %es i .p2align 4
movl %edx , %ecx lea l 1(%es i ) , %ecx
subl %esi , %ecx movl %edx , %edi
movl (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %edx subl %eax , %edi
cmpl $1 , %edx movl $1431655766 , %eax
j l e .L47 imull %ecx
movl T, %eax .p2align 4
movl %edx , 8(%esp ) movl %ecx , %eax
movl $.LC6 , 4(%esp ) sarl $31 , %eax
lea l 2(%eax,%eax , 2 ) , %eax movl %edx , %es i
movl %eax , 12(%esp ) subl %eax , %es i
155
movl fhandles , %eax lea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %eax
movl %eax , (%esp ) subl %eax , %ecx
ca l l f p r i n t f .p2align 4
.L47 : l ea l (%edi ,%edi , 2 ) , %eax
addl $32 , %esp addl %ecx , %eax
popl %es i movl −16(%ebp ) , %ecx
popl %edi movl (%ecx ,%eax , 4 ) , %es i
popl %ebp .p2align 4
ret movl $1431655766 , %eax
.LFE114 : imull %es i
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax
sarl $31 , %es i
.p2align 4
movl %edx , %ecx
subl %esi , %ecx
movl (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %edx
cmpl $1 , %edx
j l e .L47
.p2align 4
movl T, %eax
movl %edx , 8(%esp )
.p2align 4
movl $.LC6 , 4(%esp )
l ea l 2(%eax,%eax , 2 ) , %eax
movl %eax , 12(%esp )
.p2align 4
movl fhandles , %eax
movl %eax , (%esp )
.p2align 4
.byte 0x8d , 0xb4 , 0x26 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
.byte 0x8d , 0x74 , 0x26 , 0
ca l l f p r i n t f
.p2align 4
.L47 :




andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp
.p2align 4
andl $ 0 x 1 0 f f f f f 0 , (%esp )
ret
.LFE114 :
; ; unsandboxed ; ; P i t tSFIe ld sandboxed
; ; Compress ( ) ; ; Compress ( )
.a l ign 2 .a l ign 2
.p2align 4 , ,15 .p2align 4 , ,15
.g lobl Z8Compressi .g lobl Z8Compressi
Z8Compressi : .p2align 4
.LFB8 : Z8Compressi :
.LVL22 : .LFB8 :
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pushl %ebp .LVL22 :
.LCFI39 : pushl %ebp
movl %esp , %ebp .LCFI39 :
.LCFI40 : movl %esp , %ebp
pushl %edi .LCFI40 :
.LCFI41 : pushl %edi
pushl %es i .LCFI41 :
.LCFI42 : pushl %es i
subl $44 , %esp .LCFI42 :
.LCFI43 : subl $44 , %esp
movl U, %eax .LCFI43 :
movl V, %ecx movl U, %eax
movl O, %edx .p2align 4
movl 8(%ebp ) , %edi movl V, %ecx
movl %eax , −36(%ebp) movl O, %edx
movl %ecx , −40(%ebp) movl 8(%ebp ) , %edi
movl %eax , %ecx .p2align 4
movl %edx , −32(%ebp) movl %eax , −36(%ebp)
jmp .L43 movl %ecx , −40(%ebp)
.LVL23 : movl %eax , %ecx
.p2align 4 , ,7 movl %edx , −32(%ebp)
.L54 : .p2align 4
movl $1 , (%eax ) andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
.LBB379 : jmp .L43
.LBB380 : .LVL23 :
movl −20(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4 , ,7
movl (%eax ) , %ecx .p2align 4
.L45 : .L54 :
.LBE380 : l ea l (%eax ) , %ebx
.LBE379 : .p2align 4
movl %ecx , %edi andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx
movl −36(%ebp ) , %ecx movl $1 , (%ebx)
.LVL24 : .LBB379 :
.L43 : .LBB380 :
.LBB381 : movl −20(%ebp ) , %eax
.LBB382 : .p2align 4
movl $1431655766 , %eax movl (%eax ) , %ecx
imull %edi .p2align 4
movl %edi , %eax .L45 :
sarl $31 , %eax .LBE380 :
subl %eax , %edx .LBE379 :
.LBE382 : movl %ecx , %edi
.LBE381 : movl −36(%ebp ) , %ecx
lea l (%ecx ,%edx , 4 ) , %ecx .LVL24 :
movl $1 , (%ecx ) .p2align 4
movl T, %eax .L43 :
.LBB383 : .LBB381 :
.LBB384 : .LBB382 :
.LBB385 : movl $1431655766 , %eax
.LBB386 : imull %edi
lea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %es i movl %edi , %eax
lea l 1(%edi ) , %edx sarl $31 , %eax
movl %edx , −48(%ebp) subl %eax , %edx
.LBE386 : .LBE382 :
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.LBE385 : .LBE381 :
.LBE384 : .p2align 4
.LBE383 : l ea l (%ecx ,%edx , 4 ) , %ecx
movl %ecx , −28(%ebp) l ea l (%ecx ) , %ebx
.LBB387 : .p2align 4
.LBB388 : andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx
.LBB389 : movl $1 , (%ebx)
.LBB390 : .p2align 4
movl −48(%ebp ) , %ecx movl T, %eax
.LBE390 : .LBB383 :
.LBE389 : .LBB384 :
.LBE388 : .LBB385 :
.LBE387 : .LBB386 :
addl $1 , %eax lea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %es i
movl %eax , T l ea l 1(%edi ) , %edx
movl %eax , −24(%ebp) movl %edx , −48(%ebp)
.LBB391 : .LBE386 :
.LBB392 : .LBE385 :
.LBB393 : .LBE384 :
.LBB394 : .LBE383 :
movl $1431655766 , %eax .p2align 4
imull %edx movl %ecx , −28(%ebp)
.LBE394 : .LBB387 :
.LBE393 : .LBB388 :
movl −32(%ebp ) , %eax .LBB389 :
.LBB395 : .LBB390 :
.LBB396 : movl −48(%ebp ) , %ecx
sarl $31 , %ecx .LBE390 :
subl %ecx , %edx .LBE389 :
l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edx .LBE388 :
subl %edx , −48(%ebp) .LBE387 :
movl −48(%ebp ) , %edx addl $1 , %eax
lea l (%esi ,%edx ) , %ecx movl %eax , T
.LBE396 : .p2align 4
.LBE395 : movl %eax , −24(%ebp)
l ea l (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %eax .LBB391 :
movl (%eax ) , %edx .LBB392 :
movl %eax , −20(%ebp) .LBB393 :
movl $1431655766 , %eax .LBB394 :
movl %edx , −12(%ebp) movl $1431655766 , %eax
imull %edx imull %edx
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax .LBE394 :
sarl $31 , %eax .LBE393 :
subl %eax , %edx movl −32(%ebp ) , %eax
movl −36(%ebp ) , %eax .LBB395 :
movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %edx .LBB396 :
movl $1431655766 , %eax .p2align 4
movl %edx , −16(%ebp) sarl $31 , %ecx
imull %ecx subl %ecx , %edx
movl %ecx , %eax lea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edx
sarl $31 , %eax subl %edx , −48(%ebp)
addl $1 , %ecx movl −48(%ebp ) , %edx
subl %eax , %edx .p2align 4
movl $1431655766 , %eax lea l (%esi ,%edx ) , %ecx
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l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %es i .LBE396 :
imull %ecx .LBE395 :
movl %ecx , %eax lea l (%eax,%ecx , 4 ) , %eax
sarl $31 , %eax movl (%eax ) , %edx
subl %eax , %edx movl %eax , −20(%ebp)
movl $1431655766 , %eax .p2align 4
l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edx movl $1431655766 , %eax
subl %edx , %ecx movl %edx , −12(%ebp)
movl −32(%ebp ) , %edx imull %edx
addl %ecx , %es i movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax
movl (%edx,%esi , 4 ) , %ecx .p2align 4
.LVL25 : sarl $31 , %eax
imull %ecx subl %eax , %edx
movl %ecx , %eax movl −36(%ebp ) , %eax
sarl $31 , %eax movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %edx
subl %eax , %edx .p2align 4
movl −36(%ebp ) , %eax movl $1431655766 , %eax
movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %edx movl %edx , −16(%ebp)
movl %edx , −44(%ebp) imull %ecx
.LBE392 : movl %ecx , %eax
.LBE391 : .p2align 4
movl −40(%ebp ) , %edx sarl $31 , %eax
movl (%edx,%edi , 4 ) , %eax addl $1 , %ecx
sa l l $2 , %eax subl %eax , %edx
addl M, %eax movl $1431655766 , %eax
movl (%eax ) , %edx .p2align 4
test l %edx , %edx lea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %es i
je .L54 imull %ecx
movl −16(%ebp ) , %eax movl %ecx , %eax
test l %eax , %eax sarl $31 , %eax
j l e .L48 subl %eax , %edx
movl −44(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
test l %eax , %eax movl $1431655766 , %eax
j l e .L45 l ea l (%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %edx
.L52 : subl %edx , %ecx
addl $44 , %esp movl −32(%ebp ) , %edx
popl %es i addl %ecx , %es i
popl %edi .p2align 4
.LVL26 : movl (%edx,%esi , 4 ) , %ecx
popl %ebp .LVL25 :
ret imull %ecx
.LVL27 : movl %ecx , %eax
.p2align 4 , ,7 sarl $31 , %eax
.L48 : subl %eax , %edx
movl −44(%ebp ) , %eax movl −36(%ebp ) , %eax
movl −12(%ebp ) , %ecx .p2align 4
test l %eax , %eax movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %edx
jg .L45 movl %edx , −44(%ebp)
movl −24(%ebp ) , %edx .LBE392 :
movl −28(%ebp ) , %ecx .LBE391 :
.LVL28 : movl −40(%ebp ) , %edx
lea l 2(%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %eax movl (%edx,%edi , 4 ) , %eax
movl −20(%ebp ) , %edx sa l l $2 , %eax
movl %eax , (%ecx ) .p2align 4
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movl (%edx ) , %eax addl M, %eax
movl %eax , (%esp ) movl (%eax ) , %edx
ca l l Z8Compressi test l %edx , %edx
.LBB397 : .p2align 4
.LBB398 : je .L54
movl O, %ecx movl −16(%ebp ) , %eax
.LBE398 : test l %eax , %eax
.LBE397 : .p2align 4
movl $1431655766 , %eax j l e .L48
.LBB399 : movl −44(%ebp ) , %eax
.LBB400 : test l %eax , %eax
movl %ecx , −32(%ebp) .p2align 4
movl (%ecx ,%esi , 4 ) , %ecx j l e .L45
.LVL29 : .p2align 4
.LBE400 : .L52 :
.LBE399 : addl $44 , %esp
imull %ecx popl %es i
movl %ecx , %eax popl %edi
sarl $31 , %eax .LVL26 :
subl %eax , %edx popl %ebp
movl U, %eax andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp
movl %eax , −36(%ebp) .p2align 4
movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %eax andl $ 0 x 1 0 f f f f f 0 , (%esp )
test l %eax , %eax ret
jg .L52 .LVL27 :
movl V, %eax .p2align 4 , ,7
movl %eax , −40(%ebp) .p2align 4
jmp .L45 .L48 :
.LFE8 : movl −44(%ebp ) , %eax
movl −12(%ebp ) , %ecx
test l %eax , %eax
jg .L45
.p2align 4
movl −24(%ebp ) , %edx
movl −28(%ebp ) , %ecx
.LVL28 :
l ea l 2(%edx,%edx , 2 ) , %eax
movl −20(%ebp ) , %edx
.p2align 4
l ea l (%ecx ) , %ebx
.p2align 4
andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx
movl %eax , (%ebx)
movl (%edx ) , %eax
.p2align 4
movl %eax , (%esp )
.p2align 4
.byte 0x8d , 0xb4 , 0x26 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
.byte 0x8d , 0x74 , 0x26 , 0







movl $1431655766 , %eax
.LBB399 :
.LBB400 :
movl %ecx , −32(%ebp)
.p2align 4





movl %ecx , %eax
sarl $31 , %eax
subl %eax , %edx
.p2align 4
movl U, %eax
movl %eax , −36(%ebp)
movl (%eax,%edx , 4 ) , %eax








Also of note is the negligible amount of code inflation between the non-sandboxed and
the hybrid-sandboxed codes, readily apparent in the next listing below. Of course, it is
partially offset by the presence of the bitmap of valid control transfer targets (or valid
instruction boundaries) at the end of each function. As opposed to the true code inflation
of padding instruction, however, the bitmap has no effect on the execution of regular code
such as the functions in Listing 30. Moreover, because of their lack of indirect control
transfer instructions, their control flow is sandboxed statically at load time and their unused
bitmaps can safely be discarded.
It also bears repeating, that the merits of the hybrid isolation approach lie not only in
its avoidance of code inflation, but in its ability to simultaneously provide the full flexibility
of software fault isolation while minimizing its costs.
Listing 30: Contrast between the non-sandboxed and the hybrid-sandboxed assemblies
for the CheckHandle() and Compress() routines from the Edgebreaker compression refer-
ence implementation. Note the bitmap of valid control transfer points at the end of both
functions, which is computed, along with any required code instrumentation, at load time.
; ; unsandboxed ; ; hybrid sandboxed
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; ; CheckHandle ( ) ; ; CheckHandle ( )
CheckHandle : CheckHandle :
push %ebp push %ebp
mov %esp ,%ebp mov %esp ,%ebp
sub $0x28 ,%esp sub $0x28 ,%esp
mov %edi ,−4(%ebp) mov %edi ,−4(%ebp)
mov 0x8(%ebp) ,%edi mov 0x8(%ebp) ,%edi
mov %ebx,−12(%ebp) mov %ebx,−12(%ebp)
mov %esi ,−8(%ebp) mov %esi ,−8(%ebp)
mov %edi ,(%esp ) mov %edi ,(%esp )
ca l l NextEdge ca l l NextEdge
mov O,%es i mov O,%es i
mov (%esi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax mov (%esi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,%edx mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,%edx
cmp $0x1 ,%edx cmp $0x1 ,%edx
j l e L1 j l e L1
mov T,%eax mov T,%eax
mov %edx , 0 x8(%esp ) mov %edx , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT1,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT1,0 x4(%esp )
lea 0x1(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax lea 0x1(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax
mov %eax , 0 xc(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 xc(%esp )
mov fhandles ,%eax mov fhandles ,%eax
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
mov O,%es i mov O,%es i
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
L1 : L1 :
mov %edi ,(%esp ) mov %edi ,(%esp )
ca l l PrevEdge ca l l PrevEdge
mov (%esi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax mov (%esi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,%edx mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,%edx
cmp $0x1 ,%edx cmp $0x1 ,%edx
j l e L2 j l e L2
mov T,%eax mov T,%eax
mov %edx , 0 x8(%esp ) mov %edx , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT1,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT1,0 x4(%esp )
lea 0x2(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax lea 0x2(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax
mov %eax , 0 xc(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 xc(%esp )
mov fhandles ,%eax mov fhandles ,%eax
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
L2 : L2 :
mov −12(%ebp) ,%ebx mov −12(%ebp) ,%ebx
mov −8(%ebp) ,% es i mov −8(%ebp) ,% es i
mov −4(%ebp) ,%edi mov −4(%ebp) ,%edi
mov %ebp,%esp mov %ebp,%esp




lea 0x0(%es i ) ,% es i nop
lea 0x0(%es i ) ,% es i
CheckHandle tgtmap :
.byte 0x4b , 0 x92 , 0 x24 , 0 x04
.byte 0x49 , 0 x08 , 0 x92 , 0 x42
.byte 0x04 , 0 x44 , 0 x84 , 0 x84
.byte 0x20 , 0 x48 , 0 x48 , 0 x42
.byte 0x52 , 0 x88 , 0 x80 , 0 x88
.byte 0x90 , 0 x90 , 0 xa4 , 0 x19
.byte 00
; ; unsandboxed ; ; hybrid sandboxed
; ; Compress ( ) ; ; Compress ( )
Compress : Compress :
push %ebp push %ebp
mov %esp ,%ebp mov %esp ,%ebp
push %edi push %edi
push %es i push %es i
push %ebx push %ebx
sub $0x1c ,%esp sub $0x1c ,%esp
mov 0x8(%ebp) ,% es i mov 0x8(%ebp) ,% es i
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
L1 : L1 :
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
movl $0x1 ,(%ebx,%eax , 4 ) movl $0x1 ,(%ebx,%eax , 4 )
mov %eax,−16(%ebp) mov %eax,−16(%ebp)
addl $0x1 ,T addl $0x1 ,T
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
ca l l CheckHandle ca l l CheckHandle
mov V,%eax mov V,%eax
mov (%eax,%esi ,4) ,%edx mov (%eax,%esi ,4) ,%edx
mov M,%eax mov M,%eax
mov (%eax,%edx ,4) ,%eax mov (%eax,%edx ,4) ,%eax
test %eax,%eax test %eax,%eax
je L2 je L2
mov O,%ebx mov O,%ebx
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov U,%edi mov U,%edi
mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l RightTri ca l l RightTri
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax
test %eax,%eax test %eax,%eax
j l e L3 j l e L3
mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp )
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
ca l l Le f tTr i ca l l Le f tTr i
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
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ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax
test %eax,%eax test %eax,%eax
jg L5 jg L5
mov f c l e r s ,%eax mov f c l e r s ,%eax
movl $0x52 , 0 x8(%esp ) movl $0x52 , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp )
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
mov O,%eax mov O,%eax
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l Le f tTr i ca l l Le f tTr i
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
mov %eax,%es i mov %eax,%es i
jmp L1 jmp L1
L2 : L2 :
mov f c l e r s ,%eax mov f c l e r s ,%eax
movl $0x43 , 0 x8(%esp ) movl $0x43 , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp )
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
ca l l EncodeDelta ca l l EncodeDelta
mov V,%eax mov V,%eax
mov (%eax,%esi ,4) ,%edx mov (%eax,%esi ,4) ,%edx
mov M,%eax mov M,%eax
movl $0x1 ,(%eax,%edx , 4 ) movl $0x1 ,(%eax,%edx , 4 )
mov O,%eax mov O,%eax
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l RightTri ca l l RightTri
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
mov %eax,%es i mov %eax,%es i
jmp L1 jmp L1
L3 : L3 :
mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %ebx , 0 x4(%esp )
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
ca l l Le f tTr i ca l l Le f tTr i
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax mov (%edi ,%eax ,4) ,%eax
test %eax,%eax test %eax,%eax
j l e L4 j l e L4
mov f c l e r s ,%eax mov f c l e r s ,%eax
movl $0x4c , 0 x8(%esp ) movl $0x4c , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp )
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
mov O,%eax mov O,%eax
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l RightTri ca l l RightTri
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
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mov %eax,%es i mov %eax,%es i
jmp L1 jmp L1
L4 : L4 :
mov T,%eax mov T,%eax
mov −16(%ebp) ,%edx mov −16(%ebp) ,%edx
lea 0x2(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax lea 0x2(%eax,%eax ,2) ,%eax
mov %eax ,(%edi ,%edx , 4 ) mov %eax ,(%edi ,%edx , 4 )
mov f c l e r s ,%eax mov f c l e r s ,%eax
movl $0x53 , 0 x8(%esp ) movl $0x53 , 0 x8(%esp )
movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp ) movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp )
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f ca l l f p r i n t f
mov O,%eax mov O,%eax
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l RightTri ca l l RightTri
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
ca l l Compress ca l l Compress
mov O,%eax mov O,%eax
mov %esi ,(%esp ) mov %esi ,(%esp )
mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp ) mov %eax , 0 x4(%esp )
ca l l Le f tTr i ca l l Le f tTr i
mov %eax ,(%esp ) mov %eax ,(%esp )
mov %eax,%es i mov %eax,%es i
ca l l E2T ca l l E2T
mov U,%ebx mov U,%ebx
mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,% edi mov (%ebx,%eax ,4) ,% edi
test %edi ,%edi test %edi ,%edi
j l e L1 j l e L1
add $0x1c ,%esp add $0x1c ,%esp
pop %ebx pop %ebx
pop %es i pop %es i
pop %edi pop %edi
pop %ebp pop %ebp
ret ud2a
mov f c l e r s ,%eax ret
movl $0x45 , 0 x8(%esp ) mov f c l e r s ,%eax
movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp ) movl $0x45 , 0 x8(%esp )
mov %eax ,(%esp ) movl $FMT2,0 x4(%esp )
ca l l f p r i n t f mov %eax ,(%esp )
add $0x1c ,%esp ca l l f p r i n t f
L5 : add $0x1c ,%esp
pop %ebx L5 :
pop %es i pop %ebx
pop %edi pop %es i
pop %ebp pop %edi
ret pop %ebp
nop ud2a
lea 0x0(%es i ) ,% es i ret
nop
lea 0x0(%es i ) ,% es i
Compress tgtmap :
.byte 0x7b , 0 x12 , 0 x24 , 0 x04
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.byte 0x12 , 0 x48 , 0 x08 , 0 x09
.byte 0x29 , 0 x08 , 0 x12 , 0 x44
.byte 0x48 , 0 x48 , 0 x41 , 0 x24
.byte 0x24 , 0 xa4 , 0 x20 , 0 x04
.byte 0x04 , 0 x24 , 0 x84 , 0 x44
.byte 0x08 , 0 x0a , 0 x21 , 0 x20
.byte 0x20 , 0 x21 , 0 x21 , 0 x24
.byte 0x04 , 0 x42 , 0 x22 , 0 x04
.byte 0x85 , 0 x48 , 0 x48 , 0 x48
.byte 0x85 , 0 x80 , 0 x80 , 0 x84
.byte 0x90 , 0 x08 , 0 x41 , 0 x21
.byte 0x24 , 0 x12 , 0 x02 , 0 x02
.byte 0x12 , 0 x42 , 0 x22 , 0 x24
.byte 0x84 , 0 x44 , 0 x48 , 0 x21
.byte 0x48 , 0 x41 , 0 x3e , 0 x21
.byte 0x20 , 0 x20 , 0 x21 , 0 x9f
.byte 0x01
B.2 GrayEdge
GrayEdge, our second example, is an image transcoding kernel for the CameraCast ex-
tensible remote video sensor system [52]. It consists of two consecutive steps: (a) image
gray-scaling, and (b) edge detection. As with the EdgeBreaker example, the listings for
the full kernel would be too unwieldy to include in their entirety, so we will focus on the
relatively shorter gray-scaling part.
The logic and points of our argument are shared with the ones already presented in the
previous section, so we will not repeat them, but rather focus on the important differences.
Unlike EdgeBreaker, the structure of the image transcoding kernel is more monolithic,
consisting of only two but larger functions, and exhibiting a less conditional and more cyclic
structure. This is typical in graphics codes where transformations often process the image
one pixel at a time and iterate over the entire frame.
The outcome is a relatively simple assembly that, which unfortunately, is heavily mem-
ory bound and results in a large number of cache read and/or write misses as evidenced in
Table 7. That is largely due to the size of its input and output data (the video frames) and
despite the good spatial locality of the sequence of accesses.
From an isolation technique’s point of view, however, the GrayEdge code, shown in
Listing 31, plays directly to the strengths of the hybrid approach. Because of its looping
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Table 7: Cache profile generated with Cachegrind for the gray-scaling and edge detection
image processing kernel operating on the image from Figure 31.
Ir Dr D1mr D2mr Dw D1mw D2mw Function
9,527,536 4,917,605 28,800 28,800 307,685 9,600 9,600 grayImage()
39,085,773 20,643,798 9,560 9,560 2,032,467 9,581 9,581 edgeImage()
structure, it exhibits a large number of indirect memory reference instruction (by the number
of their execution) and almost no indirect control transfer instructions, save for the two
function returns, and even those are only executed but once each. Thus, GrayEdge comes
close to being the perfect candidate for hybrid code isolation and achieves an almost native
execution speed as already demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Listing 31: Integer arithmetic C implementation of the gray-scaling routine from the
GrayEdge image transcoding kernel.
int grayImage (unsigned char ∗ in , unsigned char ∗ out , int x , int y )
{
int co l , row , indx , outIndx ;
indx = 0 ;
outIndx = 0 ;
for ( row = 0 ; row < y ; ++row ) {
for ( c o l = 0 ; c o l < x ; ++co l ) {
out [ outIndx ] =
(unsigned char ) (1 ∗ ( in [ indx ] >> 2) +
5 ∗ ( in [ indx+1] >> 3) +
1 ∗ ( in [ indx+2] >> 3 ) ) ;






In the remainder of this section, we provide comparison assembly listings for the non-
sandboxed vs. PittSFIeld-sandboxed and non-sandboxed vs. hybrid-sandboxed gray-scaling
routine shown above.
Listing 32: Contrast between the non-sandboxed and the PittSFIeld-sandboxed assemblies
for the grayImage() routine from the GrayEdge image processing benchmark.
; ; unsandboxed ; ; P i t tSFIe ld sandboxed
; ; grayImage ( ) ; ; grayImage ( )
.g lobl grayImage .p2align 4 , ,15
grayImage : .g lobl grayImage
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pushl %ebp .p2align 4
movl %esp , %ebp grayImage :
pushl %ebx pushl %ebp
subl $16 , %esp movl %esp , %ebp
movl $0 , −12(%ebp) pushl %edi
movl $0 , −8(%ebp) pushl %es i
movl $0 , −16(%ebp) subl $12 , %esp
jmp .L2 movl 20(%ebp ) , %edx
.L3 : .p2align 4
movl $0 , −20(%ebp) andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
jmp .L4 test l %edx , %edx
.L5 : j l e . L2 f
movl −8(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
movl %eax , %ecx movl $0 , −16(%ebp)
addl 12(%ebp ) , %ecx movl $0 , −12(%ebp)
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
addl 8(%ebp ) , %eax movl $0 , −20(%ebp)
movzbl (%eax ) , %eax .p2align 4 , ,7
movl %eax , %ebx .p2align 4
shrb $2 , %bl .L4 :
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax movl 16(%ebp ) , %eax
addl 8(%ebp ) , %eax test l %eax , %eax
addl $1 , %eax j l e . L7 f
movzbl (%eax ) , %eax movl −16(%ebp ) , %ecx
shrb $3 , %al xorl %esi , %es i
movzbl %al , %edx .p2align 4
movl %edx , %eax movl −12(%ebp ) , %edi
sa l l $2 , %eax addl 8(%ebp ) , %ecx
addl %edx , %eax addl 12(%ebp ) , %edi
lea l (%ebx,%eax ) , %edx .p2align 4 , ,7
movl −12(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
addl 8(%ebp ) , %eax .L5 :
addl $2 , %eax movzbl 2(%ecx ) , %edx
movzbl (%eax ) , %eax addl $1 , %es i
shrb $3 , %al movzbl (%ecx ) , %eax
lea l (%edx,%eax ) , %eax .p2align 4
movb %al , (%ecx ) shrb $3 , %dl
addl $3 , −12(%ebp) shrb $2 , %al
addl $1 , −8(%ebp) .p2align 4
addl $1 , −20(%ebp) addl %eax , %edx
.L4 : movzbl 1(%ecx ) , %eax
movl −20(%ebp ) , %eax addl $3 , %ecx
cmpl 16(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
j l .L5 shrb $3 , %al
addl $1 , −16(%ebp) movzbl %al , %eax
.L2 : l ea l (%eax,%eax , 4 ) , %eax
movl −16(%ebp ) , %eax addl %eax , %edx
cmpl 20(%ebp ) , %eax .p2align 4
j l .L3 l ea l (%edi ) , %ebx
movl $0 , %eax .p2align 4
addl $16 , %esp andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx
popl %ebx movb %dl , (%ebx)
popl %ebp addl $1 , %edi
ret .p2align 4
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cmpl 16(%ebp ) , %es i
jne . L5 f
l ea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %eax
addl %esi , −12(%ebp)
.p2align 4
addl %eax , −16(%ebp)
.p2align 4
.L7 :
addl $1 , −20(%ebp)
movl 20(%ebp ) , %eax
cmpl %eax , −20(%ebp)
.p2align 4
jne . L4 f
.p2align 4
.L2 :
addl $12 , %esp




andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp
.p2align 4
andl $ 0 x 1 0 f f f f f 0 , (%esp )
ret
Listing 33: Contrast between the non-sandboxed and the hybrid-sandboxed assemblies for
the grayImage() routine from the GrayEdge image processing benchmark.
; ; unsandboxed ; ; hybrid sandboxed
; ; grayImage ( ) ; ; grayImage ( )
.p2align 4 , ,15 .p2align 4 , ,15
.g lobl grayImage .g lobl grayImage
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
grayImage : grayImage :
pushl %ebp pushl %ebp
movl %esp , %ebp movl %esp , %ebp
pushl %edi pushl %edi
pushl %es i pushl %es i
subl $12 , %esp subl $12 , %esp
movl 20(%ebp ) , %edx movl 20(%ebp ) , %edx
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %esp
test l %edx , %edx test l %edx , %edx
j l e . L2 f j l e . L2 f
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
movl $0 , −16(%ebp) movl $0 , −16(%ebp)
movl $0 , −12(%ebp) movl $0 , −12(%ebp)
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
movl $0 , −20(%ebp) movl $0 , −20(%ebp)
.p2align 4 , ,7 .p2align 4 , ,7
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
.L4 : .L4 :
movl 16(%ebp ) , %eax movl 16(%ebp ) , %eax
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test l %eax , %eax test l %eax , %eax
j l e . L7 f j l e . L7 f
movl −16(%ebp ) , %ecx movl −16(%ebp ) , %ecx
xorl %esi , %es i xorl %esi , %es i
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
movl −12(%ebp ) , %edi movl −12(%ebp ) , %edi
addl 8(%ebp ) , %ecx addl 8(%ebp ) , %ecx
addl 12(%ebp ) , %edi addl 12(%ebp ) , %edi
.p2align 4 , ,7 .p2align 4 , ,7
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
.L5 : .L5 :
movzbl 2(%ecx ) , %edx movzbl 2(%ecx ) , %edx
addl $1 , %es i addl $1 , %es i
movzbl (%ecx ) , %eax movzbl (%ecx ) , %eax
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
shrb $3 , %dl shrb $3 , %dl
shrb $2 , %al shrb $2 , %al
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
addl %eax , %edx addl %eax , %edx
movzbl 1(%ecx ) , %eax movzbl 1(%ecx ) , %eax
addl $3 , %ecx addl $3 , %ecx
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
shrb $3 , %al shrb $3 , %al
movzbl %al , %eax movzbl %al , %eax
lea l (%eax,%eax , 4 ) , %eax lea l (%eax,%eax , 4 ) , %eax
addl %eax , %edx addl %eax , %edx
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
l ea l (%edi ) , %ebx lea l (%edi ) , %ebx
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebx
movb %dl , (%ebx) movb %dl , (%ebx)
addl $1 , %edi addl $1 , %edi
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
cmpl 16(%ebp ) , %es i cmpl 16(%ebp ) , %es i
jne . L5 f jne . L5 f
l ea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %eax lea l (%esi ,%esi , 2 ) , %eax
addl %esi , −12(%ebp) addl %esi , −12(%ebp)
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
addl %eax , −16(%ebp) addl %eax , −16(%ebp)
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
.L7 : .L7 :
addl $1 , −20(%ebp) addl $1 , −20(%ebp)
movl 20(%ebp ) , %eax movl 20(%ebp ) , %eax
cmpl %eax , −20(%ebp) cmpl %eax , −20(%ebp)
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
jne . L4 f jne . L4 f
.p2align 4 .p2align 4
.L2 : .L2 :
addl $12 , %esp addl $12 , %esp
xorl %eax , %eax xorl %eax , %eax
popl %es i popl %es i
popl %edi popl %edi
popl %ebp popl %ebp
andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp andl $ 0 x 2 0 f f f f f f , %ebp
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.p2align 4 .p2align 4
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